FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL
1927

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 5 APRIL, 1927 No. 3

VESTED RIGHTS AND NATIONALISM IN LATIN-AMERICA

By Walter Lippmann

THE advance of American business interests into Central and South America has now reached a point where it may soon become necessary to formulate a policy as momentous as the Monroe Doctrine itself. This new policy is now in the making. The problem which it is meant to solve is the conflict between the vested rights of Americans in the natural resources of the Caribbean countries and the rising nationalism of their peoples. The problem could not have arisen before Americans had acquired titles to important properties and had invested large sums of money in developing them; nor could the problem have arisen while government of these countries was in the hands of a ruling class which conceived its interests to be those of the foreign owners of natural resources. The establishment of large American interests at a time when nationalist feeling has begun to run high has created the situation which now perplexes us in Mexico and may perplex us tomorrow in Venezuela, Colombia and elsewhere.

This is not a simple problem. We have become exporters of capital, and we are called upon to decide what is to be the attitude of the United States Government towards that exported capital when a foreign government subjects the property of American citizens to new and drastic social regulation.

II

Until quite recently the clear and dominating purpose of American policy has been to find national security. The declaration of President Monroe in his message of December 2, 1823, was a development of the original rule laid down by Washington that "in extending our commercial relations (with foreign nations) we have with them as little political connection as

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possible." When in May, 1823, France, acting under a commission from the Congress of Verona, put Ferdinand back upon the throne of Spain, and when Russia at the same time was advancing from Alaska down the western coast of this continent, the United States was threatened on two sides by an entanglement with the Europe of Metternich. It was threatened with a Russian Empire extending down to what is now California, and with a war to the south for the reconquest of the revolted Spanish colonies. These two threats, had they been successful, would have encircled the United States with the forces of the Quadruple Alliance, and would almost certainly have embroiled it in the dynastic politics of Europe.

Fortunately the interests of Britain, as Canning conceived them, coincided with those of the United States, and President Monroe was therefore able to state the epoch-making doctrine that bears his name. In this, its original form, the United States declared that it would resist future colonization (of European Powers) in this hemisphere, and that it would "consider any attempt on their part to extend their system (*i.e.* the system of Metternich, popularly known as the Holy Alliance) to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." This is the policy which the United States maintained with some difficulty but in the end triumphantly from Monroe to Roosevelt. Its purpose was American security; its method was to prevent European political intervention in this hemisphere.

The important events in the history of the Monroe Doctrine between 1823 and the beginning of this century were inspired by a determination to resist European expansion. So Clay protested in 1823 against the sale of Cuba to France, and the French withdrew their fleet. In 1843 the United States protested against the British naval occupation of Hawaii. In 1848 Polk warned Spain and Britain against listening to the appeal of the white population of Yucatan, then engaged in a war with the Indians. Seward in 1861 protested to Spain against the occupation of Santo Domingo. And in spite of the extreme difficulties of the situation, Lincoln never recognized Maximilian in Mexico and continued to recognize Juarez. In 1895 Cleveland actually threatened war against Great Britain if the disputed boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana were not submitted to arbitration. The last and latest phase in what might be called the evolution of the simple Monroe Doctrine was the Lodge

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Resolution of 1912 arising out of the Magdalena Bay incident.

I have called this line of policy the simple Monroe Doctrine because it was confined to resistance to the acquisition of new territory. Thus for many years after 1823 the United States did not oppose European naval blockades of the Latin republics provided the acquisition of new territory was disclaimed. In 1825 Clay told Argentina and Brazil that they would not be protected from an "obligation the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand." The United States did not attempt to interfere with British blockades of Nicaragua in 1842 and 1844, of Buenos Ayres in 1845, of Salvador in 1851, nor with the Spanish bombardment of Valparaiso and Callao in 1866. But when in 1902 Britain, Italy and Germany blockaded Venezuela as a result of certain property claims, President Roosevelt became active and insistent, and according to his account had actually ordered Admiral Dewey to assemble the battle fleet at Porto Rico if the Germans did not withdraw their squadron within a certain number of days.

This was a new phase, not so much in the principle as in the practice of the American policy, and out of this incident emerged the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Two years elapsed, however, before President Roosevelt actually announced the new doctrine. Then, in connection with the occupation of Santo Domingo, he said:

> "This country would certainly decline to go to war to prevent a foreign government from collecting" on defaulted debts; and since a temporary occupation by a European Power might turn into a permanent occupation, "the only escape from these alternatives may at some time be that we must ourselves undertake to bring about some arrangement by which so much as possible of a just obligation shall be paid."

In the meantime the Panama Canal route had been decided upon, and the treaty signed with the Republic of Panama, and in his message of 1904 President Roosevelt stated his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine:

> "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America as elsewhere ultimately require intervention by some civilized power, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

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Whatever may have been the actual circumstances and the contributing motives, it was under this Roosevelt corollary of the international police power that there took place the intervention of 1905 in Santo Domingo, the interventions by Secretary Knox in Nicaragua and Haiti which culminated in the treaties of 1911.

This assumption of the right to police the Caribbean grew out of the vital national interest created in that region by the construction of the Panama Canal. The American system of defence was based on the Canal, and it followed from this new fact that the United States could no longer tolerate European naval activity in that strategic area. There followed from this same fact the establishment of a series of naval bases at Key West, Guantanamo, Samana Bay, Mole St. Nicholas, in Porto Rico, in the Virgin Islands, in the Corn Islands of Nicaragua, and in Fonseca Bay on the Pacific side. With this development the United States could no longer tolerate political disorder in the countries involved in its naval defense. It could not tolerate the threat of European intervention in case of disorder, and it could not tolerate disorder which threatened the security of its own strategic system. From this point it was but a short step to the theory that the United States must insure itself in the Caribbean region against supposedly unfriendly governments. It was this point which was reached apparently in the present affair in Nicaragua.

Thus in a hundred years the Monroe Doctrine evolved from the simple prohibition of further colonization through the assumption of an international police power in the Caribbean to an insistence that governments in that region shall be, not only orderly, but friendly to the interests of the United States. This growth of American policy is however an evolution out of the principle of national security, and each new phase of it is consistent with that principle. That other motives played their part, that private interests may at times have created the situation, or made themselves the instruments and the beneficiaries, need not be denied. I shall not discuss here this aspect of what is popularly known as "Dollar Diplomacy," because when in these disputed cases the United States Government acted, it appealed always, and I believe sincerely, to the principle of national security.

It is important to bear this in mind because in the present dispute with Mexico the Government is appealing to a new and radically different principle. What that principle is, what its

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acceptance may imply, is a matter of real concern to the United States and to the rest of the world.

III

After the fall of Porfirio Diaz there was a revolution in Mexico which was essentially different from the ordinary Latin-American civil commotion. It was not a mere brawl between the Ins and the Outs, but a national upheaval against the landed gentry, against clericalism, and against the foreign concessionaire who was rapidly acquiring the richest natural resources of the country. An *ancien régime* was violently overturned amidst considerable disorder, much irregularity, plenty of selfishness and dishonesty and inefficiency and floods of revolutionary rhetoric. This revolution, which is loosely called bolshevik and is often ascribed by careless writers to the Russian Communists, was fought out and consummated while the Tsar was still on the throne of Russia. The new Mexican Constitution which embodies the results of the revolution went into effect on May 1, 1917, over six months before Lenin seized the government in Russia.

Whatever name is to be given to it, the fact is indisputable that the Mexican revolution arose out of Mexican conditions in an effort to correct Mexican evils, and that it takes its place historically with that series of nationalist uprisings which from China to India, from Egypt to Morocco, offer so profound a challenge to the supremacy of the Western Empires, and so deep a riddle to their statesmanship. One persistent motive in these uprisings is the desire to assert the national independence and the dignity of an inferior race. The whole spirit of extra-territorial privileges in all its forms is therefore under attack, — the whole system of special courts, codes, concessions which give the foreigner a status in these countries superior to that of the native.

This nationalism inevitably comes into conflict with the vested rights of foreigners. These rights have a varied history. Most of them were probably acquired legitimately, or at least in good faith under the old régime; some of them, enough of them perhaps to stand out as horrible examples, may not have been so legitimately acquired even under the old system. Yet no matter how they were acquired they represent after the lapse of years a large investment of honest capital, much hard work, and in the case of rare and essential natural resources, a considerable national interest to the people at home. There is then a real conflict

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between the nationalism of the country and the acquired rights of the foreigner.

It is this conflict which the United States Government has been trying to deal with ever since the Mexican Constitution was established in 1917, and even earlier. There is a long record of diplomatic notes on the subject extending back to the time when the Convention of Queretaro was still drafting the Constitution. The fundamental point of protest is Article XXVII, which declared the subsoil of Mexico the property of the nation. This famous article embodies the purposes and the slogans of the revolution; in the eyes of Mexicans it represents a recovery by the nation of property that belonged to it, except for a brief period under President Diaz and then only in respect to some minerals, ever since the title passed from the King of Spain to the States of the independent Republic of Mexico.

The Mexican revolutionists, however, have had the prudence to recognize that the acquired rights of foreigners could not be wiped out. Their courts have declared that Article XXVII is not retroactive, and in their legislation which enacts Article XXVII they have made provision for the continued use of such property in the subsoil as was legitimately acquired before 1917. Whether this provision is substantially just or not, and whether the Mexican courts fairly interpret former Mexican law, is fiercely disputed by most of the American oil companies, and their claim is supported by the State Department. Into the merits of that dispute I shall not attempt to enter here. My concern is with the doctrine upon which the American contention is based. That is much more important in the long run than the immediate dispute about the oil properties, for the doctrine we now announce, and may in the end establish, will govern our future relations not only with Mexico but with any country in which acquired rights are affected by a radical change of social policy.

Mr. Hughes, when he was Secretary of State, laid down the following rule in relation to Latin-America:

> "Each state may have its code of laws in accordance with its conception of domestic policy, but rights acquired under its laws by citizens of another state it is under an international obligation *appropriately* to recognize."

Under Secretary Kellogg this doctrine seems to have lost whatever qualification there may have been in Mr. Hughes's mind when he used the word "appropriately." Mr. Kellogg's doctrine

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as laid down in the series of notes between July and November 1926 was that Mexico did not have the power to diminish in any way a legal title acquired before 1917 whether or not the change of title inflicted a substantial loss upon the owner. Mr. Kellogg, if I understand him correctly, contends that a title to property once acquired must be left intact in letter, in spirit, and in substance for all time to come. And President Coolidge, if I understand the official spokesman correctly, has added that the rights of a vested interest to an unchangeable title against acts of the sovereign is so clear under international law that it is not even an arbitrable question. This is a radical and unqualified position, allowing no room for compromise, as does Mr. Hughes's principle qualified by the word "appropriately." The Kellogg doctrine does not, in principle at least, allow Mexico to confirm the oil companies in the use of their lands while maintaining the theory or the fiction that the title vests in the nation.

Whether or not Secretary Kellogg would adhere to so strict a dogma if Mexico offered a better bargain to the oil companies, I do not know. But it is certain that the rigorous form in which the American claim has been formulated has produced a head-on collision between two irreconcilable principles. They are the principle of national sovereignty and the principle of acquired rights. The doctrine for which Secretary Kellogg is now contending is in effect that a right to property is an inalienable right which no government can ever impair, that it is superior under international law to the right of sovereignty, and that when the acts of the sovereign conflict with the vested rights of foreign property holders these acts of the sovereign are null and void under international law. Mr. Kellogg has argued that the wrong done by the legislation which carries the Mexican Constitution into effect is such that it cannot be righted by reparation for the material damage suffered by American property holders in specific cases. He has rejected the Mexican offer to make reparation if damages could be proved. He has argued that the wrong is too deep to be remedied by the payment of damages, even assuming that Mexico would or could pay the damages which might be assessed against her. For an act of the sovereign which diminishes a title to property inflicts an injury for which no compensation after the fact can be sufficient. The act itself is confiscatory and strikes at the root of international law as Mr. Kellogg understands the law of nations.

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Just where or when it became the law of nations that the sovereign has not the power to affect the established title to property has never been explained by the State Department. For if this were the law of nations then legislation anywhere in the world, including the United States, is subject to review not only by the highest domestic courts, but by the foreign offices of aliens whose rights are affected. The United States Supreme Court has for generations been deciding cases in which the question was whether an act of Congress or of one of the State legislatures was "confiscatory." In a long series of decisions it has sanctioned legislation which drastically diminished the free use of legitimately acquired property. Under these decisions the railroads and other public utilities have been regulated, the use of real estate has been hedged with restrictions like the rent laws and the zoning laws, employers have been subjected to all kinds of "welfare" legislation. Americans have differed greatly among themselves as to whether these laws were wise, and immense law suits have been carried through the courts to determine whether they were confiscatory. But I doubt whether any American ever dreamed that after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision, a British subject who owned railway securities or New York City real estate could carry the case to the British Foreign Office for an ultimate review and decision.

If this were the law of nations it would mean that each nation possessed a veto on the legislature and courts of every other nation in so far as its nationals had rights that were affected. This theory that the vested rights of aliens are immutable, and superior to the acts of the sovereign, would mean, if it were accepted, that in proportion to the size of alien holdings, a nation's social developments would be frozen in *statu quo*. If this were the law of nations then no people which cherished its independence could ever again permit foreigners to acquire property. For such property, once acquired, would be forever removed from national control. The foreigner with his property would be above the law of the country, and his rights would be determined not by the sovereign power but by an alien foreign office.

IV

It is altogether unlikely that Secretary Kellogg would wish to commit this country to the full implication of his doctrine. It would lead us into great difficulties. Against a strong Power

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the doctrine would be unenforceable except by resort to war. If, for example, in the course of the next few years the British Government decides to nationalize the coal industry, it will not ask the consent of our State Department. American owners of coal properties in England will have to accept the same terms which are offered to English owners, and the terms will not be, I venture to suggest, a matter even for diplomatic discussion. The terms offered to landlords in Ireland were not reviewed by alien foreign offices, nor would the terms laid down by Congress be subject to review in case some day it decided to reorganize our chaotic coal industry. Any strong nation would take the position that where there was no discrimination against the foreigner or between foreigners, where there was no taking of property from aliens and giving it to its own nationals, where the action arose from a considered policy in the national interest, where in fact there was no intention to expropriate without some practicable substitute, where its own courts (or even an international tribunal) were open to hear proof of damages, there could be no ground for diplomatic interference. Mr. Kellogg has taken the contrary position in relation to Mexico. The seriousness of his position is not merely that it constitutes a threat to good relations with Mexico, but that it portends the possibility that on this continent at least the United States may set itself up as the opponent of national aspiration and social development.

No one can quarrel with the State Department for giving the oil companies every assistance in making a good bargain with the Mexican Government, nor in seeing to it that they are dealt with reasonably and without prejudice. But there is a very real danger in setting up as an unqualified dogma the theory that American investments in Latin-America are in fact extra-territorial, and that the State Department may on its own authority exercise the powers of the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment over all the governments of this hemisphere. The responsibilities we should incur under such a doctrine would be infinite. For as our investments grew the State Department would find itself acting both as attorney for interests affected by legislation in Latin-America, and as final court of review as well.

With this doctrine established in our foreign policy we could hardly expect to win the good will of the awakening nationalists of the Latin countries. They would find us confronting them whenever they contemplated a change in their social policy. And unless

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the State Department chose to play favorites, giving to the oil companies in Mexico a kind of support which it was not willing to give other American interests elsewhere, it would have to entangle itself in every political conflict which had economic consequences, anywhere south of the Rio Grande.

Rightly or wrongly the Latin peoples would regard this intimate interference as a threat to their independence, and we might expect anti-Americanism to become part of the creed of all Latin patriots, professional and otherwise. Nor would European traders in South America be above the temptation to point out the implications of this Kellogg Doctrine, assuming that the Latin peoples, already sufficiently suspicious, should somehow miss the implications. Nor is it unlikely, were we to deal with Latin-America in too heavy-handed a way, that the larger nations there would feel impelled to turn once more towards Europe, seeking a support there which would eventually restore some kind of balance of power in this hemisphere. . . .

V

To these more remote and imponderable considerations men will give weight in accordance with their temperaments and their wisdom. The immediate question before the American people is whether they wish to erect the doctrine of immutability of vested rights into a cardinal principle of their foreign policy. This is the great question which overshadows the Mexican dispute. It arises, as has been pointed out, from the conflict between the growth of capital investment in backward countries and the awakening of a national spirit in these countries. The Kellogg Doctrine, taken in the form which it has been stated in the correspondence with Mexico, holds that vested rights are unchangeable in the face of a nation's development. Such a doctrine, applied so absolutely, means an irreconcilable collision between the power of this country and the will of its neighbors.

The task of statesmanship is to avert irreconcilable collisions and to find ways of adjusting conflicting interests. That ought not to be beyond the bounds of possibility. It ought not to be impossible to protect the substantial interests of American capital abroad without challenging the right of other nations to adopt such social regulation as seems good to them. Business is a much more flexible thing than the conservative theorist is ready to believe. It cannot be irreparably injured without injury to the

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nation which attacks it. If Mexico really tried to injure the oil business, the worst damage would recoil upon Mexico herself. There are considerations to which the statesman can afford to pay attention, and they suggest that the solution of the problem, which is as real as it is delicate, will probably be found best by seeking a *modus vivendi*, respecting the national pride of sensitive peoples, and refraining, so far as it is humanly possible to avoid so great a temptation, from enunciating great general principles.

In the last analysis the security of American investments abroad must rest, as Mr. Dwight Morrow pointed out in the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, on the faith of the borrowing nations. They must believe that American capital profits them, and is consistent with their own national interest. If they do not believe this, pressure which forces them to act contrary to their convictions can give only temporary advantages to American business men. The victory on one point can be won only at the cost of arousing a general illwill against American capital and the American Government. Such a general illwill is more threatening to the security not only of capital but of the nation than any one Latin policy however inconvenient, however ill-considered. And nothing would be so certain to arouse still further this illwill as the realization in Latin-America that the United States had adopted a policy, conceived in the spirit of Metternich, which would attempt to guarantee vested rights against social progress as the Latin peoples conceive it.

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THE TWO AMERICAS

By Clarence H. Haring

THE recent intervention of the United States in the domestic politics of Nicaragua, and the recurrence of the periodical "crisis" in the relations between Washington and Mexico City, have loosed, as usual, the floodgates of criticism in the newspaper press of Europe and of South America. Not that Europe has vital political interests at stake in Mexico — the present agrarian and labor Government of that country commands little sympathy in capitalistic Germany or France or England or Spain — and still less is she concerned with the vagaries of factional chiefs in the republic of Nicaragua. But given the present unpopularity of Uncle Shylock among his European debtors, and the ever-present jealousy of expanding American trade and finance in the markets of Latin America, the European press hails with joy an opportunity to "put us in bad" with Europe's customers in the southern continent.

The case of the South American press is somewhat different. It reflects a dislike and suspicion of the United States among the peoples of Latin America that has existed for several generations. This has been for the most part a political distrust, engendered by episodes in the past diplomatic history of the western hemisphere, increased by the extraordinary growth of the United States in population, wealth and political prestige, and fostered by those European rivals who would like to see the preponderant influence of the great northern republic displaced by that of certain kindred trans-Atlantic peoples. And its strength has been in inverse ratio to the distance from the shores of the United States. In the more progressive states farthest south this sentiment as a fear of political absorption scarcely exists or is rapidly disappearing. But there remains a dread of the overwhelming economic power commanded by the United States, especially since the World War; for today Latin America comes to New York for its financing, and looks in the same direction for a large share of its imports. And with it is mingled a personal dislike of Americans, men and women, who in increasing numbers have been coming to reside in Latin America as the representatives of our industrial and financial enterprise.

The existence among our southern neighbors of a belief that

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the United States harbors imperialistic designs upon the entire hemisphere need not be surprising even to the provincial "Yankee" mind. The Monroe Doctrine itself, for the maintenance of which many Americans believe that the Latin republics owe them a debt of gratitude, is not regarded by these republics as an expression of international altruism, nor in fact was it from its inception ever intended so to be. That this principle of American policy has served at times to protect weaker states from European aggression is doubtless true; but the interpretations of the Doctrine in later practice have also given occasion for the charge that it is but a camouflage for the political and economic hegemony of the United States. Certain international events have lent force to such an interpretation. The cession by Mexico in 1848 of a third of her territory to the United States after a war for which Mexico was not solely responsible, the picaresque activities of Mr. Walker and other North American adventurers in Central America in the following decade, the imbecile "dollar diplomacy" of the United States in the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru, the Panama "incident" of 1903, the establishment of protectorates during the past twenty-five years over new or incorrigible republics in the West Indies and Central America — all have been used, and are used, by the hostile propagandist to inculcate fear or suspicion of the United States. In this pragmatic world there are of course two sides to every question; but it is just this that North Americans, including their statesmen, have often been prone to forget. There is also a Latin American side.

More recently, since the paramount interest of the United States in the Caribbean area necessitated by the building and maintenance of the Panama Canal has been acknowledged by the world at large, American statesmen in public addresses and in messages to Congress have with fair consistency endeavored to counteract the Latin's suspicion of the Anglo-Saxon. The visit to South America of Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1906, and the definition by President Wilson of that policy toward Latin America by some called the Wilson Doctrine, made a deep and lasting impression in many sections of the southern continent. There grew up an immense admiration and respect for Wilson, which was increased by his public statements during the World War and his rôle at the Conference of Versailles, an enthusiasm which persists to this day and is an element of no little significance

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in cementing the friendship between Latin and English America. This, too, in spite of his ill-advised expedition to Vera Cruz, and the military occupation of the island republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo. The disclaimers of imperialistic aims pronounced by Root and Wilson, and reiterated by succeeding presidents and secretaries of state, have had a calming effect upon South American opinion. They have served, together with the numerous inter-American congresses, political, scientific, financial, etc., of the past generation, to pave the way toward something like a genuine Pan Americanism.

In spite of such "fraternal formulas," however, and in spite of improving communications, cables and steamships, newspapers and "movies," or even perhaps because of them, an inherited distrust of the Yankee persists in South America. It does not apply to all South Americans — the United States has many loyal friends and warm admirers in the southern continent — but in the thoughtful part of the population there exist influential elements of opposition whose propaganda is very active, and which cannot with safety be ignored. It behooves us, therefore, to examine some of the sources of suspicion and misunderstanding. The barriers of "race," fear of economic domination, mistrust or misconstruing of the Monroe Doctrine and of Pan Americanism, United States policy in the Caribbean, the desire for a cultural and political union exclusively Latin in America, hostile propaganda of European origin whether political, commercial or intellectual — these are perhaps the more apparent obstacles to the development of harmony and good will between North and South America.

The psychological barrier, the writer believes, is often exaggerated. It is exaggerated by those too stupid or lazy to make the effort to understand an alien point of view; it is overemphasized by individuals who have a special interest in widening the breach between the two racial groups. It is, moreover, more easily talked about than defined. Differences of race, it is true, exist, but they are often the consequence of environment or of historical circumstance, matters subject to correction by education and experience. The Latin American finds difficulty in understanding the "gringo" or Anglo-Saxon, and the latter seems to have as much difficulty in arriving at a sympathetic appreciation of the Latin. But part of this is due to an atavistic instinct to hate or suspect the foreigner, the legacy of a more primitive, tribal

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age; and part is "protective coloring," an exaggerated egotism and national pride — inferiority complex, we call it today. The younger, pioneering peoples of the New World, whether in Latin or in Anglo-America, display these particular varieties of provincialism to a marked degree; they are familiar phenomena of the frontier.

The inferiority complex is a fact easily observed in Latin Americans, and requires little comment. It connotes a transitional stage in their national evolution, from the colonial status to that of intellectual as well as political freedom. Latin Americans hate, admire, envy and fear the United States at one and the same time. It is more apparent, perhaps, in tropical or sub-tropical countries, where European immigration has been slight, and where the bulk of the population are Indian or represent a mixture of the white race with the Indian or the negro. Yet there is nothing in the history of Latin America to prove the essential inferiority of the Mestizo. The whole matter of the mixture of unlike races has never been adequately studied, or approached in a scientific manner. Politically, the Anglo-Saxon has been more fortunate in his background. The Latin achieved independence without experience in popular government and without the public virtues which such experience engenders. The whole history of Latin America during the past hundred years, indeed, is a history of slow and often painful education in self-government. And considering the obstacles involved, in some countries the progress achieved has been remarkable.

Latin America is educating itself in ways other than political. The development of a general interest and participation in sports during the past decade has been extraordinary. Association football is now played in all the countries south of the equator, and the matches draw enormous crowds. International athletic meets are also held, golf has taken a strong hold upon Uruguay and Argentina, and in Peru the devotees of the bull-fight ruefully admit that that form of diversion is doomed to disappear — the Sunday afternoon crowd prefers a football match. This new interest in athletics and the outdoor life is of more importance than might at first sight appear. The physical benefits to be derived therefrom are obvious, but as important are the social effects. Through games the Latin American is learning the meaning of fair play, of coöperation, and of subordination of the individual to the achievement of a common end. The lessons acquired on the

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athletic field will be carried into political and social life, and will tend to narrow greatly the chasm that supposedly separates the Latin "psychology" from that of the Anglo-American.

Secondary factors in the problem of Latin American dislike or distrust of the United States are difference of language, difference of religion, and the race or color prejudice of North Americans. Difference of language becomes less formidable with the general increase of education. The speaking of English is almost as common as that of French among cultivated Latin Americans today, and the well-nigh universal instruction in Spanish in the schools of the United States in recent years is a happy augury for the future. As Roman Catholicism is the creed of millions of citizens of the United States, it can scarcely be said that a religious barrier exists. Nevertheless the widespread activities of North American Protestant missionary agencies in a continent traditionally Roman Catholic makes the South American think of the United States as a Protestant country. Religious proselytism by North Americans he naturally resents, with its implication that his countrymen are heathen to be classed with the South Sea islanders and the tribes of inland Asia. The South American nations are Christian communities. It is a question if the results achieved in the way of religious conversion are at all commensurate with the effort and money expended.

The most important and beneficent aspect of North American missionary effort is educational. The Y. M. C. A. and the Y. W. C. A. are becoming solidly established in the principal South American cities. The Methodists have a number of excellent schools, and Mackenzie College, a Presbyterian institution of collegiate grade in São Paulo, has long been a source of local pride. The Colegio Internacional in Asunción, maintained by the Disciples of Christ, is one of the most progressive forces in the educational life of Paraguay. In most of these schools there is little or no Protestant propaganda, and to that extent they are successful in avoiding native hostility. But even in educational activities a tactful consideration of native susceptibilities is imperative. When at the Pan American Protestant Congress held at Montevideo in April, 1925, a campaign was announced to raise $2,345,000 for "educational, social welfare and health work in South America, designed to cement the friendly relations between the United States and Latin American nations," there was curious comment in some of the native newspapers. And it

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is always a question whether such patronizing does not serve rather to alienate than to conciliate.

The Anglo-Saxon prejudice against men of color is a constant factor of disturbance, and it works infinite harm to the cause of international fraternity. It is especially active against the citizens of countries like Brazil, which with a large negro or mulatto population draw no color line; against the Andean republics, which are mostly of Indian or Mestizo complexion; and against our more immediate neighbors about the Caribbean Sea. But even an Argentine or a Chilean occasionally suffers because of our inability to distinguish a white man from all the "other mulattos and half breeds" of which South America is supposed to consist.

The exhibition of a raw race prejudice in the presence of our Latin neighbors is as often as not the outward and visible sign of that inward and spiritual crudity displayed by so many Americans who travel or reside in foreign parts. As a matter of fact, Americans in South America do not as a whole represent the best that the United States has to offer in intelligence, breeding or personality. Perhaps it is not to be expected that they should. But as a class they are not liked by South Americans. Argentines contend that Americans in their country do not measure up to the best in the British colony there. The same feeling seems to prevail in Uruguay and in Brazil. Americans are openly criticized for their loud manners, for their excessive drinking, sometimes for their aloofness from the natives, or their refusal to learn Spanish or Portuguese. There is frequently little more to be said for their wives, who have no real interests to engage their time and who find little in common with native women. The explanation is found in the fact that the United States differs from the older, more densely populated, or less prosperous, countries of Europe, in not having an exportable surplus of first class men and women to send to South America.

Our trade with South America has increased enormously during the past decade, as well as our capital investment in that continent. Our exports in 1925 amounted to over 399 million dollars, and imports to nearly 517 millions, a gain in total trade of 300 percent over that of the years immediately preceding the World War. With the cessation or decrease of the flow of capital from Europe, the governments of South America have also had to look chiefly to New York for their financing. In 1912 the total investments of the United States in South America were estimated

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at about 170 million dollars, of which less than 15 millions represented public securities. In 1924 they had increased to 1,229 millions, over half of which had been loaned to national, state or municipal governments.

Enlarged economic interest means increased responsibility. Fortunately the lax business methods formerly charged against American manufacturers and export commission houses have mostly disappeared, although some of the old complaints are still occasionally heard. In so far as European commercial rivalry is concerned, Americans are in the hands of their competitors, who lose no opportunity to advance their own goods and interests at the expense of those of the United States. There is no doubt considerable propaganda *viva voce* against American trade, and it occasionally crops up in the foreign language press. Sharp commercial practices are not unknown, but they are probably not more frequent or more heinous than seems to be normal in business everywhere, and responsibility is very likely about evenly divided. Americans, indeed, suffer less from the effects of unfair or questionable tactics than before or during the war, due to the large increase of their own commercial facilities, banks, cables, steamship lines and chambers of commerce.

A consideration of the practices of our European competitors in South American trade is of importance in so far as they influence the attitude of merchants and government officials toward American products and American methods, and incidentally color their political reaction to the United States as well. That the influence upon American commerce is very considerable seems doubtful. Vastly more important are the charges of economic exploitation and veiled political imperialism which are constantly made in South America against American "big business." They are aired in the native press, and they are openly or secretly encouraged by our European rivals. The intrusion of American capital into the continent, in the form of government loans or for the development of mines, oil wells and other industries, is the chief source of misgiving on the part of often well-meaning but generally ill-informed South Americans. The Caribbean countries are considered to be beyond hope of recovery, but farther south it is Peru and Bolivia which unscrupulous American capitalists are said to have by the throat. An anti-American article in *La Razon* of Buenos Aires stated that "it is notorious that the principal Peruvian enterprises are in

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the hands of the Yankees. The railroads, the tramways, the banks, even the school system, have been delivered by President Leguia to the North American capitalists." As a matter of fact, the railways of Peru are owned by British capital, the tramways by Italian capital, and of the twelve banks in Peru, one is American.

One may properly inquire why the enormous investments of British, French and German capital in South American countries do not cause similar concern. One answer is that occasionally they do. But Latin Americans have been accustomed to rest secure in the protection extended to them by the Monroe Doctrine, while as against the United States itself the Doctrine affords no protection but may even serve to conceal American encroachments upon their independence. The past record of the United States in the western hemisphere, its despoiling of Mexico and Colombia, and its interventions in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Central America, does not seem to them to be very reassuring. Whatever may be the present policy of the State Department at Washington, we suffer from the inheritance of an unfortunate reputation. And however free of blame may be the history of our financial penetration in the West Indies and adjacent regions, the development of something like a political hegemony in that area at the same time is a coincidence too striking to escape the attention of South American observers.

About the Monroe Doctrine there is as much confusion of thought and utterance in South America as there is in the United States. There is no question but that it is regarded by great numbers in these southern countries as a sinister menace to their national sovereignty and dignity. First promulgated as a warning against the extension of monarchical institutions and of further European colonization in the western hemisphere, they believe that it has come to imply paramount interest and hegemony. It has been unpopular among citizens of the stronger South American states because it seems to spell for them political inferiority. It is disliked in the weaker states because of our assumed responsibility for their good behavior. It has not been a force making for solidarity of sentiment in the two Americas.

Misunderstanding of the Monroe Doctrine is largely due to the fact that, in the words of Charles E. Hughes, "it has often been treated as though it were our sole policy in this hemisphere, and as though every action bearing upon our relation to our sister republics must be referred to it." Consequently there has been

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a mass of contradictory opinions in this country, official as well as private. Many, including senators and newspaper editors, seem to have the vaguest notion as to what the Doctrine really signifies, although they cling to it as to a fetish and can readily be led into a war with the cry that it is imperilled. In spite of Secretary Olney's famous declaration of thirty years ago, it is not an international gospel proclaiming the United States master in this hemisphere, with unlimited right of intervention in the domestic concerns of its neighbors. In view of certain "corollaries" of the Doctrine, however, and our interventions in the West Indies and Central America, it is not surprising that Latin Americans confuse it with "imperialism," "hegemony," "dollar diplomacy," and analogous concepts. There is a widespread belief that all the events that have determined the growth of this country at the expense of the independence or territorial integrity of other nations, from the annexation of Texas to the military occupation of Haiti, have their root in this American diplomatic principle. The *rapprochement* obvious among the Latin American peoples today, and natural and desirable from many points of view, too often has a basis in fear of the Colossus of the North. And the organization of something like a league of American nations, which is a general aspiration to the southward, to many seems more expedient as an Ibero-American league than as a Pan American league dominated by the United States. The Latin American mentality is disturbed by what it considers the disparity of criterions appearing in the United States regarding our foreign policy in general and the Monroe Doctrine in particular. It is therefore important that citizens of the United States know their own mind and come to some general agreement as to what the Doctrine means.

The watchword of those who labor in the cause of intercontinental solidarity is Pan Americanism. This expression, so often used, is rarely defined. It has been to some extent the substance of things hoped for, in a measure the evidence of things not seen. In the words of Alejandro Alvarez, it rests upon the conviction that "there are, among the nations of the New World, besides the continental solidarity implied in the Monroe Doctrine and its amplifications, common interests and problems, political and economic, derived from their situation on the same continent, which is different in its political and economic conditions from the continent of Europe."

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But there are those, especially in Latin America, who deny that these primary and mutual interests exist, and who stress rather the barrier of language, and the differences of culture, race, and legal and intellectual traditions that keep north and south apart. Or they assert that these "common interests" are conjured up by the United States merely as a cloak for its political and economic ambitions in the western hemisphere, to cover a policy of paramount interest which is inconsistent with the basic Pan American principle of the equality of States. In short, our sincerity is impugned. There is also no agreement as to the kind or the degree of collaboration that is necessary or possible. Some ardent Pan Americanists desire a political league of American states, analogous to the League in Europe, and operating within or in harmony with the larger organization. Others are content with the strengthening of commercial bonds and with coöperation along social and intellectual lines.

Whether a genuine league of American nations is practical or not is perhaps open to question. It seems that either the United States, Argentina and the few other first class American powers must expect to find themselves overruled and outvoted by a majority of the smaller backward states, or be prepared themselves to dictate the policy of the league. The former alternative is unthinkable, especially in view of the fact that many of the smaller states are governed by dictators or irresponsible oligarchs; the latter would violate what has always been held to be a fundamental principle of Pan Americanism, the legal equality of nations. Experience has shown, as at the Fifth Pan American Conference held at Santiago in 1923, that the nine small republics of Central America and the West Indies, to which on occasion Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela may be joined — *i.e.* the states lying within the zone of paramount interest of the United States — are apt to form a *bloc* which in voting power can control a congress of American nations. Of course the problems of uniting the divergent interests and ambitions of large and small states in an international league is not absent from the organization centred at Geneva. It constitutes one of the major political problems of the twentieth century.

Unquestionably the chief obstacle to a happy coöperation between Latin and English America is just this question of our relations with the Caribbean republics. The less friendly South American newspapers watch our movements with the intensest

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jealousy. The protectorate over Cuba, benevolent though it may be, and our policing of the more erratic republics of Central America, expose us to endless criticism. The interventions of American marines and diplomatic agents in Nicaragua and Honduras are pictured as the cause rather than the consequence of the political inquietude — "alterations of the public order" — in these countries. And our interminable quarrel with the Mexican Government over the recent land and petroleum legislation of that republic is the occasion for bitter and often malicious attacks upon the United States. "Yankee imperialism" is accused of driving Mexico to the wall, of deliberately aiming to subvert the independence and integrity of our neighboring republic. Only a few of the more friendly and conservative newspapers express regret that certain Latin states should still recur to political methods discredited elsewhere, and while remarking the increased influence of the United States within such countries admit that under the circumstances it is inevitable and can be eliminated only by the social, political and economic progress of the peoples concerned.

For Pan Americanism its foes would substitute Pan Latin Americanism, or Pan Hispanism. They advocate a Latin American league, which would present a defensive barrier to our imperialistic democracy. Outside the vague and ill-defined "Pan American solidarity" exists a real identity of interests and aspirations among the peoples of Iberian origin. This is already partially realized in the annual Assemblies at Geneva where the delegates of the Latin American republics frequently vote alike in matters of world interest. As the United States insists that the Monroe Doctrine is purely unilateral, a policy exclusively Yankee, consulting only North American interests, and as it has opposed all efforts to give the Doctrine a collective character and convert it into an international formula, notably at Santiago in 1923, the other states must find a policy and an organization consonant with their own especial interests.

There can be no doubt but that the creation of a world league centred in Europe has influenced radically the relations of the United States with the Latin American republics. The latter accepted the League idea with great enthusiasm, as the harbinger of a new era of peace and international conciliation. Most of them joined the League, and some have taken an active part in its deliberations. They have furnished two presidents to the

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Assembly, and have had a considerable share in the work of its numerous commissions and committees. The article of the Covenant excluding from the League's jurisdiction regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine is not popular with South Americans. States like Bolivia which would submit their international problems to the League for solution find their way blocked by the disinclination of the latter to incur Washington's displeasure by meddling in American affairs. The members of the League, moreover, in agreeing to sacrifice part of their "independence" by submitting their international disputes to the judgment of a World Court, have taken a long step toward compulsory arbitration, a principle which the United States has consistently refused to entertain. The League, therefore, in spite of its weakness, offers to South America a protection which the United States is unwilling to concede. And there is no doubt that those who fear the imperialism of the United States see in the League a possible support against the encroachments of the northern republic. If the Pan American movement is "an attempt to develop a Continental system based on coöperation and community of interest, a system from which fear of aggression has been eliminated and in which physical power is not the dominating influence,"[1] then why the American distrust of Geneva, and why the refusal of the United States to support the efforts to organize an American League at Santiago in 1923? The answer of the South American critics is that Washington clings to its policy of aggressive imperialism, and is therefore disinclined to submit its conduct to the judgment of the world.

On the other hand, the effects of our abstention from the League may easily be exaggerated. It is not altogether without significance that of the two largest South American powers, Brazil has stepped out of the League, and Argentina, although nominally a member, has taken no part in its deliberations since the first meeting of the Geneva Assembly in 1920. It will be interesting to observe whether, now that Brazil is out, Argentina will resume her seat in the League and seek the vacant rôle of spokesman for Latin America. Of the other South American governments, most of them seem to be interested largely because of the international standing in world affairs which membership implies, rather than because of any vital concern in the League's

[1] Dr. Leo S. Rowe at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., August 6, 1925, as reported in the *New York Times*.

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problems. Their real international interests are much nearer home, in the American continent. Moreover, anything like a genuine union of political ideas and purposes among the Latin American governments is still far from realization. Guatemala or Venezuela are far removed from Argentina or Chile in more ways than one, and when Portuguese Brazil sought to force the hand of the League and secure a permanent seat in the Council, the sister American republics, while recognizing the desirability or the necessity of permanent American representation, displayed no enthusiasm to delegate it exclusively to Brazil.

Propaganda against the United States in South America itself takes various forms, and is variously inspired. In part it is the expression of a commendable race pride, a desire to maintain and develop the heritage of Latin civilization bequeathed by Mediterranean Europe, a fear that unless Latin Americans bestir themselves they may be absorbed, if not politically, at least in a cultural sense, by the vigorous, expanding Anglo-Saxon power to the northward. Latin American intellectuals and men of letters have therefore been trying to draw together in a common effort and aspiration, by educational, literary and moral bonds to unite their peoples in defense of the collective patrimony.

Anti-American propaganda in part also derives its inspiration from Europe, especially from France and Spain. There is no doubt that Spain and the Spaniards constitute our bitterest and most relentless foe in Latin America. Spain is keenly desirous to recover her former ascendency among the younger American communities which she herself established four centuries ago. Her ambitions are political, to create a Pan-Hispanic entente in which she will be *primus inter pares;* they are also intellectual, social, and scientific, to develop an Hispanic cultural union which will compete with and supersede the Pan American Union in course of evolution today. Her ultimate goal is by these means to recover the position she once held as a great world power. But there also exists a Pan Latin ideal, for which France especially is sponsor. The literary and artistic standards of the more progressive South American nations have long ago been set by France, and her influence upon law and jurisprudence has been considerable. Every good South American, if he can, goes to Paris before he dies. France, too, therefore, would like to consolidate her position both political and economic in the world by drawing together the Latin peoples of America under her

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protecting wing. And the Pan Latins and the Pan Hispanists do not always see eye to eye. The latter resent the former's intrusion and charge them with trying to filch away the Hispanic birthright.

On top of all this is the propaganda emanating from Mexico, and to a lesser degree from others of our Latin neighbors which sometimes feel the heavy hand of Uncle Sam. In Mexico the Pan Hispanic seed falls upon fertile ground. And Mexico calls loudest for relief from the incubus of North American imperialistic ambition. During the Carranza administration diplomatic intrigue against the United States was very active. When General Obregón became President of Mexico this hostility somewhat abated, but the Calles government has shown an inclination to return to former ways. Mexican legations and consulates in South America regularly furnish copy to the local newspapers, dispatches which are generally dated from Mexico City and obviously inspired, and which often supply the text for editorial comment. And the Mexican minister or ambassador can generally be counted upon as a guest at meetings and banquets associated in any way with pro-Latin or anti-American purposes.

The United States thus faces a formidable array of hostile or competing European interests in South America. All of them act upon the belief that a sure basis for the extension of commercial and political influence lies in the establishment of cultural contacts or exchanges. To this end the French have created in Argentina an "Instituto de la Universidad de Paris en Buenos Aires," and the Spaniards an "Asociación Cultural Española." The Italians support an "Instituto Argentino de Cultura Itálica," and the Germans an "Institución Cultural Argentino-Alemana." At Rio de Janeiro there is likewise an "Instituto Franco-Brasileiro de Alta Cultura," and in due time doubtless similar organizations will be established at other strategic centres in the South American continent. Each of these associations brings distinguished lecturers from Europe each year, and all of them, so far as the writer is aware, have been established since the war.

If we are to retain or increase the friendship of South American peoples for the United States, we must carefully watch our step, not only in our relations with Mexico and the Caribbean countries, but in our conduct at Pan American conferences, whether they be political, economic or scientific, in our negotiation of international loans, and in our efforts at the mediation of South American disputes. American consular and diplomatic represent-

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atives must possess tact and understanding, and have a reasonable appreciation of the racial susceptibilities and cultural achievements of Latin American countries. Political appointments in the past have frequently been disastrous from the point of view of inter-American relations, and our representation today in some of the countries might conceivably be improved.

If the present cultural isolation of the United States from South America is an obstacle to the Pan American idea, as seems unquestionable, it behooves us to follow in the path blazed by our European competitors. Frequent exchanges of university professors; scholarships to North American universities such as those so abundantly provided for European students by the Commonwealth Fund and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation; more direct acquaintance with South American countries and their people by North American citizens of public prominence or intellectual distinction; American weeklies or monthlies in important South American cities, to which intelligent and friendly Latin Americans living in the United States might contribute — such are the obvious ways of approach.

Whether or not opinion hostile to the United States is gaining ground in South America is perhaps a debatable question. Beneath the opposition to North American imperialism, or to Pan Americanism under the leadership of the United States, there is a sincere and widespread desire for harmony and cordial intercourse. There is, however, also a real fear that the northern republic, or at least an influential part of its citizens, does not reciprocate this friendly feeling, but is ever ready to sacrifice the independence or integrity of the Latin American nations to its own selfish and material ends. Yet despite the fact that past misdeeds seem to speak louder than an occasional gesture of friendship, despite our abstention from the League of Nations, the writer feels that confidence in the United States during the past decade has probably increased rather than diminished. As before remarked, this country has many warm and loyal admirers among South Americans — even in an occasional Spaniard such as the distinguished writer, Ramiro de Maeztu. Given a reasoned and far-sighted diplomacy at Washington, an intelligent and organized propaganda can easily increase their number, and serve to persuade our southern neighbors that the imperialistic spirit is not a dominating one in this country, but rather a spirit of coöperation and community of interest.

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THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

By A. Lawrence Lowell

ALMOST universal approval, in Great Britain and all the self-governing dominions, has greeted the conclusions of the Imperial Conference; and this on the part both of those who desire to increase and of those who desire to lessen the solidarity of the Empire. By many commentators the report adopted by the Conference is thought to be merely a statement of existing relations; by others it is regarded as another step in a progress that has long been going on. To appreciate how far each of these points of view is true, one must be acquainted with the history of self-government in the colonies and of their relations to the mother country. Treating the subject in his lectures on the third British Empire, Mr. Alfred Zimmern[1] is quite right in saying that this history is better traced in the case of Canada than elsewhere, because there the process began earliest, has been most continuous, and whatever was achieved in her case has been adopted later elsewhere.

Thirty years after the conquest of Canada in the Seven Years' War, representative assemblies were created in the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, the people of the former being English, those of the latter mainly French; but in each of these provinces the governor, appointed by the Crown, and the elected assembly failed to work in harmony, and there resulted the friction which is ordinarily produced by that method of constituting the executive and legislative organs in a dependency. It continued until in 1837 rebellions broke out in both provinces. These were in each case easily suppressed, but led to Lord Durham's famous report, in which he urged that the ministers of the royal governor should be responsible in domestic matters to the Canadian assemblies, as the King's ministers are to Parliament. The principle was adopted gradually and it was not until ten years later that Lord Durham's son-in-law, Lord Elgin, carried his suggestion fully into effect. Save for the possibility of having an act disallowed by the Crown — that is by the Cabinet in England — Canada thus acquired substantial control of its own internal affairs; the same practice being later extended to Australia and New Zealand, and finally to the Union of South Africa.

[1] "The Third British Empire," by Alfred Zimmern. 1926.

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One cannot, however, draw an absolute line between what is domestic and what is foreign. In 1859 the United Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada passed an act for a protective duty on foreign goods, including those coming from Great Britain; and this of course affected not only the people of Canada but also the trade of other places. In spite, however, of opposition by British manufacturers, the home government yielded, and the right of a self-governing colony to place a tariff on both foreign and British goods was thereby established.

A still wider extension of control over foreign relations was just beginning. A reciprocity treaty had been made between Canada and the United States in 1854, and the principle of leaving the self-governing colonies free to manage their own trade relations was gradually enlarged until by the time of the Great War it had come to be the habit not to include them in British commercial treaties without their own consent. Obviously these colonies had outgrown the condition where each of them could be regarded as an isolated community, entrusted with the management of its own local affairs, but having no direct relations with the rest of the world. There were common interests in the Empire to be considered, and from 1887 a series of colonial conferences was held in Canada. In 1907 the title Imperial Conference came into use for these meetings, which became more important, more truly consultative, and took place in London. In that of 1911 the Government of Great Britain suggested contributions to its navy; but Canada and Australia preferred small navies of their own. Three years later came the war.

This brief sketch may be summarized by saying that Canada, followed by the other self-governing colonies, had from time to time been asking for a greater degree of autonomy, which was always granted when the demand appeared to be serious. In fact, while it was possible to describe with some accuracy the relation of each of these colonies to the mother country at any one time, the practical situation was that they could obtain any amount of autonomy that they earnestly desired. It was perfectly understood that neither the Cabinet nor the Parliament at Westminster would resist such a demand, and hence that the nature of the connection with the mother country would be determined by the progressive wishes of the colonies. A symptom of the adolescence of these communities appears in the fact that about this time they preferred to be called dominions, taking

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the name used for Canada in the British-North American Act of 1867, which is in effect the present constitution of Canada. It may be observed, also, that there was no general desire on the part of either British or dominion statesmen to form a federation, or set up a common political organ. The control of the government at Westminster was slackening, and nothing was being prepared to take its place.

The war showed the magnificent readiness of the dominions to play their part, and stand beside the mother country, in her great struggle; but at the same time it developed a stronger sense of nationality in each of them. This was shown at the Imperial Conference of 1917, where Resolution IX, after declaring that the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference after the war, went on to say —

"They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several governments may determine."

It may be observed that the dominions are spoken of as "nations" with their "several governments," but although something was said by Borden of Canada, Smuts of South Africa and Ward of New Zealand about the equality of the nations composing the Imperial Commonwealth, there is no such statement in the resolution; and, indeed, it conveys the impression of autonomy in domestic matters and an adequate, but not necessarily equal or independent, voice in foreign affairs. Apparently it was understood otherwise in the dominions, for in March, 1919, when the Treaty of Peace was being discussed and they were claiming the right to become parties thereto, they declared that: "The Crown is the Supreme Executive in the United Kingdom and in all the Dominions, but it acts on the advice of different ministries within different constitutional units; and under Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, the organization of the Empire is to be based upon equality of nationhood."

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Acting on this principle, the dominions signed the peace treaties and became members of the League of Nations as distinct and separate states.

From this time the leading dominions were anxious to establish fully the international character of their autonomy and equality of nationhood. Canada asked, and obtained, the right to send a minister of her own to Washington, a privilege which she is acting upon only at this moment; while the Irish Free State, when given the same position as Canada, sent her minister at once. The consequences of the status attained began to be rapidly drawn. When the Great War broke out, every foreigner would have assumed that Great Britain being at war, all parts of the Empire were so likewise; but when, after it was over, the question arose of preventing by force the Turks from crossing into Europe, the Premier of Canada said that her Parliament must determine whether the country should take part in a war in which other parts of the British Empire might be involved. Later, when the treaty was made with Turkey at Lausanne, he took the ground that the Canadian Government assumed no responsibility for treaties which it did not help to negotiate; and the treaty has remained unratified by Canada. Again, the failure of the Protocol was due to the refusal of the dominions to accept it, a policy of aloofness which they maintained in the case of the Locarno Pact, while approving of Great Britain's binding herself thereby. So much for the right of the dominions to refuse to be bound by treaties made by the mother country.

Meanwhile, Canada had gone a step farther in claiming the right to make treaties by herself, without the interference of Great Britain. In 1923 the treaty regulating the halibut fishery on the Pacific coast was negotiated between Canada and the United States; and the method of its execution was felt to present a test case. Canada asked that it should be signed by her representative alone. This the British Ambassador at Washington, acting evidently under instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, refused. The Canadian Cabinet insisted, and finally, after obvious disagreement between the colonial and foreign offices in Downing Street, the latter gave way, and the treaty bore the signature of the Canadian agent alone. At this point the United States Senate, quite unconscious of Canada's object, curiously blind to its aspirations, and fearing that the treaty would not prevent the taking of halibut by fishing

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boats belonging to inhabitants of the British isles, inserted in the ratification an understanding "that none of the nationals and inhabitants and vessels and boats of any other part of Great Britain shall engage in halibut fishing contrary to any provisions of this treaty;" a reservation that would, of course, necessitate the signature of the treaty by the British Ambassador. Thereupon Canada waited, the matter was explained, the Senate withdrew its reservation, and the treaty was ratified. At the Imperial Conference that same autumn the question of the making of treaties of course came up, and characteristically enough, without any express declaration on the subject, the Conference passed a resolution which assumed the right of each dominion to make its own treaties and provided for the forms of signature.

Such was the situation at the time the recent Imperial Conference met on October 19, 1926. One of its first acts was to refer the question of inter-imperial relations to a committee which included the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland, the Vice President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, the Secretary of State for India, and the British Secretaries of State for foreign and for dominion affairs, with Lord Balfour as Chairman. The committee made on November 18 a report, which was unanimously adopted by the Conference the next day. It is not a statute or treaty, much less a constitution, and some of its recommendations will require legislation to give them effect; but as a declaration of the relations between the self-governing members of the Empire it may be regarded as conclusive; and here it may be well to observe that the term Empire includes all the dependencies, whereas the group of self-governing portions thereof is now known as the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Report begins by saying that "nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a constitution for the British Empire," which "bears no real resemblance to any other organization which now exists or ever has been tried." It goes on to define the position and mutual relations of Great Britain and the dominions as follows: "They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinated one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Commenting on this, the committee remarked that geo-

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graphical and other conditions made federation impossible, and the only alternative was autonomy; that free institutions are the lifeblood of the British Empire, free coöperation its instrument, and "though every dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its coöperation, no cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperiled."

To satisfy the Irish Free State, the Report proceeds to advise that in the royal title the words "of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas King," etc., should be changed to "of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas King," etc. This has provoked objection from Ulster, but has no significance for the relation between the mother country and the dominions. The next clause deals with the position of the governor general, and is of much greater importance. It declares that this officer holds "in all essential respects the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs in the dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain, and that he is not the representative or agent of His Majesty's government in Great Britain or of any department of that government. . . . It was thought that the recognized official channel of communication should be in future between government and government direct." That is certainly an innovation, but it follows logically from the equality of status, for it means that the representative of the Crown in a dominion shall be advised wholly by the Cabinet there, and shall be in nowise responsible to the Cabinet in Great Britain. The same principle applies to legislation and the royal disallowance of dominion acts. The committee, therefore, proposed to place "on record that, apart from provisions embodied in constitutions or in specific statutes expressly providing for reservation, it is recognized that it is the right of the government of each dominion to advise the Crown in all matters relating to its own affairs. Consequently, it would not be in accordance with constitutional practice for advice to be tendered to His Majesty by His Majesty's government in Great Britain in any matter appertaining to the affairs of a dominion against the views of the government of that dominion;" and "the constitutional practice is that legislation by the Parliament at Westminster applying to a dominion would only be passed with the consent of the dominion concerned." The details are to be worked out by a committee, — the appointment of

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another committee being recommended to consider uniformity in shipping legislation.

The thorny question of appeals to the judicial committee of the privy council was left to each part of the Empire primarily affected, with the proviso that where issues were raised in which other parts were also concerned, changes in the present system should be carried out only after consultation and discussion.

A larger part of the Report is devoted to relations with foreign countries than to any other subject, and, as the Conference of 1923 assumed the right to make separate treaties, so this one assumes the right of separate negotiations of all kinds; recommendations, however, being made about giving notice of any matters that might interest other parts of the Empire. Standard forms of treaties are set forth, to conform more than those hitherto in use to the principle of equality among the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In regard to the general conduct of foreign affairs, it "was frankly recognized that in this sphere, as in the sphere of defense, the major share of responsibility rests now, and must for some time continue to rest, with His Majesty's government in Great Britain. Nevertheless, practically all the dominions are engaged to some extent, and some to a considerable extent, in the conduct of foreign relations, particularly those with foreign countries on their borders. . . . We felt that the governing consideration underlying all discussions of this problem must be that neither Great Britain nor the dominions could be committed to the acceptance of active obligations except with the definite assent of their own governments." "In cases other than those where dominion ministers were accredited to the heads of foreign states, it was agreed to be very desirable that the existing diplomatic channels should continue to be used as between the dominion governments and foreign governments, in matters of general and political concern." In short, the dominions can, if they choose, send ministers of their own to foreign countries, but until this is necessary they are advised to use the diplomats of Great Britain.

The Conference discussed also matters relating to coöperation in defense, to registry of British nationality, to economic questions, etc.; but none of these affect the autonomy, or equality, of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The results of the Conference may be considered under three aspects, — legal, political and coöperative.

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The legal may prove to be the least important, and it is certainly the simplest. Assuming that the statements in the Report are final and will be carried into effect, the dominions are no longer to be in any way under the control of Great Britain, or subject to her authority. She stands only in the position of a *primus inter pares*, for all are equal. The sole legal bond is the King. It is more accurate to say the King than the Crown, for the latter in Great Britain includes all the functions vested therein by acts of Parliament, which are not always the same in the dominions. Again, it might be misleading in this connection to speak of the King as the Sovereign, for the British use that term in two different senses. Popularly it is used for the wearer of the Crown; but among political philosophers it means the ultimate source of authority, and in that sense the sovereignty in Great Britain, although delegated to Parliament, resides in the last resort in the electorate, as from this time forth it will also in the dominions.

The only bond, then, is the King; not the King in council or in Parliament, but the King in person. It has been suggested that, as in the United States two flags are habitually used on public occasions, — the Stars and Stripes and the ensign of the state in which the function takes place, — so a similar practice might be adopted in the British Empire, and in that case the logical flag common to all would be the royal standard. Legally the condition is the same as when William the Third was also Staathalter of the United Netherlands, and when the four Georges were Electors of Hanover. In these cases the personal authority of the monarch was different in the two countries. Moreover, as head of the state he might be at war in one of them and not in the other; and his ministers in one had no control over his actions in the other. The present situation is in many respects quite unlike that at the time of William the Third or of the Georges; but legally the position is the same, notably in the fact that, as a common head did not make Great Britain and the Netherlands or Hanover a single state or prevent their being constitutionally independent, so does it not in the case of Great Britain and the dominions. States, indeed, bound together in an association of any kind, without a common organ of government, must in the nature of things be legally and politically independent; because the very definition of independence is not being subject, wholly or in part, to any control by an external authority.

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At the time of the halibut treaty between Canada and the United States, Professor Arthur Berriedale Keith, the great authority on responsible government in the dominions, remarked in a letter to the *Times* that without an imperial government there could be no Empire. That depends on what is meant by a government, or an organ of government, and what by Empire, and these are political rather than legal questions. Coming, therefore, to the political aspect of the question, we must ask ourselves, is the King personally an organ of government? In the sense of a ruler who has authority, legal or practical, to ordain what he thinks best, he certainly is not. He is one of the organs of government, but not the final one, and such powers as he possesses he must use on the advice of the cabinet in that member of the British Commonwealth of Nations to which the matter pertains. In Great Britain, indeed, his personal views, as expressed to his ministers, are not negligible, and may be important; but by no means to such an extent that he could be regarded as the common ruler, or political head, of Great Britain and other countries in a similar condition. Are his personal views likely to carry more weight in the dominions where he is at a distance and less familiar with the conditions? His powers there are delegated to a governor general, presumably appointed and removable on the advice of the local cabinet, for although this is not expressly mentioned in the Report it follows from the principle that all the King's acts are to be performed on the advice of the cabinet in the place to which they relate. In any case he is not an external authority in the dominions. He is a part of the mechanism of government there as in Great Britain. The fact that he habitually resides elsewhere is constitutionally unimportant, for his position is not unlike what it is in England when he happens to travel abroad.

The dominions would appear to be hereafter wholly free in the matter of legislation. Mr. Baldwin, indeed, has stated in the House of Commons that the right of veto on dominion legislation is not affected. Legally that is true. Even in Great Britain the legal right of the King to refuse assent to bills passed by Parliament still exists, but it has not been used since the reign of Queen Anne; nor is it likely to be capable of being practically used in the dominions, for, as intimated in the Report "through the Secretary of State for dominion affairs," "His Majesty will not be advised to exercise his powers of disallowance with regard

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to" acts of the dominion parliaments. Another of the attributes of independent nations, that of making treaties and negotiating on all subjects with foreign states, has now been conceded. In fact, Canada and the Irish Free State have already appointed their ministers to the United States. Moreover, the dominions being no longer subordinate, and the governors general no longer agents of the government at Westminster, there will be need of some kind of diplomats like those exchanged between independent states. It was therefore proposed in the Report to appoint representatives of Great Britain in the dominions and vice versa. Hence the latter would appear to have become, legally and politically, in both domestic and foreign matters, independent states.

But the legal and political aspects are not all. There are great possibilities of coöperation; there is a strong sentiment for the Empire; and at the recent Conference arrangements for common action were proposed, and a cordiality of spirit was shown, which has made people believe that the cohesion of the different parts of the Empire will become stronger rather than weaker. To discuss that question would be in the nature of prophecy. Yet it may be noted that three forces which draw peoples strongly together are only in part present. Anything in the nature of a common tariff is wholly out of the question, because the principal dominions are protectionist, and while willing to give preferences to British over foreign goods, are by no means prepared to forego protective tariffs against British competition with their own industries. Great Britain, also, although ready to favor some of the less important raw products of the colonies, cannot contemplate a general tariff on foodstuffs in their favor.

Another force that draws peoples together is the need of common defense, but while for military and naval objects Great Britain is far more powerful than the dominions, they are not all in need of her help. The United States would never permit any hostile army to land on the shores of Canada; and without first crippling the United States, no hostile army would venture to do so, thereby subjecting itself to attack from the south on the long frontier. Canada, therefore, is absolutely protected from invasion by what, for that purpose, is the most powerful nation in the world. There is, in fact, no country quite so safe as Canada. Save for her shipping, she has no need of defense by the British army or navy, and in her present international position she can-

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not be brought into a foreign war without her own consent, — this last being true also of the other dominions.

A third influence that binds peoples together is that of a common citizenship, with a right to travel and settle freely in any part of their domain, but this is by no means true of the British Empire. Not only are British subjects of oriental race more or less completely excluded from the dominions, but residents of England are subject in Canada to immigration laws that do not apply to her own native born. In touching at Halifax four years ago the writer was impressed by the division of the passengers about to land into Canadians, other British subjects and foreigners, each group being treated in a different way. It was a striking example of the absence of unity in citizenship even among the white subjects of the King; but the English passengers did not appear in the least surprised or offended.

The absence of these three forces of cohesion, although tending to reduce, does not exclude a sense of imperial unity and a desire to cling together. The combination of legal independence and a spirit of coöperation is perhaps the reason that those persons who have desired greater autonomy, and those who have desired to perpetuate and strengthen the Empire, are both pleased with the results of the Conference. This is well illustrated by the immediate effect of the announcement in South Africa, where the two political parties had been sharply at odds over the relations to the Empire; the South African party — mostly English — desiring to maintain, if not strengthen, the imperial ties; while the Nationalist party — mainly Dutch — of which General Hertzog, Prime Minister and delegate to the Conference, is the leader, have been anxious to achieve independence. Article IV of their program stated their wish for sovereign independence, and they have been advocating a bill for a separate flag. When the news of the result of the Conference came, both parties accepted it with joy. General Hertzog was reported as saying that what had been achieved would satisfy the people of South Africa, both Dutch and English-speaking; and General Smuts, the leader of the South African party, who desired autonomy and international recognition thereof, while opposed to separation from the Empire, was also pleased, but remarked that the acid test for the good faith of General Hertzog would be found in the dropping of Article IV from the program of the Nationalist party. At the same time others called upon that party to give up

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the demand for a separate flag. On the other hand, Mr. Roos, the acting Prime Minister, though highly approving of the Report of the Conference, remarked, "If we have got greater independence than the Article calls for, it can remain because it can do no harm; if we have got the same independence the Article demands, it can remain; if we have not yet reached the goal, the Article can remain as an ideal for the future." Dr. Malan, another member of the Cabinet, also believed in retaining Article IV, and added that "a free, independent South Africa without our own flag would be so unnatural that we ourselves would appear foolish in the eyes of the world if we decided not to have our own flag. I believe that all sober-minded sections will now be prepared more than ever to have this flag." The newspapers have rung the changes on these questions, each side insisting that it had won what it was after, — one the attainment of independence, the other that of remaining within the Empire.

In fact a divergence of opinion on the achievements of the Conference may easily be the result of regarding them from different standpoints. Great Britain is a world power, and also essentially a European nation. Her statesmen are constantly obliged to face, often not without anxiety, problems that arise among their continental neighbors; and at the same time others in the Near East, in India or in China. They must consider how a course of conduct toward the Turks, for example, will affect the sentiments of Mohammedans in various parts of the Empire. But in most of these things the dominions are little interested, for they are neither European nor world powers. Their aims are for the most part centred in their problems at home, or with their immediate neighbors. Hence the government in London thinks more about quiet and coöperation throughout its vast field of contacts than of its precise relation to far away dominions; while these are more concerned with the right to manage their own affairs in their own way. They do not feel bound to assume obligations in which they have no interest, and Great Britain with its wide and complex connections cannot limit its engagements to what they will accept.

The right of independence seems certainly to have been attained, under the mantle, or the shadow, or in the light of the Empire. Metaphors are dangerous, for they are sometimes misleading. No one of the dominions can now be constrained to adopt, or compelled to abstain from, any policy contrary to its

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wishes. It is free to coöperate with other parts of the Empire or not; but so long as the sentiment for that Empire is strong, and conflicting interests do not oppose it, the cohesion is likely to remain. The independence of the dominions, the absence of authority over them by Great Britain, are real, and some people will say that having obtained legal and political independence, the question whether this is enjoyed within or outside of the Empire is merely one of name. Others will urge that it is a substantial matter of attitude, and that the name helps to maintain the attitude of mind. So far as the dominions are concerned the British Empire has become, legally and constitutionally, little, if anything, more than a name. Its real bond is that of tradition and sentiment; a desire for harmonious action with very imperfect instruments for the purpose, and with the handicap of long distances and comparatively slight common interests. In the absence of any attempt at federation, which has of late been out of the question, the evolution of self-government has borne its logical fruit. It has brought the dominions to a condition of full constitutional independence. No doubt the powers that appertain to such a condition will be used sparingly at first, but they can hardly fail to be applied more and more freely as the larger dominions become more conscious of nationhood, and come into more direct relations with other countries. The process of development that has produced the present situation has been continuous and may be expected to continue.

Meanwhile, one or two matters are worthy of notice. It has already been remarked that the British Commonwealth of Nations means Great Britain and the self-governing dominions. With a few small exceptions, like the mandates of Australia and New Zealand over certain islands, the rest of the Empire, which has not self-government, is under the direct control of Great Britain. In it the dominions have no share except so far as Great Britain chooses to accord it to them. Just as she has no claim to the wheat of Canada, the wool of Australia or the gold of South Africa, and no right which cannot be cut off to sell her manufactures in those countries; so they have no right to the rubber and tin of the Federated Malay States, or to the products of India and tropical Africa, which are under her control.

To Americans another matter of interest is how, if at all, the development in the status of the dominions should affect the conduct of our country. That we should send diplomatic repre-

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sentatives to Canada and the Irish Free State in return for those they have sent to Washington would seem to be merely a matter of common courtesy; and of course we should do the same if any other of the dominions should want to send ministers to us. If we are to negotiate with Canada in future it should be directly with her representative, without seeking the intervention of the British Ambassador. The Canadian minister ought to inform him if the matter interests other parts of the Empire, but that is his affair, not ours. If, on the other hand, we wish to deal with Australia alone, there being no interchange of diplomats between us, we must do it through the British Ambassador. In doing so, however, we are not dealing with the government of Great Britain, but through the Ambassador solely for, and under the instructions of, the government of Australia; and, in accordance with the forms approved by the Conference, the agreement reached is to be signed by him on behalf of His Majesty the King for the Commonwealth of Australia. Such an agreement would not bind, or in any way commit, Great Britain. As our trade and that of the dominions grow greater, the need of direct diplomatic intercourse with them will increase, to say nothing of the fact that they are sure to apply to American bankers for loans more than in the past.

Whether the Report of the Conference is an authoritative statement of the existing international position of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or marks a further step in the progress that has long been going on, it is a pronouncement to all men of the condition that must henceforth be accepted by other nations. To us it is a notice that the dominions have come of age, have full rights of citizenship among the states of the world, and are to be treated accordingly. Like ourselves, their people are in the main descended from settlers in a strange land; in many ways their interests, their hopes, their political ideas, are similar to ours, and their language is for the most part the same. Whether geographically near or far we should play the part of a friendly neighbor, welcome them into the family of nations, and on all occasions seek to cultivate with them the most cordial of relations.

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THE GOAL IN INDIA

By Sir Frederick Whyte

MODERN India is a study in contrasts. Its problems are continental in scope, and the varieties of its peoples in speech and in social custom make them as intricate as they are spacious. The pivot round which all these problems revolve is the struggle between tradition and change. The very use of the word "modern" implies that India in the twentieth century is different from historic or traditional India; and yet there are many competent observers who will deny that there has been any fundamental change. Pointing to the fact that the Indian way of life has remained unchanged for countless years, they maintain that the political ferment is a superficial phenomenon provoked by alien influence and that the true sources of Indian life are still untouched.

Now it may be true that the springs of Indian thought still flow from their ancient secret source; true also, that tradition still rules the daily life of the great majority; and manifestly true that, on the surface, many things are much as they ever were. If Asoka, the great Buddhist Emperor who reigned in India two thousand years ago, could return to Patna, or if Akbar, the Mogul contemporary of Queen Elizabeth, could emerge from his noble tomb at Sikandra, a still familiar India would greet their eyes. Indeed Akbar would find far less change in his India than Elizabeth would find in England today. He would recognize the India of Kipling's "Kim," for there life moves as it did in Akbar's time. The bullock cart still rumbles along the deep dust track; the wheels creak and the ox-bells tinkle as of old; the mendicant and the holy man still walk the roads of Hindustan, with crutch and begging bowl; the brown landscape spreads its fertile expanse under sun and rain; and over every village at nightfall the blue bitter dungsmoke still spreads its iridescent canopy. And despite the strange apparition of the railway train and the unwonted lines of telegraph wire flanking the road, Akbar would be able to say: "After three hundred years, my people are not changed. They speak and eat, they work and worship, much as they ever did."

But after a while he would be aware of a change, deeper and more subtle even than the difference between the bullock cart

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and the motor car. It is not something that can be seen by the eye or measured by the hand; but to the ear that can hear, it is like the rustle of distant trees in the wind, the murmur of waves on the flowing tide. It is the sound of a mind awaking. The mind of India is awake as it has never been before. And we are the cause of its awakening. When I say we are the cause of that Indian awakening which is called unrest, I do not mean to claim that we have set about deliberately to disturb the deep and mysterious waters of Indian life. It would be truer to say that we have been the agents of a process which has been going on all over Asia for years, but that we British feel a responsibility for India because the King is Emperor of India.

We have been taught to believe, however, that the Orient is the "Unchanging East," and those who would have us adhere to the dogma of Oriental inscrutability have much to justify their contention. Political novelty, let us admit, might be a mere passing fashion if it stood alone; but, as it does not stand alone, we must accept as a working hypothesis the possibility of fundamental change. For the political agitation which has turned Asia into a melting pot of constitutional experiment is accompanied by other significant phenomena. Popular education stimulates it; economic forces assist it in the assault upon established tradition; the emancipation of women makes a wide breach in ancient custom; and the prevailing spirit of renascence in Asia gives the whole movement the zeal of a crusade. In India, as elsewhere in Asia, we must acknowledge that, if this ancient land has not forsaken the past, her peoples have a vision of the future.

The most obvious signs of the change are material, and some of the greatest forces at work are economic, but the invisible spring from which they all flow is intellectual and moral. It is not by our industrial machines that we have created a new life in India, it is by our ideas. And the whole inwardness of the Indian problem today lies in the question: "Can our ideas, when put into practice, for instance in the form of democratic government, be transplanted to India and adapted to the needs of India?" To that question there is no quick and easy answer. The Viceroy in Delhi, the Indian legislator in the Legislative Assembly, the member of a district board struggling with the problem of water supply for his village — all of them, often without knowing it, are helping to find the answer. And I think that all of us, whether British, Indian or American, may be sur-

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prised when we have found it: for we do not always remember that when you take an animal or an institution out of its natural climate, change its diet and adapt it to new circumstances, it does not remain the same. Loch Leven trout transported to the streams of New Zealand grow a monstrous size, become lazy and lose nearly all the qualities that make them trout. The European, migrating to the American Middle West, adds an inch to his height, lengthens his nose, softens his heart and becomes a rampageous and sanguine person. And, finally, the fish out of water dies.

Now, if all these transformations take place in the physical world, shall they not also take place in the political world? And, if so, must we not expect to find the Parliament which England has transplanted from the Palace of Westminster to the Plains of Hindustan becoming something different, something Indian? We do not yet know whether representative institutions in India are a fish out of water, or merely a creature which will change its color and its habits in its new surroundings. And it will be a long time before we can answer these questions.

The problem here described is the chief matter of interest in the operation of the Indian Constitution. It was my privilege to describe certain features in the political evolution of India in a recent issue of this review.[1] I propose here to carry the account then given a little further.

The Preamble to the "Government of India Act, 1919," (the law passed by the Imperial Parliament after the war to reform the Indian political system) declared the purpose of Parliament thus:

". . . to provide for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian Administration, and for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the empire:

"And whereas progress in giving effect to this policy can only be achieved by successive stages, and it is expedient that substantial steps in this direction should now be taken:

"And whereas the time and manner of each advance can be determined only by Parliament, upon whom responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples:

"And whereas the action of Parliament in such matters must be guided by the coöperation received from those on whom new opportunities of service will be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility:

"And whereas concurrently with the gradual development of self-governing

[1] FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 4, No. 2.

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institutions in the Provinces of India it is expedient to give to those Provinces in provincial matters the largest measure of independence of the Government of India, which is compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities:

"Be it therefore enacted. . . ."

This is the most comprehensive declaration of a policy made by the British Government since the famous Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858. It heralded a new departure towards a definite goal, laying down a broad line of advance and prescribing standards by which success in each stage of progress may be measured. The goal is Indian self-government, the line of advance is found initially in the Provinces, the rate and the character of progress are to be determined largely by the sense of responsibility with which successive new opportunities of service are employed and also by the spirit in which India coöperates with England for the common good of the Indian Empire. The Act was passed in 1919, it came into effective operation with the Indian General Election of 1920, and its operation will be examined by a Royal Commission not later than 1929. It is possible, and even probable, that this Commission may be appointed before that date, for the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, has described himself as "no slave of dates" and has been careful to leave the door open to earlier action if the circumstances warrant it.

The Preamble to the Act declares that the future action of Parliament will be guided by the coöperation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service have been conferred. It is therefore important to appreciate the meaning of "Non-Coöperation" and to disengage the constructive and coöperative effort of contemporary India from the destructive activities of Mr. Gandhi's movement. In my previous review of the situation I endeavored to make a judicial estimate of the good and evil of Non-Coöperation, and was led to conclude that "the net sum of it is not evil and goes to the credit of its creator." But, judged in political terms, it was a refusal to coöperate; and if it had achieved its aim in 1920 there would be no constitution in India today offering an opportunity for the gradual development of self-governing institutions. It failed; and its very failure, writ large upon the face of India today, is no small part of the proof that, as the merits of the reformed Constitution become better known, an ever increasing body of political Indians was prepared

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to coöperate with Government in working the new institutions for the benefit of India. Moreover, even if Non-Coöperation had retained its early power, there would still be evidence of Indian coöperation to satisfy the criterion of the Preamble. The new legislative bodies came into being and weathered the storms of the first three years because enough just men were found in Sodom to man the ship, even at the worst moment. We have pointed out before that India owes a very large debt in about equal measure to the government of Lord Reading for its fortitude and forbearance under severe trial and to those Indians who, at much personal and political risk, entered the new Councils in 1921 and by thus accepting our good faith enabled England to keep her word. Some of these men no longer survive to see the fruit of their labors, others have been driven from public life by an ungrateful people, but there are many still left; and I rejoice to see that one of them, the liberal young Rajah of Santosh, now has his reward for good service performed under fire in his election the other day by a substantial majority to the Chair of the Bengal Legislative Council.

Here, then, is the first and perhaps the most significant evidence of coöperation. Nor does it stand alone; for that sense of public duty which enabled my first colleagues in the Legislative Assembly to face the unpleasant music of 1920 carried them through many a test of responsibility in the ensuing three years. They shouldered manfully a burden of taxation which was more than doubled by the odium which it entailed; despite the pressure of a rampant popular movement outside, they maintained (with some oscillations and abberations) a fairly steady course of action in all the chambers; they resisted the temptation to curry favor with violent men by demanding the release of the firebrands of Non-Coöperation; and they succeeded, amid the depression of budget deficits and the allurements of political agitation, in devoting some time to genuine social reform. Moreover, all these things were achieved without leadership and in great measure without organization. India today has no Parnell, no Garibaldi, no Cavour, no Kossuth. She is singularly poor in men; and individuals are very apt to be disloyal to their own friends. With these defects, the political conduct of the Indian parliamentarians in recent times has only been the more remarkable. They were not paragons of political virtue, and sometimes both the sense of responsibility and the sense of humor deserted them. They were

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often unable to see the wood for the trees, and would throw away substance for shadow at the bidding of patriotism. But what nationalist has ever seen eye to eye with the philosopher in this matter of the "best political good" and the best means to acquire it? Plato did indeed say that no nation would ever be justified in slaying its rulers; but he did not say that our rulers should be immune from hard words or even sharper reminders of their human frailty. And in contemplating the political acts of India, let us never forget that the men under observation are ardent patriots face to face with an alien government.

The growth of a sense of responsibility is perhaps not so evident in all this: but it will be obvious to the careful reader that, if this account offers proof of "coöperation," it also indicates "responsibility." Indeed it is impossible to distinguish one from the other. At the same time, and before we proceed to examine the contemporary record, let us be quite sure what we mean by "a sense of responsibility." When we say that the Prime Minister of Great Britain is a responsible person we use the word in two senses. He is responsible to Parliament, as the representative of the nation, for the good conduct of all national affairs and for the general character of his own policy. In the true constitutional sense he is the personal climax of responsible government and is presumed to act with a due sense of this constitutional responsibility. But in an individual sense also, his is a responsible person: for, as Stanley Baldwin and not merely as Prime Minister, he acts with the knowledge that he must bear the consequence of his action, and does not, in usual fact, seek to evade those consequences. Now, in the larger sense, the Indian (and especially the Hindu) is brought up in the belief that, while he must bear the consequences of all his acts, both the acts and the consequences are part of a fore-ordained scheme of human affairs which is beyond his power to change, and the knowledge breeds in him a certain irresponsibility of fatalism. He therefore sets out on his political voyage from a different homeland of character and belief, feeling within himself a motive of responsibility less virile than that which animates other men in other parts of the world.

There can be no question here of the ultimate superiority of either type, for no ultimate question is involved. All that is at stake is the peculiar blend of political qualities necessary for the particular enterprise of representative government. Moreover, experience proves that these qualities, even when not innate, are

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none the less within the reach of those who would develop them. It is not true that this sense of responsibility is like the poet, born not made. Rather it is like the appetite which grows by what it feeds on, and those who have watched the Indian political scene for the last six years will be the first to acknowledge that "responsibility" breeds a "sense of responsibility."

This development of responsibility is a phenomenon which you may observe in India today, provided you take a steady view of the whole Indian panorama and refuse to judge the whole by any of its parts. If you were to see India through the windows of Bengal your conclusions might be unfavorable; if you saw it through the eyes of Lord Willingdon — one of the successful operators of diarchy — you might wax too sanguine; but if, after a survey of all the provinces and an inspection of the Government of India at close quarters, you were to draw your own picture, you could hardly fail to see that the main stream has been flowing in increasing volume in the direction indicated above. The Swaraj Party is often held up before the world as a pattern of irresponsibility and has only too often justified its detractors; but it is an excellent example of the *tendency* to which I have endeavored to draw attention. Its birth was a good omen, for it broke away from Gandhi because Gandhi had become "politically impossible." Its first manifestoes, disingenuous as they often were, sounded the first note of sanity in the Indian revolution since the war. Its decision to enter the legislative bodies was a constructive act, though veiled by a profession of obstruction. And its course of action in these chambers has brought it, by a converging path, ever nearer the main road of coöperation. It is not a "coöperator" yet, and perhaps it will never profess the full-blooded faith of the true coöperator; but it is no longer a "non-coöperator," and if it often looks back with regret to the forsaken Gomorrah, even if the Providence should turn it into a pillar of salt (of which it runs some risk), it has shown India the way out of the condemned city of non-coöperation — which, in itself, is a form of "coöperation" if not of "responsibility."

These changes in Swaraj Party tactics have been dictated to it by the general opinion which more and more demands practical policies if not positive results from the politicians. But all tactical movements notwithstanding, the Swaraj Party has on the whole failed to keep pace with the changing opinion of India.

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It has not dared to retreat rapidly enough from its first extreme position, and it now finds that the control of the main line of advance is falling into other hands. Pandit Motilal Nehru, the leader of the Party, speaking at Lahore on April 11, 1926, found himself in the predicament of having to proclaim the principle of "civil disobedience" (i.e. refusal to pay taxes, etc.) and to admit its invalidity in practice. "What we undertake to do," he said, "is to educate the country to resort to it, whenever it comes, it may be fifty or a hundred years hence." Meanwhile the general body of opinion asks to be told what he proposes to do, not a century hence, but tomorrow in the Legislative Assembly; and when he is seen in his seat in that chamber his very presence there is interpreted as a kind of pledge that he has now dropped civil disobedience. Moreover, when he and his Party walked out of the Assembly at the opening of the Budget debate in 1926 (a month before the above speech was delivered) the country saw in this gesture merely an electoral maneuver and decided that the Pandit could not eat his cake and have it. And definite expression was given to this judgment when the elections of 1926 deprived the Swarajists of their hegemony of political India.

It is not possible, at the time of writing, to give a complete and reliable table of the election results in detail, but the principal features of the polling are certain. The Party has lost 24 percent of its strength in the Legislative Assembly, mainly to the so-called Independent Congress Party led by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (Benares) and Lajpat Rai (Punjab); it has barely held its previous meagre quota of seats in the United Provinces and in the Punjab; it has failed to improve its position in Bengal; it has lost heavily in Bombay; and has almost been wiped out of existence in the Central Provinces. Against this universal decline it has the satisfaction of a substantial victory (though not a majority) in Madras, where, however, Swarajist success is to be interpreted more in terms of the unpopularity of the "Justice" (or Non-Brahmin) Party than of positive approval of the Swaraj Party. But let us be wary interpreters! Where the Constitution has worked best, in Madras, there its professed enemies win. Where the Constitution came to deadlock by Swarajist action, there the Swarajists (decisively in the Central Provinces, equivocally in Bengal) suffer defeat. The truth is that personal feuds, provincial peculiarities, communal feeling, and, in a word, all those elements that give local color to the picture, are essen-

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tial to a true estimate; and therefore a judgment based on a general review has to be safeguarded by accurate local knowledge. In the present case, it would appear that the Swarajists win seats in Madras because they are the opposition exposing Non-Brahmin misdeeds, and lose in Bengal (and more decisively in the Central Provinces) because they have brought progress to a standstill and have nothing to show for it. Finally, they go back to the Legislative Assembly in diminished numbers because they tried to make the best of both worlds and failed.

The parties who went to the Indian polls in December are more numerous than ever. In Bengal there were: the Swaraj Party, the Independent Congress Party, the Responsivists, the Bengal Muslim Party, the Independent Muslim Party, Europeans, and odds and ends. In Bombay they were as numerous, and their number creates an almost insoluble problem, as in French Cabinet making — how to weld the fragments in a majority which will hold together in support of a ministry. The parties are not battalions in the army of principle, they are disorganized appetites; and nothing but the power of a commanding personality could melt their petty jealousies and fuse them into a tempered political instrument.

On the whole these results give cause for satisfaction to the friends of Indian progress. But in some cases it is not yet possible to say whether they will yield legislative bodies of a more constructive character than those which preceded them, nor is it easy to say where the balance of power will lie in any of them. Even where the Swarajists are strongest, as in Madras, they have no majority, and their pledge to refuse office of any kind is interpreted in different ways. It is notorious that some of their ablest leaders openly repudiate the authority of the Indian National Congress which attempted to impose that pledge anew upon the Party last December at Gauhati in Assam; and these men know that a Swarajist who consents to take office under the British Raj is no longer his early self, and that there is little to distinguish him from the Independent, the Liberal or the Responsive Coöperator. In a word, the Swaraj Party is moving towards the historic line of Indian political agitation which has only been broken by two men, Tilak and Gandhi, the former preaching open violence, the latter veiled violence, and neither making any substantial political gain thereby. The net result of it all is that we may contemplate two or three years of construc-

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tive work, uninterrupted by senseless violence, unhindered by financial stringency. In a sense, India has made a new start. On the very day (January 18, 1927) when Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, opened the new Council House in Delhi, in a ceremony in which his own speech of impressive sincerity struck the highest note, the Bengal Legislative Council gave an unexpected and emphatic testimonial to the Constitution which it was wont to revile by asking for the revival of the defunct diarchical Ministry by 94 votes to 38. The Indian Constitution has defeated the Indian Revolution, and a period of comparative peace is assured.

Political peace in India is never long-lived, and the calm of to-day is but an armistice which will not last more than a year or two. Storms of emotion, now political, now religious, more often the latter exploited by the practitioners of the former, break over the Indian scene with an almost incredible ferocity, suggesting the onset of devastation which nothing can resist. But soon the storm abates, the disturbing emotion subsides, and who can say what result has been achieved? The tempest itself is to be seen as a protest, not as a purpose: it usually explodes by emotional pressure from within, not in order to break a resistance without. This is a historic truth, just as valid to-day as it has been any time these thousands of years. But there is a distinction to be drawn between the emotional crises of the past and the storm of Non-Coöperation. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that, beginning with Tilak, a definite political motive is now playing a part for the first time in demonstrations hitherto mainly emotional in character. Moreover, it is vital to our purpose to take note of the significant fact that the political motive has outlived the emotional protest: for though Gandhi, the spearhead of the protest, is politically dead, the general body of opinion in India is politically more alive than ever. The growth of the political means must therefore keep pace with the growth of the political spirit. In a word, the comparative peace which now prevails — we leave the Hindu-Mussulman feud on one side, but without forgetting it — is no excuse for standing still. It is a breathing space to be employed in estimating the direction and magnitude of the next advance.

Now the estimate of the future, as we have seen, will depend upon the estimate of the past; and therefore the evidence now available regarding the general character of Indian politics since 1920 must be an important factor in the ultimate decision. On

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the question of "coöperation" and "sense of responsibility" we have already foreshadowed certain conclusions; but there is a mass of important detail in the Muddiman Report which has an equal though different validity. To it we now turn.

The Muddiman Committee was appointed in 1924: (1) to enquire into the difficulties arising from, or defects inherent in, the working of the Government of India Act and the rules thereunder in regard to the Central Government and the Governments of governors' provinces; and (2) to investigate the feasibility and desirability of securing remedies for such difficulties or defects, consistent with the structure, policy and purpose of the Act. The first clause threw open the whole area to the scrutiny of the committee, but the second confined their proposals to changes *within the structure of the Act.* Against this restriction the minority, composed of four leading Indians, protested, and as the main purpose of their report was to emphasize the fact that no satisfaction could be found in minor amendments of the Act, they had to content themselves with certain statements of principle, of which the most important was that "the only cure (for certain admitted evils) was the replacement of the diarchical by unitary and responsible provincial government." The majority report, on the other hand, made a number of minor proposals which, valuable in themselves, are not such as demand examination here. The value of report lies, not in the proposals made in either section, but in the conditions revealed by the enquiry.

The Local Governments submitted reports of provincial conditions which varied considerably in character. The Madras Government reports "a considerable measure of success;" the United Provinces Government denies that the Constitution has broken down, but describes diarchy as "only a transitional expedient;" the Bombay Government says that some progress in Parliamentary Government has been made, but that it has been retarded by the weakness of parties in the Council and by the influence of Non-Coöperation outside; the Bengal Government is not optimistic, nor is the Government of Bihar and Orissa; the Punjab Government gives prominence to communal troubles, but concludes that the balance of the account is not discreditable to the Legislative Council. The bulk of the evidence shows that:

(1) The present Constitution has not broken down, but has worked with varying degrees of success — with deadlock in some places, and genuine progress in others.

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(2) It is universally regarded as provisional, and therefore the politicians tend to think more of the method by which it can be exploited with a view to early amendment, than of using it for constructive purposes in economic or social reform.

(3) It has failed to provoke the creation of genuine political parties, but has none the less contributed largely to the general political education of the legislators.

(4) The legislators have not made any general and effective effort to use the work of the Legislative Councils as a means of educating the electorate, and therefore the electorate itself does not play its proper part in the balanced mechanism of the Constitution.

(5) The difficulties and defects inherent in the Constitution "are quite incurable by any mere alteration of the Act or the Rules;" and, in the words of the Governor of the United Provinces, "concessions which fall short of complete provincial autonomy will placate no section of the opponents of the existing system."

These preliminary conclusions raise a forest of vital questions, of which the most characteristic and far-reaching are: first, the validity for India of representative Government *in its British form;* second, the federal relations of the Government of India and the Provinces; third, the problem of the electorate and the cognate problem of political education.

Any *one* of these is formidable stuff to handle. For a Commission which must embrace them *all*, nothing short of a providential sagacity will suffice. Moreover the root of the whole problem lies deep in the obscure heart of India where the struggle between tradition and change is growing hotter every moment. India, let us remember, is not yet a political country. Politics are, no doubt, the all-absorbing interest of the educated classes, but even these classes are not politically minded. They are quick to learn the forms and phrases of political life, but have shown little aptitude for statecraft on a national scale. Throughout the ages India has been accustomed to accept government imposed from above; and the mind of her people has never till recently been stirred by political ambition. The literature of India contains no political treatise comparable with Aristotle's "Politics," Plato's "Republic," Machiavelli's "Prince," Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois," Burke's "Essays and Speeches," Mill's "Liberty," or Alexander Hamilton's "Federalist." This shows that the habit

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of political thought has never grown in India. It is only another way of saying that India is a religious not a political continent. The rich soil of political theory in which the Greek States grew, and the massive work in political administration which gave Rome her predominance, provided Europe with a prepared field of statecraft which is almost wholly lacking in India. India has no such harvest of political experience.

Difficulties arise in various forms as we survey the Indian scene. There is a serious lack of leaders; the peninsula is the home of many diverse social elements separated by great distances and even greater differences of speech and social habit; the feud between Hindu and Mussulman gravely hampers progress towards unity; and the economic organization of the country is such that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that India is trying to operate a twentieth century constitution on the resources of the Middle Ages.

Moreover, in Indian minds the ultimate form of Indian self-government is uncertain, for they have rarely approached the problem with a constructive intention. Born and bred in the school of agitation, conceiving of politics solely as a game in which they are the bullet and the Government the target, they have never devised or proposed, they have remained content with criticism. Only in the most recent times has a new temper arisen; and here and there we may observe definite signs of a disposition to treat statecraft as a task which only disciplined and constructive labor can enable them to discharge.

With this awakening sense of responsibility there begins to be evident a resolve to treat constitutional and political projects on their merits. Even under the operation of the present Constitution, admittedly transitional and incomplete as it is, the Indian legislator has shown a concern for realities. He has begun to understand what government is and to see that theoretical designs, if divorced from human experience, remain sterile. The Legislative Assembly has not infrequently shown that it could appreciate the purpose of Government in proposing unpopular taxation, and was prepared to support other unpalatable measures which were necessary for the welfare and the security of the commonwealth; while the Legislative Councils in the Provinces — or in some Provinces — have displayed a similar disposition. The manner in which those new opportunities of service, of which the Preamble to the Act speaks, have been taken by the repre-

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sentatives of the Indian peoples offers no justification for a harsh judgment, and therefore I do not believe that, when the Constitutional enquiry is held, India need fear an unfavorable verdict.

The Indian of 1927 has the appetite for politics, has learned something of the meaning of statecraft, and assumes that this acquired knowledge is adequate to the political needs of his country. Most significantly, he believes so utterly in his power of comprehension and in his adaptability that he conceives it possible for India to leap over those long stages of preparation through which we have passed on our way to democratic self-government and to reach Home Rule by a royal road.

Hence his impatience: hence, too, our caution! We must remember that, if it be right for us to pronounce a not unfavorable verdict upon the Indian political record of the past six years, the evidence upon which this judgment is based refers only to a period in which England and India were coöperating in the tasks of Government; and, coöperating, moreover, under a Constitution which still assumes British leadership. It is not necessarily valid for a condition of affairs in which that leadership is removed or impaired. But if we assume that the personal leadership of a good British Viceroy — or of British Governors in the Provinces — is not likely to be removed for many a long day, and if we further assume, as I think we may, that as India takes an increasing share in her own responsible government she will seek voluntarily what she now has to accept under compulsion, namely, guidance from the greater political experience of Great Britain, then we may look forward with hope.

We do not, for one moment, forget the warnings born of past experience and of present difficulties. Indeed we shall ignore them at our peril. If Hindu and Mussulman cannot, or will not, establish a truce of God between their warring communities; if Brahmin cannot, or will not, release his less fortunate brethren from ancient tyranny; if, in a word, India shrinks from the task of purging herself of those evils which distress her, England will not abdicate the trust which she has assumed. But there could be abdication of that trust which would be no defeat. An India set free from evil would be an India that had prepared herself for her new political task. And to those of us who are or may be the instruments of England's new purpose in India, the obstacles that now beset the path are the material for reform; they reveal the magnitude of the task, but they do not foreshadow defeat.

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APRIL, 1917 – APRIL, 1927

By Rollo Ogden

TO attempt to identify and interpret the changes wrought in American mentality by the Great War and its sequels is alluring but hazardous. So easily does the writer dip his pen in the pathetic fallacy. If he has lived through the period 1917–1927 with an intensity of emotion almost painful, and with every inherited patriotic fibre often set quivering, he is in danger of confusing his own consciousness with the collective mind, as Gibbon was said to have been unable to tell, at the end of his long studies, where his own personality left off and that of the Roman Empire began.

Nor must he forget how swiftly the generations march across the scene. Today there must be a million Americans between twenty and thirty years of age to whom the first battle of the Marne is but as a faint and far-off echo of something read about. They can know nothing first-hand of the agonized suspense with which their elders watched its clash and recoil of armies as leading to either the end or the hope of civilization. And one who, as he saw his nation enter the war and emerge from it triumphant, felt like crying out, "Oh, Beautiful my Country," must not be too sure that such a sentiment swells in the hearts of his fellows just because it still does in his own.

Another difficulty of understanding is the common and complacent assumption that the last ten years changed America out of all recognition. It is true that Titanic energies were let loose, but they did not utterly shake down the old landmarks. The result was less a creation than a disclosure. Americans simply perceived themselves more clearly in the lightning flashes of the war. They were not new made but new circumstanced. The world looked on in wonder but it was only because the time had come for America to meet the poet's test and "appear to be that which thou art internally."

Let us also put aside the notion that the war first made the United States conscious of being a World Power. America had no such delayed infancy. Its fathers had from the beginning empire in their brains. The nation which, only half made up, could announce and maintain the Monroe Doctrine, certainly had no craven fear of being great. The proud dispatch that Daniel

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Webster when Secretary of State sent eighty years ago to the Austrian Foreign Office was as assured in strength, and as confident in facing a frowning world, as was Seward's notification to France to quit Mexico, or Olney's note to Lord Salisbury asserting our fiat as law in this hemisphere. America did not need to wait for the roar of her guns in the Argonne to know that she had an immense destiny challenging her to live up to it.

Undeniably, the people of the United States took from the anvil of the war a newly forged sense of unity. How could it have been otherwise? A spirit of nationalism breathed on the face of the waters. In those days of mighty effort, the North cried to the South, "Give up," and the East to the West, "Hold not back." Cliques, cults and sectionalism were swept into the gulf. The nation stood out a glowing whole. Tell citizens of a necessary sacrifice, and, instead of doubting or shrinking, they leaped to it. Law did something; glad spontaneity much more. Each man felt himself a willing rival of his neighbor in competing for the privilege of giving up something for the country. Never had there been so nearly a common mind in America. Inevitably something of the warmth of that fusion of thought and purpose was lost later on, but the demonstration had been complete. America knew herself one. Nothing can hereafter blot out that consciousness.

Nor can America ever forget the realization of her power which the war brought to her. It was partly physical. Those marching millions embodied an irresistible force which we did not know was ours. That this was not insensate pride of war or delusion of military grandeur was shown by what followed. Our armies melted back into the peaceful mass from which they had sprung. The contrary was planned by hasty statesmen. We should never be caught that way again. There would be a standing army of at least 500,000 men. Compulsory military service would be continued. Look what the camps had done to lick insubordinate boys into disciplined men. The country had seen that miracle, and would never consent to go on again without it. Wouldn't it! Little did those who reasoned in this way know their America. She had shown how she could fight, but she had never wavered in the belief that her mission and work in this world are peace. Let her democracy be called haphazard and improvident; shambling, impatient of regimentation, careless of the future. Never mind. At least it possessed and cherished "the manners of liberty." Unkempt and disorderly, if you please, but still free.

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Note should be taken of one other aspect of their resources of power which the war first fully revealed to the American people. This was financial. Money flowed to the Government in streams beyond previous imagination. Vast popular loans were floated to an amount a hundred times greater than skilled bankers thought to be the limit of the possible. And taxation rose correspondingly. Huge sums were taken from citizens who beforehand would have wailed that it meant confiscation and ruin. They found that they could pay and live. The country observed that they could pay and prosper. That lesson abides. The old arguments about not being able to provide public funds for needed public works have lost their teeth. Free education, hospitals, roads, parks, town planning, the City Beautiful have been shown where to go for money, and we may be sure that they will not forget the road. An unsuspected financial strength called forth by the war will remain to serve peace.

Sure of herself as mistress in her own house, America has for ten years had more to do with her neighbors on the earth than ever before. They have looked in at her windows. They have knocked at her door. She has not been able to ignore or avoid them. Even if she had agreed with Dr. Johnson that foreigners are mostly fools, there they were with their unescapable contacts, their ineluctable relations, commercial, financial, political. In vain sternly to remind her that she must turn her back on entangling alliances. She saw herself entangled in a thousand ways. New bonds had tied her to Europe that could not be snapped. Break one and two new ones took its place. The more the doctrine was preached that she must leave Europeans to stew in their own juice, the more she discovered herself stewing along with them. The time had passed when any one nation could live unto itself. It could not even die unto itself, for the whole world would then be chained to a body of death from which a mortal infection would flow to the rest. This was a new experience to America — new at least in degree. Previously she had touched old world affairs when she pleased; now she found that she could not pass them by on the other side even if she sought to do so. Caught in the great coil in spite of herself, she had continually to ask what she was going to do about it. The effect of all this upon the American outlook, the American mentality, invites like a fascinating study.

It would be superfluous to go over again here the long chronicle

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of confusion and cross-purposes and groping from 1919 onward — the treaties, the conferences, the negotiations, the approaches, the retreats, the settlements that settled nothing, the definite refusals that meant only renewed demands. The record is open and known of all. What mainly interests today is less the events themselves than their sequences, the results etched by them in the American consciousness. Here we must discriminate and divide. We cannot say that all Americans were affected alike. They have to be scrutinized group by group, party by party. To attribute motives is both ungracious and precarious. Yet effect defective comes by cause. All action has its impulses and aims, and no account of what was taking place can be complete or even fair unless it pierces to the quick and shows how those were actuated who were responsible for its taking place.

Scanning the turbulent flood which has swept over the earth during the ten years past, what has it carried away, what left? We have seen thrones sunk in the muddy waters. Dynasties have been engulfed. Institutions have been broken up, so that only their disjected parts are now visible. Yet America has kept most of its old frame intact — more than has any other nation. But what about the American idealism of which we used to hear so much in the early days of the war? Has that been sucked to the bottom of the Serbonian bog? Is it true, as so many have been quick to say, that our professed ideals have gone sour and sordid?

On this subject it is necessary to clear our minds of a lot of cant. Uncle Sam never was the knight in shining armor that it pleased some to picture him in 1917–18. Of the American boys — the rose and expectancy of the State — who crossed the sea on a path starred with noble purpose, too much cannot be said in praise. They deserve our fondest idealization. But the rhetoric which we poured out on them as a marching song did not convey the exact truth about the attitude of the country as a whole. It was not thinking in terms of high altruism, so much as setting its teeth to do a hard job. We had not wanted to go into the war, but being in we resolved to make the others sweat for it. They would find that we had the men, we had the ships, and we had the money too. Our own peril we but dimly sensed. But we openly faced our tough work. And it was more in a spirit of dour efficiency than of knight errantry that we tackled the business. If there was a trace of Don Quixote in Uncle Sam at the time, there was still more of Sancho Panza, the intensely practical man who was con-

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fident of his ability to govern any island that might be assigned to him, no matter how large.

In all this matter of national idealism, Americans are but slightly self-conscious. They are not in the habit of X-raying their moral insides. They do not take kindly to a grand public clinic in psychoanalysis. For them the main thing is the next piece of work in hand. This is what they have been busying themselves about since the war. They have labored and traded and farmed and manufactured and bought and sold and got rich. They have sought to whiten new seas with the sails of their foreign commerce. They have explored and exploited. They have investigated and invested. All this may seem very far from abstract idealism, but it has opened the way for the most practical kind of idealism. Unconsciously, Americans have been preparing themselves to take their fit place in the world. They may have thought that they were merely amassing wealth. But they are waking up to the fact that they have been accumulating power. And it is a power which requires extension and exercise beyond the ocean, else will it crash at home. America has been making herself the ablest of nations. But able for what? Manifestly, for holding the nations together, for supporting them in their struggles to get back on their feet, for keeping the peace of the world, for enlarging opportunity to every mortal that breathes.

Let us for the moment drop idealism and talk of hardheadedness. Of that Americans have God's plenty. They may not be patient with fine-spun theories, but they know when they are hit in the face by a solid fact. With actual events they understand that they have got to reckon, and it was a true word spoken by an English observer when he said that the United States would be brought into the World Court and the League of Nations, not by appeals on the score of duty or humanity, but by the inexorable logic of events. In the end, enlightened self-interest will lead us where impassioned eloquence could not persuade us to go.

As the tenth year closes we can hear the slow grinding of the mills of the gods. By a kind of moral gravitation the ends of the earth are more and more drawn together. America aloof is as impossible to conceive as America thrust back to Colonial days. Trade knits us to other lands. Finance calls us. Common problems of health bind us. Quickened intercourse and interchange make it impossible for us to live apart. For us not to be willing to share and coöperate is to shrivel up and die. There has to be a physical

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basis for everything precious in life. We have it in this country, and have it more abundantly. But it has to be used, or it will fall in upon itself like a dome from which the supporting arches have been removed. And it is the immense, virtually unlimited physical basis for playing a great and needed part in the world, that America has been building up, unwitting of its destined end, it may be, which gives us confidence in this year 1927 that she will perforce go forward to fulfill or surpass in practice all the hopes and dreams of 1917.

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SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT DISARMAMENT

By Allen W. Dulles

THE spectacular achievement of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 in reaching an agreement — almost over night — on methods of naval limitation, has tended to create the impression, in this country at least, that the entire problem of armaments could likewise be promptly disposed of if a conference were called to deal with the subject. Unfortunately, the solution is not so simple. Many of the factors which made possible the success of the Washington Conference are no longer present and the mathematical standards used to measure naval tonnage are of little value when applied to human beings and their capabilities as combatant forces or to the intricate and diverse elements which make up the sum total of a nation's military establishment.

At the very outset one finds a difference of opinion between the Powers as to the method of dealing with the problems of a general limitation of arms. The European continental Powers for the most part insist that all types of armament, land, sea and air, should be dealt with simultaneously. Other Powers, including the United States, have maintained that further naval limitation might well be given immediate consideration, even though the time may not yet have arrived for the holding of a successful conference of a more general character.

Without attempting to analyze the arguments pro and con on this point, we will, as a matter of orderly presentation, consider separately naval limitation and the limitation of other military elements.

I. NAVAL LIMITATION

The Washington Conference was a success because of the impelling influence exerted by the United States at a time when it was about to assume a controlling naval position. The results were purchased at a price which has often been criticized by our naval men, but which the country at large has approved. We gave up the opportunity to secure naval superiority in exchange for an agreement on the basis of equality with Great Britain and a 5–3 ratio with Japan in battleships and air craft carriers, with a

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limitation in the size of cruisers to 10,000 tons. When the Conference failed to agree on a basis for restricting the total tonnage of cruisers and submarines, each Power reserved its freedom of action with respect to the future building of such vessels. In this country this freedom of action has been construed as an invitation not to build, but as far as the Washington Treaty is concerned we have no just grounds for complaint if other Powers elect to construct cruisers and other types of vessels which the treaty does not restrict. We must frankly recognize, however, that as a result we cannot now exercise the same effective influence for naval limitation as we did in 1921. No Power has any reason to fear that we are now seeking naval supremacy and no Power consequently would be particularly impelled to make concessions which they might be disposed to make in different circumstances.

Fortunately, it does not necessarily follow that further naval limitation is indefinitely postponed. The recent discussions in Congress have clearly brought out that, if it were not for the President's desire to postpone construction until further efforts had been made to bring about naval limitation, we would now be undertaking a considerable program of naval building. Both Great Britain and Japan are several laps ahead of us in cruiser construction but they would presumably be the first to recognize our ability eventually to overtake and pass them if competitive building should be carried on in earnest. And even if these countries were disposed to doubt that the United States would continue to spend large sums in naval construction for a period of years, even after the impetus of Congressional and popular enthusiasm were past, certainly neither Great Britain nor Japan desires to provoke even the beginning of such a contest. The present attitude of Congress may thus have had the useful result of giving notice to these Powers that unless there is limitation there will probably be a start towards aggravated competition in naval construction. The recent initiative of the President, on the other hand, should serve the purpose of giving every opportunity for a thorough consideration of further naval limitation before this country is called upon to decide its future naval building program.

Even the complete success of the President's program would not have the result of eliminating further cruiser construction on the part of the United States. It is very unlikely that Great Britain or Japan will be disposed to scrap any of their recently

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constructed cruiser tonnage in order to approximate more closely to the level of construction which we have reached in this type of vessel. The mere threat of future building on our part would hardly be a sufficient inducement to bring about any such concession. Any limitations, therefore, which may eventually be fixed will probably be far in excess of our present or prospective cruiser strength. But it would be preferable to take as the basis for the application of a ratio the cruiser tonnage of Great Britain, present or authorized, than to have no limitation at all. In the case of submarines or destroyers, any maximum limitations would probably be in the neighborhood of our present effective strength in these classes, as here we have not fallen behind as we have in the case of cruisers. In fact, in number of destroyers the United States leads, though the age of these vessels makes our leadership less real than the figures imply.

As far as this country is concerned, it seems fundamental that we would not accept a treaty which limited the United States in any class of vessel to a tonnage inferior to that of Great Britain or which changed the 5–3 ratio with Japan. The argument which was used at the Washington Conference that limitation should be based on existing naval tonnage may be raised against us in view of our present limited cruiser strength. The slogan "stop now" is simple and very appealing to those who have built well during the past few years. It will probably not be entirely overlooked by either Great Britain or Japan. But it is not likely that this argument will be seriously pressed by either Power in an effort to alter the ratios of the Washington treaties in so far as the three Powers are concerned. They would hardly desire to add fuel to the Congressional fire by suggesting that our failure during the past few years to construct cruisers is a valid reason for consigning the United States to a position of permanent inferiority. Whether we should ever build up to the present cruiser strength of Great Britain — were this taken as the maximum limit — is problematical. Certainly this would remain a purely theoretical goal for many years.

If an agreement could be reached with Great Britain on the basis of equality in all types of naval vessels, and with Japan on the 5–3 ratio, our interests would be adequately safeguarded. Great Britain, however, has her own particular problems to face. As a Mediterranean as well as an Atlantic and a Pacific naval Power, the size and character of her navy obviously depend not

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only upon the naval establishments of the United States and Japan, but also upon those of France and Italy. We are not ourselves immediately affected by the cruiser and submarine tonnage constructed by France and Italy and need not assume primary responsibility for attempting the adjustment of this difficult problem between those countries and England. Presumably any settlement satisfactory to the three would be satisfactory to the United States. But as long as there can be no limitation until Great Britain limits, and if her action is predicated in part at least upon that of France and Italy, we cannot casually dismiss the question of British-Franco-Italian naval adjustment as of no concern to us if we are sincerely desirous of making progress.

It is at this point in developing a program for naval limitation that serious difficulties are encountered: first, that of finding ratios[1] for auxiliary craft acceptable to France and Italy; and, second, a difficulty resulting from a difference of opinion between important naval Powers as to the basic principles of future limitation. The French and Italian naval experts at the recent Geneva Disarmament Meeting vigorously opposed the principles upon which the Washington treaties are predicated, namely, the limitation of naval vessels, class by class, with a fixing of definite and separate maximum tonnages for capital ships, cruisers and submarines. They favored limitation by limiting total tonnage alone, leaving each Power free within the limits of this tonnage to construct the type and number of vessels, whether battleships, cruisers or submarines, which it considered best adapted to its needs. They contended that as their countries are limited both by considerations of expense and by the ratio of the Washington treaty, they could not plan any considerable construction of capital ships. But they do not desire to be hampered by restrictive ratios in other classes. Thus Geneva as well as Washington has shown that France and Italy plan to safe-

[1] It is often, though erroneously, assumed that it was proposed at the Washington Conference that the ratios for France and Italy for all types of vessels should be the same as the capital ship ratio, namely, that the French and Italian ratio throughout should be 1.67 to the British and American ratio of 5 and the Japanese 3. Such was not the case. That there is no mystic significance in the French and Italian ratio of 1.67 is shown by the Washington treaty provision for aircraft carriers, which are limited on the basis of 135,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, 81,000 for Japan and 60,000 for France and Italy — a ratio of 5:3:2.22. The last American proposal for a submarine ratio at the Washington Conference was: United States and Great Britain 60,000 tons, Japan and France approximately 31,000 tons, Italy 21,000 — the tonnage of the last three being estimated on the basis of their 1921 submarine tonnage.

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guard their right to construct a proportionately larger number of cruisers and submarines than might be possible if each class of vessel was restricted to a fixed maximum tonnage.

As between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, the attempt to arrive at naval limitation by allocating only a maximum tonnage without limiting each class would be so highly unsatisfactory that it is unlikely that they ever would seriously consider it. Of course, as long as the Washington agreements are effective, (namely, through 1936 and thereafter unless denounced by two years' prior notice) the French and Italian thesis could not be applied to all types of naval vessels. But even apart from this consideration there are other inherent difficulties in the plan. Let us assume, for example, that the United States, Great Britain and Japan attempted to apply the French and Italian thesis and agreed that the 5–5–3 ratio would be applied on the basis of 1,000,000 and 600,000 tons of naval craft respectively. If the three Powers were free to follow any plan of distributing this tonnage between battleships, cruisers and submarines, and if one of the three specialized in battleships, another in cruisers and the third in submarines, there would be no accurate method of gauging the relative strengths of the three fleets. The success of the Washington treaty has been due in no small measure to the fact that it permits a reasonably accurate basis of comparison of the naval strength of various countries. The adoption of the theory of limitation by total tonnage would, in the case of the three leading naval Powers, defeat that end.

In each phase of the problem of arms limitation we find progress retarded because of the difficulty of finding a basis for agreement acceptable to any large number of Powers. But if concrete action is postponed until all of the important military and naval Powers of the world are in agreement, the delay may be indefinite. In the case of naval limitation it very possibly will be necessary to proceed by gradual stages, by agreements between a limited number of Powers under safeguards which would release the participants from restrictions *inter sese* in the event that other Powers resorted to threatening building programs.

Even if the five Powers which signed the Washington Treaty are not all prepared at this time to take further action along the same lines, the United States, Great Britain and Japan might arrive at a limitation agreement provided it were subject to revision in the event that any other Power carried through an

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extensive building program. Italy's position is clear. She has constantly indicated that she would be content with the treaty right to maintain a navy equal to that of France. It thus rests largely with France to determine whether she will facilitate or obstruct the reaching of an agreement. Even assuming that France may not now be disposed to bind herself by treaty for a period of years to a definite and limited cruiser and submarine tonnage, surely it is to her own interest to see other Powers limit their naval forces. France may well consider that it is the part of wisdom at least to refrain from carrying through a naval building program which would seriously complicate, if not entirely prevent, agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Japan. At the present moment the program of France is reported to include 47,000 tons of submarines already laid down or appropriated for, as contrasted with the present British program of about 12,000 tons and that of the United States of only 2,000 tons. It is this French program which is likely to prove the most serious obstacle to any submarine agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Japan.

As a beginning, it would be better to be content with relatively high maximum limitations in the various classes of vessels now unrestricted than to have no limitations whatever. If *some* limitations are set, further progress might be possible by curtailing replacement programs when the time comes to scrap obsolete tonnage, thus gradually reducing the maximum tonnage allowances without disturbing the ratios. With reasonable good will such reductions should be feasible since naval programs are influenced more by the fear of competitive programs on the part of others than by any inherent national need. Since we have the experience of the Washington Conference to draw upon, future naval limitation will not necessarily require the elaborate machinery of a formal conference; and in a matter where national passions are so easily aroused and national susceptibilities so naturally affected, the publicity which inevitably attends an international conference might only aggravate the difficulty of securing the mutual concessions essential to success.

II. LIMITATION OF LAND AND AIR ARMAMENTS

The limitation of land and air armaments presents far more perplexing problems than are encountered in dealing with naval forces. In the case of navies, limitations can be applied to tangible

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objects — naval vessels; personnel and equipment (guns excepted) can be disregarded, since a crew without a vessel is of little use and the size of the vessel and its character determine to a great extent the equipment which the vessel can effectively employ. When you have limited naval tonnage, you have limited the effective combatant value of a navy.

It is harder to determine the elements of land or air forces which can effectively be limited. An obvious starting point would be the agreement upon the number of men actually to be maintained under the colors in time of peace. But problems arise at the outset. To illustrate, let us assume that a limit of 100,000 is fixed as the maximum number of effectives to be maintained by States A, B and C at any given moment in time of peace. Let us further assume that State A recruits its force on a one year compulsory training basis; that State B recruits on the Swiss system of compulsory training for a short period each year for several years; and that State C recruits its forces on a voluntary long-term enlistment basis. At the end of five years, the number of trained men available in case of war would be very different in the case of each of these three States. State A would have a large number of partly trained men and State C a small number of highly trained men. The scale of limitation, theoretically the same for each of the three States, would have brought about very different results in each case as a result of the differences in the system of recruitment. The same yardstick would have produced quite different measurements.

Theoretically, all States might agree on a common method for enlisting their armies. But there is no prospect that this will be done. The European continental powers are no more likely to adopt our system of voluntary service than we are to adopt, in time of peace, the compulsory system.

In addition to the regular standing army, the United States and practically all other countries have auxiliary organizations for military training, such as the National Guard, officers' training camps and the like. To reckon the military value of these organizations in comparison with the regular army defies the skill of the most competent statistician. Yet it is hard to conceive of any fair or effective method of limitation which dealt only with what we call the regular army and left auxiliary organizations free to expand and thus to take the place of the regular army.

Turning to a consideration of air forces and reserves of war

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material, we find factors which are more tangible, but the problems presented are equally perplexing. Theoretically, it is possible to limit numbers of aeroplanes, numbers and caliber of artillery, and the amount of miscellaneous military supplies, including poison gas reserves. Some such limitation would be a necessary part of any thorough-going plan for restricting military establishments. Here, however, we encounter the difficulty of distinguishing between elements which are essential parts of the normal economic life of the nation and elements which are primarily adapted for use in war. One need only mention commercial aeroplanes, the private manufacture of arms, factories equally adapted to the manufacture of dyes and to the production of poison gases, to illustrate this point. This difficulty of distinguishing the implements of war from the necessities of our every-day peace-time life also makes it hard to conceive of any effective control over such a system of limitation. Even granting a conscientious effort on the part of the governments concerned, it appears inevitable that treaty provisions which attempted to deal with the intricacies of military establishments would only lead to international controversies that would defeat the very object sought.

It has been suggested that some method of international control could be devised to supervise the execution of whatever limitations had been agreed upon. But the American representative at Geneva and the representatives of several other Powers have clearly put on record their objection to "itinerant inquisitorial commissions of investigation." In this our representatives have reflected the feeling of this country against any attempt at international supervision of American action under any program for arms limitation.

This statement of some of the difficulties involved in the limitation of land and air armaments is not made in order to argue that any form of limitation is hopeless, but rather to suggest the desirability of revising our views as to how to approach the problem.

Possibly we have been too largely influenced by the procedure followed in the case of naval limitation and by the formulas — more elaborate than effective — imposed on the Central Powers in the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly. The assumption usually is that limitation is to be brought about by a general treaty, applicable to a large number of Powers, which would prescribe numerical standards and ratios regulating the

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size of armies, the supplies of ammunition, the number of aeroplanes and the various items of military equipment. Such a program seems doomed to failure. The situation of countries varies too greatly; their military systems and military problems are too divergent, too complex; many of the elements composing their military strength are too closely related to their normal economic life to be susceptible of regulation by treaty. Any treaty which was sufficiently detailed to effect a real limitation would be too complicated to permit of practical enforcement. Further, it is hardly probable that any considerable number of Powers would now be prepared to limit their freedom of action in military matters for any considerable period of time, and unless a treaty of limitation had a duration of several years it would be of little value.

But even though all Powers may not be able to disarm in the same way or according to the same formulas, it does not necessarily follow that all progress is impossible. Regional agreements of limited scope between countries whose military establishments bear a direct relation to each other might be feasible even though a general treaty is out of the question. If, for example, two or more of the continental European powers which maintain their forces on a conscript basis could agree together to limit their period of military service, an auspicious beginning would have been made even if no other points were covered. France has already voluntarily reduced its period of service from three years to eighteen months, and plans have been made for a further reduction to one year. This voluntary unilateral action on the part of the leading continental military power ought to make it easier to effect a general reduction of the term of military service in Europe. Unfortunately, Russia introduces a feeling of uneasiness in the border states, complicates their military problems, and naturally makes them hesitate to reduce their forces. Their military establishments in turn react upon their western neighbors, and this contributes to the maintenance of a scale of armament throughout the whole of Europe higher than would be the case if Russia could be counted upon to coöperate in any program to reduce armaments. But despite this complication some progress might nevertheless be made through regional agreements in Europe.

We find a very different problem in North and South America or in the Far East, and it therefore is impracticable to try to fit the same military strait-jacket to all the continents. Limitation

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agreements by countries which like the United States have never maintained large peace-time armies are not an essential part of any plan of European limitation. The inclusion of the United States in any general scheme for the reduction of land and air forces would result in fixing a maximum limit for our forces far above what in actual practice we would expect to maintain. This would only complicate the problem by increasing the number of Powers party to the negotiations. The United States and other Powers of this continent, and probably Japan, should have no difficulty in agreeing not to exceed whatever limit might be fixed as the maximum strength for the land forces of the strongest European power.

In the event that Russia proves an insurmountable obstacle to the conclusion of European regional agreements, some progress might be made by securing the undertaking of each of the important military Powers that they would formulate and exchange statements setting forth their military programs, the forces they intended to maintain under national control, how these forces would be recruited and equipped, and other related information. If the Powers could further agree not to increase their military organizations without a prior public notification of their intentions, this might have considerable influence in discouraging competitive arming. Governments would hesitate to notify each other of increases in armaments unless they felt that they could justify such increases.

III. CONCLUSIONS

If a state is to play a decisive part in international negotiations it generally is necessary for it to make a definite contribution. The exception to this rule is when a Power is called in as a mediator without having interests of its own at stake. In the matter of arms limitation the United States neither is a mediator nor is it in a position to supply elements vitally necessary for success.

In naval matters we of course have a very immediate concern. But our contribution, in view of our present naval position, may well be restricted to declining to start a competitive building program until we have exhausted all other possibilities. If limitation should then prove impossible, it may develop that only by commencing in 1927 or 1928 to round out our naval program can we induce other Powers to come into line. That is for the future to

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decide; but our 1916 building program, and the decisive effect it played in bringing about the Washington Conference, is a precedent.

In regard to land and air armaments we have little except good will to offer the European states to induce them to limit their forces. We obviously are not prepared to supply that measure of security which the European Powers would feel they were foregoing by reducing their armies. Further, it seems unlikely that we would be willing to undertake to join in measures of economic or financial boycott against aggressor states.[2]

It could be argued, and with logic, that arms limitation and the abolition of the competitive race for armaments would increase national security. It could further be urged that a mutual and corresponding reduction by states engaged in military competition would not affect their relative security. But these arguments do not entirely satisfy states that have had the experience of France, Belgium and Serbia. At the Washington Conference, M. Briand, in declining to appoint experts to consider the limitation of land forces and of war material, made a cogent statement of the French position:

> France could not appoint an expert to take part in a committee of that nature. If a definite proposal of collaboration were advanced, if it were a question of establishing in common an international force with the duty of maintaining order, well and good — disarmament might be considered. If the peoples of the earth were as eager as was claimed to see armaments limited, their representatives had only to say: "A danger exists; we recognize it; we will share it with you shoulder to shoulder; here is our signature." In this case France would fully agree to consider the problem of the limitation of armaments. But up to that time no such proposal had been heard and along these lines nothing but declarations had yet appeared. France had realities to deal with; she had suffered them five years ago and fifty years ago. A French administration which should enter upon the course into which certain members of the Conference would entice it would be false to its mandate. . . . France

[2] This is a point which deserves the most careful scrutiny. Before the discussion of arms limitation has progressed much further the question will most assuredly be raised as to whether the United States would be willing to coöperate in giving effect to measures taken by the European Powers to cut off intercourse with a state judged guilty of an act of unprovoked aggression. Clearly, we would not bind ourselves to accept the verdict of others as to whether an act of aggression had taken place; but assuming that some method could be devised for passing on this question in the United States, would it be legally feasible, and, if so, practical and desirable, to attempt to join in the boycotting of an aggressor? If it were possible, it would constitute a very definite contribution by the United States towards the maintenance of peace. It would, however, involve a decided departure from our traditional position of neutrality and involve constitutional and practical difficulties for which no one has as yet suggested an entirely satisfactory solution.

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might agree to any reduction of armament, if her safety were guaranteed. If she were alone she could agree to nothing.

That France is now joining in the work of the Geneva Disarmament Commission is evidence that progress has been made since the Washington Conference, due in large measure to the Locarno treaties. But as the United States is not prepared to make an effective contribution to security in Europe we cannot expect Europe to look to America for guidance in the limitation of land armament. Furthermore, we cannot aid in a settlement merely by the attempt to substitute Washington for Geneva as the place for deliberation. But at least we can prevent our military program from obstructing progress, and we can give the benefit of our coöperation when it is sought, as we are now doing by participating in the Geneva meetings.

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COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTHS

The Washington Conference, which closed February 6, 1922, limited the number of Capital Ships and Aircraft Carriers. Other naval classifications—Cruisers, Destroyers, Submarines—were not limited. The following tables are in large part based on "U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings," January and February, 1927.

TABLE I. CAPITAL SHIPS

Power	Built		Building		Tonnage to be Arrived at in 1941	True Ratio in 1941
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons		
United States	18	525,850	None		525,000	5.00
British Empire	22(a)	580,450	2(a)	70,000	525,000	5.00
Japanese Empire	10	301,320	None		315,000	3.00
France	9	194,544	None		175,000	1.67
Italy	7	133,670	None		175,000	1.67

(a) *Nelson* and *Rodney* building to replace *Ajax*, *Centurion*, *King George V*, and *Thunderer*. When this replacement is effected capital ship tonnage for British Empire will be (20 ships) 558,950 tons. The following status will then obtain:

	U. S.	Brit. Emp.	Jap. Emp.	France	Italy
Capital Ships; Armed with 13.4-Inch Guns or Heavier	14	20	10	3	0
Capital Ships; Armed with 12-Inch Guns	4	0	0	6	7

TABLE II. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Power	Built		Building		Totals		Totals of Non-Experimental Carriers		Total Tonnage Allowed by Treaty
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	
United States	1	12,700	2	66,000	3	78,700	2	66,000	135,000
British Empire	4	67,290	2	37,200	6	104,490	3	56,300	135,000
Japanese Empire	1	9,500	2	53,800	3	63,300	2	53,800	81,000
France	None		1	21,160	1	21,160	1	21,160	60,000
Italy	None		None		None		None		60,000

(a) All experimental, with exception of British carrier *Furious* of 19,100 tons, completed September, 1925. Under treaty, experimental carriers may be replaced at any time, provided total carrier tonnage is not exceeded.

	U. S.	Brit. Emp.	Jap. Emp.	France	Italy
Actual Ratio, Built and Building (Tons)	2.91	3.87	2.35	0.78	0.00
Allowed Ratio (Tons)	5.00	5.00	3.00	2.22	2.22

TABLE III. CRUISERS (UNLIMITED)

(Modern, 3,000–10,000 tons)

Power	Built		Building		Authorized and Appropriated for		Total		Tonnage on present British basis at 5:5:3: 1.67: 1.67 ratio
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	
United States	10	75,000	2	20,000	3	30,000	15	125,000	332,290
British Empire	40	194,290	11(b)	110,000	3	28,000	54	332,290	332,290
Japanese Empire	19	102,005	6	54,200	None		25	156,205	199,374
France	3	16,731	6(c)	53,619	1	10,000	10	80,350	110,985
Italy	8	30,784	2	20,000	None		10	50,784	110,985

Actual Ratios	U. S.	Brit. Emp.	Jap. Emp.	France	Italy
Tonnage	1.88	5.00	2.35	1.20	0.76
Number of Vessels	1.38	5.00	2.31	0.93	0.93

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TABLE IV. DESTROYER TYPE (UNLIMITED)

(Destroyer Leaders, 1,500 tons plus; Destroyers, first line, 800–1,500 tons)

Power	Built				Authorized and Appropriated for, or Building				Totals			
	Leaders		Destroyers		Leaders		Destroyers		Leaders		Destroyers	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
U. S.	None		276	329,153	None		None		None		276	329,153
Brit. Emp.	18	31,310	169	194,575	None		2	2,540	18	31,310	171	197,115
Japan	None		78	85,650	4	7,400	14	20,230	4	7,400	92	105,880
France	4	9,144	20	20,062	9	22,647	25	36,560	13	31,791	45	56,622
Italy	8	14,889	20	18,111	None		15	19,112	8	14,889	35	37,223

Actual Ratios	*U. S.*	*Brit. Emp.*	*Japan*	*France*	*Italy*
Total Tonnage	7.29	5.00	2.48	1.93	1.14
Total Number of Vessels	7.30	5.00	2.54	1.54	1.14

TABLE V. SUBMARINES (UNLIMITED)

Power	Built				Authorized and Appropriated for, or Building				Totals		Tonnage on present Japanese basis at 5:5:3: 1.67: 1.67 ratio
	No.	1,000 tons +	No.	700 tons +	No.	1,000 tons +	No.	700 tons +	No.	Tonnage	
U. S.	6	9,675	50	43,822	3	6,000	0	None	59	59,497	114,295
Brit. Emp.	7	11,350	28	25,150	9	12,215	1	890	45	49,605	114,295
Japan	6	10,110	43	34,834	17	21,970	2	1,663	68	68,577	68,577
France	3	2,988	19	17,509	4	10,010	19	26,621	45	57,128	41,146
Italy	0	None	9	7,167	4	5,200	9	7,145	22	19,512	41,146

TABLE VI. NEW NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

This table shows all the new naval craft, in both the limited and unlimited categories, appropriated for or actually laid down by the Powers since the Washington Conference.

Type or Class	United States				British Empire				Japan				France				Italy			
	Laid Down	Appro. For	Total		Laid Down	Appro. For	Total		Laid Down	Appro. For	Total		Laid Down	Appro. For	Total		Laid Down	Appro. For	Total	
			No.	Total Tonnage			No.	Total Tonnage			No.	Total Tonnage			No.	Total Tonnage			No.	Total Tonnage
Capital Ships					2		2	70,000												
Aircraft Carriers	2		2	66,000	3		3	56,300	2		2	53,800								
Light Cruisers	2	3	5	50,000	11	3	14	138,000	12		12	88,285	6	1	7	63,619	2		2	20,000
Mine Layers					1		1	6,740		1	1	3,000	1		1	4,000				
Destroyer Leaders										4	4	7,400	9	3	12	29,724				
Destroyers					2		2	2,540	27	8	35	46,400	22	4	26	37,994	16		16	20,136
Submarines	3		3	(a) 2,119	3	6	9	12,215	21	9	30	38,664	32	11	43	47,871	13		13	12,345
Gunboats	6		6	2,790	4		4	?	4		4	1,352		1	1	720				
Mine Sweepers									6		6	4,200					9		9	(c) 6,486
Tankers									3		3	46,200	1	2	3	23,900	4		4	30,100
Tenders						1	1	?	3		3	32,400		2	2	14,000	1		1	5,000
Supply & Repair						1	1	?	1		1	17,500					1		1	8,140
				(a)				(b)												
Totals	13	3	16	120,909	26	11	37	285,795	79	22	101	339,201	71	24	95	221,828	46	(d)	46	102,207

(a) Does not include tonnage of 2 submarines. (b) Does not include tonnage of 4 gunboats, one repair ship and one submarine tender. (c) These are combined mine sweepers and mine layers. (d) No information.

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ALSACE-LORRAINE SINCE THE WAR

By Harold Callender

ON the east side of the circle of statues to French cities that bounds the Place de la Concorde, the female figure representing Strasbourg, capital of Alsace-Lorraine, for many years sat draped in mourning, a constant reminder to a symbol-loving nation of an historical event which President Wilson in his Fourteen Points was to describe as "the wrong done to France in 1871." That wrong having been righted by the agreement by which Germany laid down her arms on November 22, 1918, the French army marched over the Vosges, to be greeted at every village by an outburst of collective emotion approaching the delirious. Improvised triumphal arches bore the legends, "To our Liberators," and "We Have Long Awaited You." Streets were decorated as for a festival and in the windows of many houses appeared portraits of ancestors of the occupants, testimony of loyalties antedating the forty-seven-year rule in Alsace-Lorraine of the Empire whose disorganized forces had scarcely yet completed their eastward passage of the Rhine. The President of the National Council of the two provinces, speaking from the tribune of the Palais Bourbon, assured the French Chamber that Alsace and Lorraine "gave themselves freely to France;" while the National Assembly at Strasbourg issued a declaration welcoming "joyously" the return to France "after a long and cruel separation," and suggesting "a new era of liberty, prosperity and happiness."

Within the last few months — more than eight years after this exhuberant embrace between Alsace-Lorraine and "*la Mère Patrie*" — nearly every revue and newspaper in France has undertaken to explain, each in accordance with its particular political bent, what has been commonly referred to as "*le malaise en Alsace.*" Some have described in detail the political difficulties there; others have attributed the discontent chiefly, if not entirely, to German propaganda; while some Frenchmen are inclined privately to insist — as certain people used to say of Ireland — that *malaise* was chronic in Alsace and should not be taken too seriously. In any case, it became evident that the "era of liberty and happiness" had not quite come off.

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The sources of this *malaise*, of which certain of the more acute manifestations merit a stronger term, are to be found, not alone in the uncomprehending stubbornness of the French officials who took charge of the provinces in 1918, and in the surprising number of provocative errors they managed to commit, but also in the peculiar history that has given a special character to Alsace-Lorraine and its people.

Alsace and Lorraine form culturally a part of the Rhineland, always strongly attached to the Church and to the regional liberties so jealously defended for centuries by the series of small states and cities extending from the Alps to the Low Countries. A confederation similar to the Hanseatic League, which embraced in the thirteenth century nearly one hundred Rhenish towns, exemplifies the early development of a community of sentiment and interest among the Rhine Provinces; while the rapid growth of the universities, the invention of printing by Gutenberg, who lived in Mayence and Strasbourg, and the erection of magnificent cathedrals, convey a suggestion of the rich artistic fruitfulness that spread over Europe from that politically self-contained Rhine Valley which Goethe, one of its products, referred to as a paradise. Long before either France or Germany achieved national consolidation, Alsace and Lorraine possessed a culture and a nationalism of their own.

Some cognizance of this distinguished past and of its cultural, social and sentimental heritage is necessary to enable one to cease to think of Alsace and Lorraine as merely two small and annoying provinces on France's eastern frontier, and to gain a slight appreciation of the significance of the affectionate term, "*la Petite Patrie*," which Alsatians sometimes apply to their country. No people possesses a more profound attachment to its homeland than the Alsatians and the Lorrainers. If their emotions are able, in a certain sense, to reach out and encompass France, their oldest and deepest roots remain in the soil of the Rhine Valley.

Lest this should be regarded as a species of parochialism, let it be remembered that, by virtue of their position on the frontier of two civilizations, the Latin and the Germanic, the provinces have long enjoyed a double culture that has prodigiously broadened their appreciative powers and enriched the minds of their educated class. It is the French officials, rather than Alsace-Lorraine, who are guilty of parochialism — in so far, that is, as

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they wish, as some do, to impose a single culture upon the provinces, thus destroying those rare qualities that the cultivation of two languages and ancient regional traditions have produced.

The older and basic of these cultures is, of course, Germanic. From the time Cardinal Mazarin brought Alsace under French protection until the Revolution, there was no special attempt



to introduce the French language or French customs. "Let Alsace alone," was the wise motto of the ministers of Louis XIV; and Napoleon remarked that he did not mind what language the Alsatians spoke since they "fought in French." The effort of the Revolutionaries to displace the local tongues in all parts of France failed, partly because it came a century before popular education.

So the languages of the provinces have been little changed by

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political vicissitudes. As the Count Jean de Pange expresses it in his book, "Les Libertés Rhénanes" — "The linguistic frontier in Lorraine, as well as in Alsace, dates from the barbaric invasions. . . . In Lorraine the limits of the languages bear no relation to the topography of the country. They form an irregular fringe, marking the points where the Frankish invaders ceased to be sufficiently dense for their language to replace that of the Gallo-Roman population. Nevertheless, these limits, arbitrarily traced by historical accident, have not appreciably altered in fifteen centuries." Broadly speaking, the northeastern half of Lorraine and practically all of Alsace are charted on the maps as areas where Germanic dialects predominate, four Germanic patois being spoken in Lorraine and one, known as Alsatian, in Alsace. Of these tongues there is no written form, printing and writing being in high German, with which all the dialects have a close affinity.[1]

While the demarkation is surprisingly abrupt in places, one village speaking a form of German, another a few miles distant speaking only French, both languages are spoken in the larger towns, and it is difficult to arrive at precise figures for the proportions of French-speaking and German-speaking inhabitants. Of the 1,161,639 residents of Alsace (census of 1926), French government estimates state that about three-fourths speak Alsatian. The Abbé Delsor places the proportion at four-fifths. In the Department of Moselle, the Lorraine area annexed by Germany in 1871 and generally spoken of now as Lorraine, there is a population of 633,461. The Abbé Charles Ritz, editor of *Le Lorrain*, a Metz daily, among other Lorrainers, told the writer that three-fifths of this population spoke French, and this estimate was accepted by the correspondent of the London *Times* who recently made a study of the region. It is perhaps a bit optimistic, for the Count de Pange states that only approximately one-third of Moselle speaks French. One is perhaps justified in assuming that the 1,795,000 Alsatians and Lorrainers include, at the most, not more than 500,000 French-speaking people. The educated classes and some of the trades people speak both languages, with varying degrees of proficiency.

The great majority also are Catholics. Since the French census does not classify the population according to religious faith, the

[1] For a discussion of the linguistic frontier see "Franco-German Frontiers," by Charles H. Haskins, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, December, 1924.

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latest government statistics are those of the 1910 census, which gave the following figures for the two provinces: Catholics, 1,428,000; Protestants (Lutherans), 408,000; Jews, 30,000. The departure of more than 150,000 Germans since the armistice has reduced the number of Catholics and Protestants, but the proportions have not been greatly altered. It is estimated that the Catholics now comprise 62 percent of the population of the Bas Rhin, 84 percent of that of the Haut Rhin and 85 percent of Moselle; the Protestants 35 percent, 14 percent and 13 percent, respectively, of the three departments.

Political changes of the last half century have affected the population considerably. The annexation of 1871 resulted in the emigration of about 300,000 French-speaking residents, many of whom went to America, many to Algeria, others to France. A large number of Germans entered the provinces during German rule, and the number living there at the time of the armistice is estimated as between 300,000 and 400,000. About half of them departed almost at once, many being expelled, others leaving to avoid expulsion. Those who had married Alsatians had the opportunity of becoming French citizens, and 75,000 to 80,000 did so. Relatively few not thus naturalized have remained, the 1926 census showing that there are only 164,997 foreigners of all nationalities in Alsace and Lorraine, 114,409 being in Lorraine. The Germans and other aliens, some of whom have immigrated within the last few years in response to the need for labor, are engaged chiefly in the industrial districts of Lorraine. Of the employes of the coal mines of that department 40.3 percent are French, 6.5 percent natives of the Saar living in Lorraine, 20.5 percent Sarrois living in the Saar, 9.5 percent non-Saar Germans, the rest being Poles, Czechs, Italians and others. In the metallurgical industries of Lorraine 25 percent of the workers are French, only 8.8 German (including the Sarrois), 37.5 percent Italian, 11.4 percent Polish. The number of foreigners in the provinces has increased 31,895 since the year 1921, 25,869 of this increase being in Lorraine. The Germans remaining in Alsace have largely merged into the population, while those in Lorraine consist chiefly of industrial workers, and neither group can be said to constitute a political force. Some of the exiles have sought to exert an influence from across the Rhine, and the autonomous press receives constant encouragement, if not more substantial support, from Germany.

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But there is only an extremely small amount of pro-German sentiment in Alsace and Lorraine, and the causes of the discontent must be sought elsewhere.

While Alsace and Lorraine immensely increased the mineral and industrial wealth of France — Lorraine producing 5,279,000 tons of coal in 1925, 38.8 percent of the French output of cast iron and 35 percent of that of steel, and Alsace possessing rich potash deposits and a large textile industry — 49 percent of the population of the two provinces is listed in the 1926 census as rural. In Alsace the soil is rich and small garden culture on farms, generally less than 100 acres in area, prevails. The Lorraine soil is heavy and hard, several oxen or horses being needed to draw one plow, and it is used chiefly for grain crops and dairying. The fact that his reluctant and difficult soil imposes a rude and laborious life upon the Lorraine peasant, while his Alsatian neighbor reaps plenteous harvests with less effort, may perhaps partly explain the existence of important differences in temperament and behavior between the inhabitants of the two provinces. A recent commentator remarked that Alsace and Lorraine were no more alike than England and Ireland. This comparison was suggested doubtless by the observation that the Lorrainer is regarded as being somewhat stolid, slow and relatively unemotional, like the peasant of the north of France; while the Alsatian is vivacious, lively and argumentative, resembling rather the French of the south. Alsatians and Lorrainers agree in recognizing that there are broad differences of this type between the populations, though those unacquainted with the region make no such distinctions, largely, probably, because of the fact that the provinces formed a single territory in the German Empire.

Alsace, being less industrialized than Lorraine, is perhaps a bit more aggressively clerical. Lorraine resented being made a political tributary of Alsace when the Germans created the capital of the two provinces at Strasbourg, and at Metz one discovers on the part of some a lack of enthusiasm for a regional government for Alsace and Lorraine, based upon the apprehension that the Alsatian metropolis again would be its centre. Alsace, behind the barrier of the Vosges, has led a self-contained existence. Lorraine, which is a plain, has greater affinities with the adjoining French departments to the west and south than with Alsace.

From this social and cultural situation, scarcely considered

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by the French Government in 1918, have arisen certain definite political grievances which constitute the tangible manifestation of the *malaise* of which France probably will have to take far greater account than she so far has done. These grievances are approximately the same in both Alsace and Lorraine, though Alsace, as its temperamental qualities might have led one to expect, has expressed itself lately with greater vigor than Lorraine. They all relate to what Alsatians and Lorrainers refer to as their liberties, and reflect the marked particularist sentiment characteristic of the Rhineland of the middle ages.

On November 9, 1918, a trainload of sailors from Kiel, the original point of eruption of the German revolution, arrived in Strasbourg, formed a Council of Soldiers and Workmen in the conventional Russian manner, placed the red flag on the cathedral spire and declared the revolution. Two days later the members of the second (elected) chamber of the Parliament of Alsace-Lorraine formed a National Council and a government. One of the first acts of the Council was to declare the "right" of Alsace and Lorraine to "remain members of the French family," and to express the "joy" of the provinces in returning to France. There never was any doubt upon this point.

If Alsace and Lorraine thus voluntarily rejoined the French nation, they expressed at the same moment, in the same declaration of the Council, the stipulation that the new relationship involved the "safeguard of their traditions, their beliefs and their economic interests, which has been solemnly guaranteed to them by the chiefs of the victorious army." As early as November, 1914, Marshal Joffre, addressing Alsatians in an Army Bulletin, had said: "France brings to you, with the liberties she has always represented, the respect of your own liberties, your traditions, your convictions, your customs." M. Poincaré, then President of the Republic, specifically confirmed this promise of the Marshal in February, 1915, in an address at Saint-Amarin. Generals Pétain, Mangin, Gouraud, M. Deschanel, President of the Chamber, and M. Millerand, President of the Republic after being Commissioner General at Strasbourg, all repeated and elaborated these assurances in the name of France. When the provinces greeted the French army in 1918 they accepted these conditions and regarded them as constituting a solemn agreement.

What are these liberties, traditions and customs, unfortu-

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nately not described in more precise terms in the agreement? Recently when the present writer met Mgr. Charles Ruch, Bishop of Strasbourg, he summed up the difficulties between Church and State by saying: "We were assured that the religious régime would remain unchanged: we ask only that France keep her word." The Concordat, negotiated by Napoleon I and the Vatican, by which the clergy is paid by the State, and the confessional schools, in which pupils are segregated according to their religious allegiance, receiving instruction from teachers of their own faith, are obviously among the liberties and traditions of Alsace and Lorraine. So is the right to speak German and to learn it in the schools. So also are certain local laws, municipal privileges and methods of government. It might even be argued that, since Alsace and Lorraine had had a separate Parliament since 1911, that, too, was a tradition that France should respect. This is precisely the position of the autonomists, whose demand for administrative "*selbständigkiet*" (independence) within the French nation has been bitterly denounced as German propaganda. As a matter of fact, the provinces do not appear to desire a separate legislature, though they do cling tenaciously to some of the laws their provincial Parliament gave them.

When M. Herriot was Prime Minister of France in 1924 he undertook to wipe out entirely the Concordat, to disestablish the churches and to introduce the laical schools that have existed in France since the separation of Church and State in 1905.[2] Catholic school children in Alsace and Lorraine went upon a strike and Catholics in many parts of France rose in protest. M. Herriot did not succeed. By virtue of a law of 1850 an effort was made to re-introduce what are called interconfessional schools, in which the pupils are placed in classes without regard to religion, separating only for religious instruction. On the authority of the municipal councils, this system was inaugurated in four towns, Strasbourg, Colmar, Mulhouse and Guebwiller. The churches, especially the Catholic Church, bitterly opposed this move, desiring to direct not only the religious instruction of the children, but all other instruction as well. The Church does not want the pupils to study history, for example, under non-Catholic teachers.

French is, of course, the official language of the schools. For

[2] M. Herriot described his program — political, educational, religious — in an article in the June, 1924, issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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their first two years primary pupils must study French exclusively. After that they receive three hours a week of German. Religious instruction, given four hours a week, is generally in German. The Church is not satisfied with this arrangement, its leaders contending that the non-Catholic teachers brought from France have neglected the religious training and often given it in French, a foreign tongue to most of the children. Many Alsatians urge equality of the two languages, but the French Government insists upon French having a primary place, in view of the handicaps it faces as a minority language.

What the Alsatians and Lorrainers call their liberties represent in part concessions wrested from Germany after long struggle, and it strikes them as an ironical paradox that immediately after the arrival of the French troops, greeted as liberators by the provinces, they should have to defend against the agents of the French Government the traditions and customs that French statesmen had so recently promised to respect. But the forty-seven years of German rule developed in Alsace and Lorraine a habit of aggressive protest that has served them with some effect in their dealings with France.

Though the recovery of the provinces became one of the chief objects of the war, when the armistice was signed the French Government had no prepared policy in regard to them. It began by ignoring the National Council, thus wounding the susceptibilities of a proud people, by suppressing the Strasbourg Municipal Council, by placing the government of these highly religious provinces in charge of an anti-clerical Under-Secretary of State. It established the French currency in such a way as to do injustice to both the Alsatians and Lorrainers and the Germans living there. It sent out to run the railways and other public services officials who knew no German, who had no understanding of the provinces and whose sole idea was to govern them in the manner in which the rest of France was governed. Many of these men were members of families that had left Alsace-Lorraine after 1871, and they were received coolly by their compatriots who had stayed in the provinces during the period when it was necessary to defend their liberties against the German Government.

The strike of Lorraine railway men in August, 1919, was a vigorous protest against this policy. "Alsace-Lorraine belongs to Alsatians and Lorrainers," said one of the strikers' representatives, "and it wasn't worth while to get rid of the Germans if

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the French come and take all the good jobs." The strike, enjoying the almost complete support of the public of the two provinces, lasted five days. The Government capitulated, accepting the ultimatum of the workers which demanded the removal of all French railway officials and foremen not speaking German.

Unmistakable manifestations of the opinion of the provinces, and the hopeless confusion in administration to which the unwise beginning had led, meanwhile had resulted in the appointment of M. Millerand as Commissioner General for Alsace and Lorraine with an office at Strasbourg. Thus the French Government came to Alsace-Lorraine. But little by little the administration was transferred from the Commissioner General to Paris, and in 1925 his office was abolished, the Government returning to Paris. But the protests against the "*revenants*" and the functionaries "from the interior" have since then led to considerable increases in the proportions of Alsatians and Lorrainers in the public service in the region and the Government has fortunately adopted a far more sympathetic attitude, as illustrated by M. Poincaré's letter expressing his willingness that the provinces remain bi-lingual.[3]

In their struggle against the over-zealous centralizers there is little division among Alsatians and Lorrainers save in the vehemence of their complaints. If the Catholics cling to the privileges of the Church, the Socialists are equally intent upon maintaining the obligatory old age pensions and the superior municipal services of the provinces, a product of the German system of professional mayors, now abolished.

The newly annexed provinces have brought to the fore the question of decentralization, the revision of the rigid Napoleonic structure of the French State in the direction of greater local freedom in administration. Several recent decrees have made changes of this nature, transferring certain powers to Prefects and Sub-prefects, enlarging the scope of the Councils General, enabling many decisions to be made locally instead of by a minister at Paris. Related to this is the question of allowing the local authorities greater liberty in coöperating with each other in the interest of regional improvement. There is a disposition to grant this also, but governmental reforms move slowly in France. There is a prospect that Alsace and Lorraine, instead of being cut

[3] The Countess de Pange has well depicted, in her novel, "Le Beau Jardin," the divergent attitudes of the Alsatians and the French functionaries during this period.

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up into three departments, as at present, may be permitted to develop a system under which they may govern themselves without being hobbled by arbitrary departmental lines.

In defending so stubbornly their regional liberties and culture, Alsace and Lorraine may eventually contribute not a little to a salutary revision of the antiquated and inefficient system of administration which today handicaps the life of France. The reforms made during the latter part of the year 1926 probably were motivated largely by a desire to appease Alsace and Lorraine without further recognizing the special position of the recovered provinces within the French State. In enlarging the powers of local French officials generally, the Government was able to concede something to Alsace and Lorraine, while at the same time maintaining its policy of declining further to discriminate between them and the other departments of France.

Moreover, the provinces have supplied an impressive example of the limitations of the doctrine that there is necessarily a connection between language and culture, on the one hand, and nationality on the other. German writers often have argued that, being German in speech and tradition, Alsace should be embraced politically within the German nation. The fallacy of this contention is illustrated by the fact that the German military authorities deemed it necessary during the war to treat Alsace and Lorraine as unfriendly territories. The French have been inclined to apply the same doctrine, though reversing the reasoning. Alsace and Lorraine are French and desire to remain French, they said; therefore they should learn to speak French as soon as possible and abandon their Germanic culture and their local traditions and customs. Both were wrong. Though speaking a Germanic dialect, the Alsatians had no desire to become German subjects and protested to the last when the French National Assembly was forced in 1871 to purchase peace by ceding the two provinces. Though willing to rejoin France in 1918, Alsatians and Lorrainers resent the suggestion that their acceptance of French political allegiance involves the alteration of their ancient speech and culture.

The Powers have accepted, nominally at least, the principle that territories should not be shifted from one sovereignty to another without regard to the desires of the inhabitants. The case of Alsace and Lorraine suggests that in applying this principle it is not always warrantable to judge the political preferences of the populations concerned by the language they speak.

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ALBANIA AND HER PROTECTRESS

By William Miller

THE signature of the "Pact of friendship and security between Italy and Albania," at Tirana on November 27, 1926, has caused widespread comment in the Balkans and considerable surprise in diplomatic circles. The excitement in Belgrade was such that the Italophile Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nintchitch, resigned, and the Jugoslavs talked of a new orientation of their foreign policy. In Greece, where the signature was announced and the text published on the eve of the entry of the new "Œcumenical" Ministry into office, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Michalakopoulos, has cautiously watched the attitude of Great Britain and France, and the Greek press has displayed calmness and prudence. But obviously any change in the condition of Albania must directly affect her Greek and Jugoslav neighbors, and indirectly the other states of south-eastern Europe.

First, let us examine the text. The preamble states the object of the Pact to be to "tighten the mutual relations of friendship and security resulting from the geographical situation" of Italy and Albania, to "contribute to the strengthening of peace," and to "maintain the political, juridical and territorial *status quo* of Albania." These phrases sound somewhat vague. "Peace" has not usually been "strengthened" by the intervention of a Great Power in the affairs of a Balkan state: Russia and Austria-Hungary brought "not peace but a sword" by their interference in the Serbia of the Obrenovitch dynasty; Russia's intrusion into Bulgarian politics led to the abdication of the first Prince of Bulgaria and the long social ostracism of the second; in Greece, the reign of Otho was embittered by the quarrels of the three "Protecting Powers;" German influence was largely responsible for the losses of Turkey in the late war. The principle of "the Balkan Peninsula for the Balkan peoples" is sound and nowadays generally accepted. Nor is it clear what is meant by "maintaining the political, juridical and territorial *status quo*." Probably, from the standpoint of Ahmed Zogu, the President of the Albanian Republic, the "maintenance" of "the political *status quo*" means the "maintenance" of himself in power by the strong arm of his ally, whose cannon would protect the huge mansion

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built for him on the hill overlooking the roadstead of Durazzo and connected (according to a local story) by a secret underground passage with the shore. Who, again, was threatening "the juridical and territorial *status quo*" of Albania? Neither Greece, who under the Republican system (especially under Pangalos, himself of Albanian origin) has been on particularly good terms with her smaller neighbor, nor Jugoslavia, who would scarcely have dared such an affront to the public law of Europe and was the supporter and host of Ahmed Zogu, a fugitive in Belgrade at a time when Italy was the friend of Fan Noli.

As published, the Pact consists, besides the preamble, of five articles. Article 1 repeats that "Italy and Albania recognize that every disturbance directed against the political, juridical and territorial *status quo* of Albania is contrary to their political interest" — a statement admitting of wide and varied interpretation. Article 2 engages "the high contracting parties, for the safeguard of the above interest, to lend to one another their mutual support and their cordial collaboration. They also pledge themselves not to conclude with other Powers political or military agreements prejudicial to the interests of the other party, as defined in the present Pact." Yet we were informed that a similar Pact was offered to Jugoslavia by Albania! Article 3 engages both "parties to submit to a special procedure of conciliation or arbitration the questions which might divide them and which could not be settled by the ordinary diplomatic procedure." "A special convention, to be concluded with the least possible delay," was to regulate "the methods of this procedure." Article 4 fixes the duration of the Pact at five years, and permits of its denunciation or renewal "one year before its expiration." The last article provides for its ratification, and subsequent registration by the League of Nations.

Even supposing that there are no secret articles, the published text of the Pact suffices to cause alarm to the friends of Albanian independence, who did not create an independent Albania in order that it might become an Austrian, Italian or Serbian protectorate. From the time of Francesco Crispi, himself a Sicilian of Albanian origin, Italian statesmen have had their eyes directed to the opposite coast of the Adriatic, visible on a clear day from Otranto. From a much earlier period, that following the death of Skanderbeg and the Turkish conquest in the last third of the fifteenth century, Italian interests in Albania

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had been aroused and maintained by the considerable Albanian colonies of refugees, who had fled to Southern Italy and found there a second home. Crispi's program was not the annexation of Albania, then Turkish, but the prevention of an Austrian occupation. After the battle of Adua in 1896 and the consequent fall of Crispi, the policy of Imperialism underwent a long eclipse; but in the early years of the present century another Sicilian, the Marchese Di San Giuliano, travelled in Albania and published a little volume of "Letters from Albania," of which he made a holocaust when he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, his book is rare, except in a German translation. Meanwhile, Italian consuls, like Millelire at Jannina and Di Gubernatis, worked for the extension of Italian influence. After the declaration of Albanian independence the six months' reign of Prince William of Wied at Durazzo was a continuous struggle between Austria and Italy, in which leading Albanians were used as pawns by the two great players. Meanwhile San Giuliano had done his best to make the Serbs evacuate Durazzo and the Montenegrins Scutari in 1913, and to throw the Greek frontier as far as possible to the south. Even a Prime Minister so little interested in foreign policy as Giolitti told Mr. Kaklamanos (the present Greek Minister in London), then Greek *chargé d'affaires* in Rome, that "if Greece wished to remain on friendly terms with Italy, she must not touch Valona." Consequently, Mr. Venizelos prevented the Greek troops from occupying Valona and, in 1914, obtained from the Greek parliament the cession to Albania of the islet of Saseno in the bay, which in the British days had been an appendage of the Ionian Islands, and had with them been ceded by Great Britain to Greece in 1864. At the end of 1914, the Italians occupied and fortified Saseno, perhaps on the strength of Lucan's application to it of the epithet, "Calabrian" in his *Pharsalia*. There they still remain, although Saseno is waterless and could be commanded by cannon planted on the Akrokeraunian Mountains. Valona and other places in Albania they evacuated under the Tirana agreement in 1921, when Giolitti was again Premier, and the late Take Jonescu, the Rumanian statesman, told the writer that he had congratulated the Italian Prime Minister on having got rid of so thankless a burden. The malaria bred in the lagoons near Valona had wrought havoc among the Italian troops, and one Italian garrison had mutinied rather than go to Albania. At

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that time the Albanians showed quite plainly that they did not want them, and that *l'Albania farà da se*. But the modern blackshirts are in many cases too young to remember the unpleasant Albanian bivouacs of the war, while to the present director of Italian policy Durazzo may seem, as it was to the ancient Romans whom he professes to imitate, the first step on that Via Egnatia which led to Salonika. Even before the advent of Fascism, it was obvious that Italian Nationalism, its intellectual predecessor, was bent upon assuming the part formerly played—but with greater experience and local knowledge — by Austria. But the Balkan peoples did not, by dint of gigantic sacrifices, rid the Balkan peninsula of Austria in order to put Italy in her place, although Austria had in Bosnia and the Herzegovina a set of officials who on a smaller scale reproduced the British civil service of India. Yet none the less Austria was unpopular, because she was a foreign Power, alien to the national sentiment. Most peoples prefer to be worse governed by their own compatriots than to be better governed by foreigners, as Great Britain found in the Ionian Islands.

The attitude of Sir Austen Chamberlain in the present question would certainly have surprised some of his great predecessors in the British Foreign Office. His Minister in Albania, Mr. O'Reilly, foresaw what was coming and warned his chief. The fact that he had done so leaked out and reached Rome, whereupon Sig. Mussolini is said to have complained to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Palmerston or Curzon would have supported his subordinate. Sir Austen Chamberlain removed him from Durazzo and transferred him to Venezuela. It is, indeed, a novel experience for an Italian, or any foreign, statesman to secure the removal of a British Minister for having done his duty to the best of his ability. When Mr. O'Reilly's predecessor, Sir Harry Eyres, a diplomatist of life-long experience of the Near East, was at Durazzo, he successfully defeated intrigues against himself and occupied a paramount position in the councils of the Albanian Government because it was known that he and his collaborator, Mr. Eden, had no political axe to grind and spoke the truth frankly on all occasions. The British Foreign Minister has now simultaneously sacrificed British prestige alike in Albania and Jugoslavia, because of his regard for Sig. Mussolini. Probably the Italian Premier has modified the opinion which he expressed over his own signature in his own newspaper, the

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Popolo d'Italia, four weeks before he became Prime Minister: "The interest of Italy is to collaborate in the demolition of the English (*sic*) Empire." He now appears to act as if it were rather "the interest of Italy to collaborate with the British Empire," and to forget Malta and the rest.

The repercussion was naturally most felt in Jugoslavia. The Croats, and still more the Slovenes, who have "unredeemed" brethren under Italian rule, are unfriendly to, and suspicious of, Italy; while the Serbs, although more remote from the Adriatic, have always been inclined to chauvinism. The writer has heard the Adriatic claimed in identical phrase as "our sea" in both Rome and Belgrade, and the struggle over "the Adriatic question," arising out of the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, which conceded a large part of Slav Dalmatia to the Italians but which finally was whittled down to Zara, has left a legacy of unfriendliness behind it. On the other side, unpleasant memories of the Croats during the Austrian occupation of Lombardy and Venetia, kept alive by the school-books of history, predisposed Italians to look upon their new neighbors much as they looked upon Austria. An Italian caricature represented a young and vigorous three-headed eagle floating over the Adriatic in place of the old and decrepit double-headed bird. The immediate result of the Italo-Albanian Pact has been to unite more closely the three component elements of the Triune Kingdom. Some think that it will have the further effect of throwing the Bulgarians and the Jugoslavs into each other's arms. This last event seems, however, less probable than an Italo-Bulgarian Pact with a view of encircling Jugoslavia. Historically, the Serbs and the Bulgarians, alike in mediæval and modern times, have rarely been friends — witness the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885 and the Bulgarian attack upon Serbia during the late Armageddon. Ethnologically, the Bulgarians themselves told us during that conflict that they were not Slavs, but merely spoke a Slav language. Others believe that the Jugoslavs will now navigate towards Russia, as in the old imperial days, despite their horror of bolshevism. But in any case, Sig. Mussolini's action looks like the lighting of a match near the powder-magazine of Europe, where the last war had its origin.

A country like Albania, governed for centuries by the clan system, with four religions and only fourteen years of corporate life, will probably remain for a long time the theatre of internal

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conflicts. The warlike tribes of the north, who rose against the Turks in 1911, are specially likely to rebel from time to time against the central authority. Here will be the opportunity of Italy to step in, by virtue of the Pact and by an unilateral construction of the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference authorizing her to defend the interests of Albania. Having entered "to restore order," she will provoke the Jugoslavs to do likewise, and then the two rivals may meet over the prostrate body of Albania, with the direst results to Balkan or even European peace. Here the Italian dictator may find that exciting diversion which he is believed to require for the jaded palates of his younger followers. And 1927 may be his "Napoleonic Year."

Meanwhile, foreign economic interests in the country, other than Italian, will suffer, and the new protectors will have in Albania a monopoly such as the present Italian Finance Minister, Count Volpi, formerly established in Montenegro, where the tobacco manufactory at Podgoritsa, the Antivari harbor works and the Vir-Bazar railway were in his hands. A further menace to the general peace would consist in the assignment of naval bases to Italy along the Albanian coast, as has been rumored but not so far demonstrated. It is true that the shallow roadsteads of San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo, where the writer sixteen months ago saw the sunken war steamers still sticking with their funnels out of the water, are poorish anchorages, while Italy already has one base on Saseno. But Jugoslavia would certainly chafe at this conversion of the lower Adriatic into an Italian lake, and the small but well-manned Jugoslav fleet is not despicable, for the Dalmatian sailors are among the best of the world and the numerous islands and inlets of the Dalmatian Coast excellent submarine-bases. Other greater Naval Powers might also object to this strategic closing of the Adriatic, especially after the recent establishment of the Italian naval base at Leros in the Dodecanese. Thus the Adriatic would, politically as well as physically, justify Horace's epithet of "turbid."

Sir Austen Chamberlain's own country will probably also suffer from the Italian hegemony in Albania. Thanks to the efforts and influence of Sir Harry Eyres, the Albanian Government had engaged a British officer, Col. Stirling, to draw up a scheme for reorganizing the internal administration — a work for which the British, with their long colonial experience of undeveloped

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countries, were peculiarly fitted. Moreover, Major-General Sir Jocelyn Percy was appointed as Inspector-General of the Albanian gendarmerie with nine other British officers under him. Now, if we may judge from the Italian press campaign carried on against the late British Naval Mission in Greece and from the hostility of the Italians to the British Police Mission there, it is probable that the same policy will be pursued in Albania, and Ahmed Zogu will be asked to substitute Italian *carabinieri* officers for the British inspectors. Financially, Italy, unable to pay any but a small portion of her war debt to Great Britain, has provided a loan for Albania for public works and the improvement of communications — a task for which the excellent Italian engineers are well fitted. The discovery of further deposits of petrol will doubtless be exploited by Italian financiers and captains of industry, to the detriment of their British and American competitors.

The Albanian Legation in Paris has published an official denial of the comments made upon the text of the Pact. Official *démentis*, as every student of foreign politics knows, have a very relative value. As the private secretary of a former Italian Premier once said to the writer: "A denial by the Premier would constitute the indirect confirmation of the facts denied." The present denial informs us that Albania "preserves her sovereignty," and is ready to conclude a similar Pact with other states, "notably those who are her neighbors." The published text of article 2 of the Pact would seem to make the conclusion of such another Pact somewhat difficult. In any case, as the denial states, this is "the first time that Albania has signed a Pact of reciprocal friendship and security with a Great Power." That, in itself, constitutes a modification of the Balkan *status quo*, by the introduction, for the first time since the last settlement of the Balkans, of a Great Power into the affairs of the peninsula. It is a return to the old system of alliances and counter-alliances, which the League of Nations was to supersede. Doubtless the League does not enjoy a wide popularity in the Balkans, where events happen rapidly and politicians are not much addicted to political theory. But Albania, of all Balkan countries, has least reason to complain of Geneva, where Fan Noli enjoyed the powerful patronage of Lord Cecil.

This Pact has given to Greece, at least, an opportunity such as she has not had before for making a new arrangement with

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Jugoslavia and settling the question of the "Serbian free zone" at Saloniki in a way more favorable to herself. For Jugoslavia finds herself isolated, and her natural ally is Greece, especially now that she has had, since August, 1925, direct access by rail to the Adriatic at Spalato and is therefore no longer so anxious for an outlet at Saloniki. The four Græco-Jugoslav conventions made in the last week of the Pangalos dictatorship by Mr. Rouphos, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, have never been ratified, and his successor, Mr. Argyropoulos, looking upon himself as a member of a merely service cabinet, did nothing more in the matter. Unfortunately, the death of Pashitch, the protracted ministerial crisis in Serbia, and the death of Mr. Gavrilovitch, the Jugoslav Minister in Athens, have prevented immediate negotiations for the modification of these conventions. A new Græco-Jugoslav alliance based upon mutual interests would not only be some guarantee for Balkan peace, but would enable Greece to reduce her military expenses, now amounting to 23 percent of her total expenditure.

The whole incident is typical of the unrest prevailing in Europe since the peace, which seems, after all, to be only an armed neutrality. Most European Powers are surrounded by suspicious neighbors, and Sig. Mussolini holds much the same language which William II held before the war. It may be intended only for "internal consumption," but such a method is playing with fire, for someone may take his menaces seriously. Certainly Albania, smallest and youngest among Balkan nations, though perhaps oldest among Balkan nationalities, is not worth the bones of the proverbial Pomeranian grenadier. But as the old Serbian Regent, Ristich, said, *pays balkanique, pays volcanique*, and a new political crater may one day be formed at Tirana, which erupts simultaneously with Vesuvius. That its ashes will be carried far is probable; they may even reach Locarno. It therefore behooves statesmen to follow carefully what is happening in Albania, and foreign ministers to believe what their conscientious representatives on the spot communicate to them, all the more because there are usually no press correspondents at Tirana and news from there is either sensational or official. The truth usually lies between the two.

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YOUNG CHINA

By Edward H. Hume

WE shall have, some day, a history of China that pictures vividly the unique succession of the seasonal cycles in her national life: long winters of stagnation of thought and activity, following on days of real harvest; and followed, in turn, by the freshness of spring, when the sap of vitality crowds the blossoms out on every branch before the frost has disappeared. It is spring, though winds of violence scatter petal and seed pod, delaying, even destroying, much of the fruitage. Of no period will the historian say with such assurance as of today, "This was spring. Here China was young again."

To those who have felt the violence of the extremists and watched the withdrawal of the moderates, Young China means hot-headedness and irresponsibility. The term recalls to their minds noisy groups of youngsters, herded into line for a patriotic procession, ordered to shout slogans, compelled to carry banners with truly strange devices, keen to overthrow all order and discipline in school as well as government, "for patriotic reasons." Such radicalism, however, is only part of the picture. It is generally admitted that not over twenty percent of the student world supports the extremist program. It would be as unfair to limit the term Young China to the violent radicals as to designate only the vociferous and the immature when speaking of Young America or Young France.

The truer Young China is the group that is moved by the vitality of spring, crowding out the old stagnancy. It includes the thoughtless, to be sure; but it also includes even larger numbers of those thoughtful souls who understand something of what it means to build up a vigorous, self-dependent nation. It is the purpose of this study to inquire in some detail what Young China stands for, what are the forces that impel it and the pitfalls on its road, what its program is and what it holds of future promise.

Young China is, in the first place, the aroused portion of her citizens. To be sure, this means thousands of immature and ignorant boys and girls, scarcely out of primary school, forced to march in endless parades, compelled to sit through noisy gatherings where party slogans are taught them, then driven back again to their schools, to present long series of demands to

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their principals. Beginning with declarations that they are revolutionaries, anxious to participate in the great movement that will overthrow militarism everywhere, they insist on complete freedom of speech, on the presence of a student delegate with power to vote in all faculty meetings, on the approval of the Student Union in cases of major discipline, on the right to demand the removal of teachers, or even of the principal "when he shall have lost the confidence of a majority of his students." Obviously, since so much time is required to memorize the patter of the propagandists, curriculum work and the disciplinary elements of school life come in a poor second.

But in addition to these hot-heads there are countless mature men and women in every sphere of public life. "There was never a time in China," says a sober, world-travelled executive, "when people's hearts bounded with more hope than today. For the first time in many years, glimmerings of a possible solution to our problem are visible on the horizon. The atmosphere strongly reminds us of the revolutionary days of 1911. Expectancy and hope are in the air and a forward move is now possible." Even the self-seeking militarists of the north have discovered that they must indicate their own awakening by insisting on their readiness to defend China's cause against foreign Powers.

For, to be fair to aroused Young China, there has swept over the land a belief that the nation is in peril and that only concerted action can save it. So, however blind the following of these leaders, however selfish the motives of many of them, there is a sincerity in the attitude of Young China, the like of which has not been seen before.

Young China is, also, crusading China, no whit behind the Crusaders of old in the reckless pursuit of an ideal. To be sure, the quest often blinds even the true crusaders of today, making it possible for a small minority of agitators to intimidate their fellows. Starting bravely, they dare not fall by the wayside. So great is the power of the radical leaders that many a youth who refuses to keep up with the crowd is compelled to endure impossible indignities and mortifications. Many of them are beaten, crowned with high hats inscribed "Hound of the Imperialists;" ropes are tied around their necks and they are paraded through the streets to the accompaniment of derisive cries.

Still, there is a truer Young China. It consists of an alert, devoted group, which is seeking the unification of the nation and

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its liberation from inequitable foreign agreements, is honestly asking "What's wrong with China?" and trying to answer the question with a real patriotism. It subscribes, whole-heartedly, to the first of the three principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, requiring everyone to subordinate himself to the welfare of the state and the people as a whole. As men watch this new spirit at work, they soon discover that the largest element in the success of the crusade is a great faith in the revolution, and particularly in its ability to bring about and to maintain stable government.

Again, Young China is discriminating. Time was when the Emperor expressed the national attitude by his tone of contempt for the foreigner. The "barbarians to the West" were not worthy to be admitted to the land as social equals. The thundering of guns and the quieter, but even more potent, influence of science dislodged the old conviction of superiority, and China went through a stage of admiration, almost adulation, slavishly copying the forms and fashions of the West. Today, a new spirit is abroad in the land. On the surface, attention appears to be directed largely to a decrying of Western imperialism, to an endeavor to overthrow foreign schools and hospitals. Beneath all this, however, is the new critical spirit which is testing impartially the old literary standards, the old religious traditions, the age-long family loyalties, as well as the influences from abroad, educational, political, social and religious.

One must admit that while the real spirit of inquiry and selective choice has arisen from an inner urge, there is, unquestionably, prompting from without as well. Men are saying everywhere in China, "We may not accept Russia's economic teaching, but her methods of revolution are the very best." Those who have come closest to Borodin appear certain that his counsel has been, not so much that China should imitate Russian communism, as that she should organize under party control, and enlist the laborer and farmer as well as the student, the merchant and the soldier. "Don't follow the West blindly," Russia seems to be saying to China today, "Find out what is best adapted to your own needs. Count on our help wherever you find we can give it. You will probably get what you desire all the more quickly if you can teach all the people some simple formulae." "Down with imperialism" is an easy slogan to learn and to shout in unison.

Most striking of all, Young China is a unifying force. Before the revolution of 1911 it worked underground. Secret societies

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were its method of organization. Pledged to work for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, their ultimate aim was to enlist the support of all classes of the people. When the outward label of monarchy was changed, they realized that their real task lay ahead. During the years up to 1919 it was the student class and the leaders of commerce who were enlisted, the influence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen becoming constantly more potent. A tremendous stimulus was given to the unification movement when Japan's "Twenty-One Demands" were discovered in 1915, students and merchants in many parts of the country joining in an effective protest. These groups became still further aroused and united in May 1919, when a nation-wide strike was effective in compelling China's delegates to withdraw from the Versailles conference and to refuse the treaty proposed there.

During the next six years, labor, which had hitherto had little part in the organized life of the nation and little chance to express itself, became increasingly involved. Today, it is one of the most powerful groups in the land and has to be reckoned with in every political situation. Its power was shown in the significant strike of seamen at Hongkong in 1923. The most explosive evidence of this new power of organization in China came, however, after the May 30th incident in Shanghai in 1925. By this time Young China had come to include all the student organizations throughout the land, large numbers of labor organizations, and a considerable fraction of the merchant class.

Young China has actively espoused the cause of labor during the past seven years, teaching the workman such phrases as "Fair Wages," "Shorter Hours," "The Dignity of Labor," conceptions he had never dreamed of before. Strikes have become a familiar weapon, and when strikers have suffered, as in the Shanghai mill incidents of 1925, Young China has taken up their cause and sought redress or reform. Far too often the methods used have been demonstrative rather than constructive. Mob violence has been released, followed by clashes with the police. These have resulted in still greater suffering and renewed demonstrations, a vicious circle that threatens to continue unless sober minds discover ways to break it. The fact remains that Young China has allied industry to itself, and can now order strikes or boycotts at will.

The newest campaign of education is designed to enlist the support of the farmers. One has only to bear in mind how vast

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a majority of the population they form to appreciate the significance of this latest development. The indoctrination is being carried on through rural schools, by groups of volunteer lecturers who go out into the country, and by bands of travelling players who give vivid presentations of the dangers to China's life, internal and external.

Add to all these elements the fact that the inclusion of women in all the social, educational and economic programs of Young China is rapidly increasing, and there arises a picture of China's new social democracy, in which all classes and both sexes are united in a common national cause.

In the last analysis, however, Young China means liberal China. Liberal in thought, to begin with. It is the mind of China, thinking in new channels and freed from traditional restraints. Says an ancient proverb, "All pursuits on earth are mean in comparison with that of learning." It is the scholar who has governed in the past, who has molded the thought of the common people and who has made of public opinion the irresistible force it has become. It is intellectuals who supply, today, the freedom, the initiative and the sustained dynamic force for the new forward movements, economic, literary and political. Today it is men such as Dr. Hu Shih and Dr. David Yui, who would be leaders of thought in any country, that are molding the opinion of the nation. Old China relied on the dictatorship of a Yuan Shih-kai or on the military prowess of *tuchuns*. The political leadership of today is passing rapidly to Young China. One of its chief concerns at this time of crisis is to keep the control of events in the hands of the moderates. The insistent demand of the extremists for power has followed as a natural sequence upon the admission, in 1921, of the communistic group as one wing of the Kuomintang, or People's Party. This group had gained a small following from the early days of Western contact onward, but had never occupied a position of any political importance. The Chinese are innately averse to the radical principles on which communism rests, but by 1921 the leaders of the Kuomintang were convinced that their party organization needed something that the radicals could give. It was understood that the moderates should formulate the party political program, while the extremists were to organize the technique of political propaganda. What could be more natural than that such a union should result in dangerous radical leadership in certain areas? The present party organization leaves

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every committee almost supreme in its own district. In places where uneducated workmen and immature students form a majority of the district committee, the program and the conduct of those in power is thoroughly communistic. The moderates everywhere regret that this is so, none more than the leaders of the Kuomintang itself. In places where communistic storms are wrecking institutions and working havoc with the constructive activities of the community, the moderates admit their helplessness for the moment and stand aside till the fury of the elements shall have spent itself.

In spite of the danger that the agitators may get out of hand now and then, Young China is working steadily ahead for the creation of a liberal public opinion. Through all the varied political activities of the past fifteen years, when military movements and cabinet changes have followed each other in kaleidoscopic sequence, success has invariably come to that side which had the approval of liberal public opinion. When President Yuan Shih-kai appeared to be at the height of his power, had actually set the date for his own coronation as Emperor and had chosen the title and had the seals cut for the new dynasty which he was to inaugurate, a movement led by a single courageous general overthrew all his plans. Tsai Ao, then governor of Yunnan province, a fearless leader in the Young China Party, started the revolt which ended Yuan's hopes and set the seal of national disapproval on any further attempt at reviving imperial government.

II

The forces impelling Young China are varied and complex. In the first place, Young China is moved by a sense of responsibility. No other group cares about the nation's welfare. No other will undertake the task of safeguarding it. China's reconstruction would be left unachieved unless Young China strove for it. This alone would be a sufficient motive. But in addition to it, there is fast developing an intelligent loyalty which increases the ability to bear the burdens assumed.

It is frankly recognized that the core of the problem of national reformation is at home. The evils of militarism, the wrangling of political rivals, the prevalence of official greed, are not possible of concealment. On the contrary, they are attacked publicly. "The important thing," said a high official of the People's Party at a recent gathering, "is not the battles which have been

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won but the principles for which our armies have been fighting. We are fighting militarism first of all — the militarism represented by Yuan Shih-kai, Wu Pei-fu and men of that stamp. We are fighting, also, the foreign imperialism which has supported all these militarists in their efforts to crush the people's revolution."

It is Young China, too, that has taken up the responsibility of reducing illiteracy. President Ray Lyman Wilbur was one of many at the Institute of Pacific Relations at Honolulu in 1925 who came away believing that no more significant movement had been reported there than the Mass Education Movement in China. Though less than seven years old, it has already demonstrated its effectiveness by adding literates to the population at the rate of several hundred thousand a year.

A second force is a sense of irritation. There is precisely the same stirring in the Young Filipino, the Young Egyptian and the Young Turk. Young China is trying to rid itself of external irritants, in particular. It knows that peace and order have disappeared, that education is suffering, that transportation is crippled — all because of the plague of militarism. But it is the aggressiveness of the foreigner that rankles most today. In his report on the Shanghai incident of May 30th, 1925, Finley Johnson, the American judge in the Court of Inquiry, insisted that the anti-foreign feeling in China was not due, primarily, to the events of that regrettable day, but to a variety of political causes: loss of territorial sovereignty, and the usurping of powers, legislative, judicial, administrative and police, in Chinese territory, as well as "the failure on the part of the foreigners in China to realize that the Chinese people have made greater advancement during the past ten years in civics, in the fundamental principles of government and in the better understanding of individual rights under the law than they had made in any hundred years during their entire history."

One underlying reason for the irritation against the West is found in the belief that moral issues, so basic in Chinese philosophy, appear to be ignored frequently. The Chinese frankly admit that they do not live up to their own high standards; yet their chief concern is with human behavior, for the appraisal of which they possess a remarkable instinct. Their indignation over recent occurrences is not, in their own thought, primarily anti-foreign; it is moral. After living with the Chinese for many years I have come to believe that the sense of resentment against the West is

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strongest in those matters where the West appears to them to disregard their ideas of what is "right," "ethical," "reasonable from a moral standpoint."

A third force is a determination to preserve the national heritage at all costs. When China discovered that she was in danger of being outclassed by other nations because of their progress in science, there was a period of discouragement. Today, China has determined to build for herself the civilization she needs, using her own indigenous cultural materials and such as she chooses to borrow from without. Her political integrity she will not surrender. In the realm of the spirit, China is re-discovering a distinguished line of social reformers who "experimented with almost all the schemes for social improvement devised by men in any age," as well as many eminent statesmen and administrators and scholars who have enriched many fields of intellectual inquiry.

So, too, in the economic realm, China is determined that revenues that ought to be hers, banking profits that her own financiers ought to secure, shall no longer go to the foreigner. In the ordinary rivalries of business the Chinese merchant never had anything to fear; he was an adept there. He is through, as well, with consortiums and concessions which endanger his economic control. These purposes have largely arisen out of the general distrust of the Westerner that is, unfortunately, so prevalent.

Finally, the forces that have aroused Young China may be understood better by recalling certain innate and distinctive Chinese qualities. For example, there is their faculty of tenacious memory. The boy who could never forget the "four books and the five classics" which he had memorized so thoroughly as a child, now writes on blackboards and doorways, "Don't forget the national humiliation." On May 4th he writes, "Don't forget the day of disgrace." This was when China lost her cause at Versailles in 1919. On May 7th he writes, "Don't forget the Twenty-One Demands." On September 7th he writes, "Don't forget the signing of the Boxer Year protocol." And of course May 30th is a date burned into the heart of Young China, the anniversary of the Shanghai incident in 1925.

Another trait is confident belief in the principle of reciprocity. "As you would be done by" was taught long before the Christian era. It has made all Chinese love the method of arbitration.

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Whether the case at issue be the wage of the laborer, the boundaries of a plot of ground, or the political implications of a diplomatic controversy, every Chinese desires and accepts the principle of arbitration. To him this is a moral and equitable way of solving difficulties.

Still another fundamental influence is the prominence of the group rather than of the individual. Chinese thought has always been family thought, clan thought, village thought. Its essentially democratic character makes public opinion an exceedingly potent force. So, too, it is the family that arranges marriages, the clan that buys and sells property. The group, not the individual, creates benevolences, supports religion, fosters education. Little wonder, then, that there is such ready acceptance of the committee system insisted upon by the People's Party as a cardinal principle of government, at least for the time being. The transformation going on before us today is one of basic loyalties. All classes are being taught the meaning of national loyalty as something transcending the native devotion to family and clan.

Assemble these varied elements — the sense of responsibility, the sense of irritation, the new spirit of determination; add to them those significant qualities of memory, of devotion to the principle of reciprocity, of group thought and action; create a series of situations in which all these factors are called into play at once; let the scholar lead as he has always done, however hot-headed many of his followers; teach the laborer and the farm-hand a few simple things about patriotic duty; and there is formed some conception of what is stirring Young China. Obviously, in addition to these psychological factors, other important elements are involved, such as the influence of modern science in education and industry and the influence of new tides of social and religious thought.

III

The most serious obstacle to Young China's progress is likely to be selfishness within its own ranks. Those who put self before their cause and personal gain before national welfare, as well as those who foster party jealousy and narrow provincialisms, are the real menace. Conspicuous for their self-seeking are the military adventurers who have lined their own nests with revenues squeezed out of the provinces. No greater tribute could be paid to the memory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen than that, in the very decade

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when so many other political leaders became personally wealthy, he died without wealth.

But selfishness is by no means confined to the militarists. Many of the most vocal of the younger leaders have tied themselves up with the Nationalist movement, confident that its success will bring them better positions and larger incomes. Another type of selfishness appears in narrow-minded provincials who attempt to confiscate the property of leaders from outside their provincial borders or to wreck institutions conducted by foreigners or by others than those belonging to their own immediate neighborhood. Such men ignore real values for passing gain. Their patriotism is likely to falter at the slightest sign of personal danger.

A second danger confronting Young China grows out of the yoking together of groups that can never work in harmony. Slogans consisting of complaints against the foreigner can scarcely form a stable bond of union between rival elements in government or in party organization. Yet that is exactly what we see today in the Kuomintang, where the moderate wing has yielded to many of the demands of the radicals in matters such as anti-British agitation, attacks on institutions conducted by Westerners, and the like, in order to hold the party together. Dangerous enough as a temporary expedient, continued yielding of this sort can scarcely fail to work harm to the party. In this same category lie the dangers likely to result from admitting to equal power with the moderates the unthinking among the workers. To permit labor to continue the levies on capital that have already begun may easily disrupt China's economic life, and, in the end, aggravate rather than improve the status of the laborer.

Still a third danger ahead is that Young China, in its warm advocacy of the democratic principle, shall develop without discipline. Allow the pupils of the higher normal schools in a province like Hunan, with its population of 25,000,000 people, to assume supervision of institutional discipline, penal, financial and administrative; allow the graduates of these schools to become the teachers in the primary schools and junior high schools throughout that province, themselves yielding, in turn, to the demands of their pupils of every grade and of all ages; and the provincial school system is not merely disorganized but breeds radicalism and license. Instead of being a constructive instrument, it is transformed into a subversive force in the social order.

This is not written to imply that Young China will be over-

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whelmed by these perils. On the contrary, they are discussed here in the belief that the human leadership which has developed during the past fifteen years is fully conscious of the obstacles in the path of progress and that it will deal with them frankly and courageously. The excesses have been, on the whole, those of vitality. Decadent individuals could never be so alert and active.

IV

Nothing could give a clearer picture of the spirit of Young China than the program of intellectual endeavor planned by its constructive leaders. They are determined to bring information to the masses. "Eliminate illiteracy and make new citizens for China," is the watchword of the mass education movement, conceived, organized and developed by the younger group of the intellectuals. It is this same group that is responsible for the intellectual renaissance and the literary revolution. The former is best described, perhaps, as the awakening of a critical attitude towards facts and the determination to deal with these facts by the method of science. True as it is that this awakening has followed China's contacts with the West, the motive force comes, after all, from within. Little by little it will enable China to become, once more, supreme in the fields of her own cultural and social heritage.

The platform of the literary revolution may be summed up in the words of Dr. Hu Shih, one of its initiators:

> Write only when you have something to say.
> Write what you have to say and write it as it is said.
> Write it in your own words, not in some one else's.
> Write in the language of your own time.

One has only to visit a modern book-stall or a city news-stand to discover how this movement has opened wide the flood-gates of literary production. A vital part of the literary revolution is the rapid extension of the "national speech" movement to every locality where Chinese live. I had the opportunity, a few months ago, to observe Chinese schools as far from their home base as Singapore and Sumatra. The children in these schools were being taught the national speech and could converse fluently in it, though their elders still clung to the native dialects of the provinces from which they had emigrated. Could any program for national rehabilitation and wide spread unification be more effective than one which will extend China's cultural domain from

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Mongolia in the north to the Malay States near the equator and which will unite in one spoken language, in an almost continuous area, so large a proportion of the world's population?

Side by side with the school as effective parts of this program, are the press, the platform and the theatre, as well as quiet discussion groups and research in the university centres.

Another major emphasis in Young China's program is the modernizing of industry. On the one hand, new methods and equipment are being introduced with surprising rapidity; on the other, there are already looming large many of those industrial problems of which, till yesterday, China was unconscious, problems such as the regulation of hours, sanitary surroundings, the prevention of accidents, workers' compensation. Even more momentous are the changes consequent upon the employment of large numbers of workers, a system that eliminates the old human relation between master-worker and apprentice. Until labor can develop better leadership, can conquer the present illiteracy and ignorance, and can substitute corporate thinking for propaganda conducted by paid agitators, its lot will be difficult. But a number of organizations have already come into being to secure for the worker the safeguards and the compensations that are his due. Every such provision makes it increasingly certain that in the China of the coming days the workman and the farmer will be given a full share of responsibility in the nation's affairs.

The future is in the hands of Young China. The older generation failed utterly to be creative; the military group because of its greed and over-weening confidence in force; the intellectuals because of their static philosophy and complacency; the laborer and the farmer because they never knew that it would be possible to have any share in social reconstruction. Young China has become, therefore, the leader of a real revolution, something as essentially different from the movement that overthrew the Manchus in 1911 and from the subsequent so-called lesser revolutions as an on-rushing sea-tide differs from the ripples on a shallow pond. It is working for a future in which China shall fully realize its newly-awakened national aspirations.

Into the accomplishment of its task it is pouring the devotion, the enthusiasm and the fearlessness of youth. All who meet its leaders become conscious at once that they are moved by something akin to the passion of religious devotees. It is planning a democratic reconstruction that shall extend to every element in

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the social order and that can only be fully accomplished when every social group participates in carrying out the program. The magnitude of the task is inconceivable. The past fifteen years of strife and turmoil may have been a necessary means of convincing men that a change was imperative. When the change in political ideas shall have permeated the mass of the population so that the state becomes central in their loyalty instead of the family and the clan — a process that may take decades — then alone will it be possible to bring into play the forces that shall create a new China, blending the old materials of the national heritage with the new from abroad.

At the moment, the process of change is being blocked both by militarists, who continue their strife as if unaware how completely they are held in universal execration, and by those radical forces, unleashed by Young China in its effort to make the new movement democratic. An able Chinese observer writes, "All will be well while the mass is amenable to the leadership of the moderates. But should the workers now aroused ever get out of hand, then we shall have the devil to pay." Yet no thoughtful person should be misled, by the passing extremism, into believing that China is on the verge of disorganization. The new attitude of Young China should make it clear that there cannot possibly come about either a break-up into separate states, a revival of the monarchical idea, or a control of the entire country by a single dictator.

Young China looks to the West today to do four things: to understand, by intelligent inquiry, the unfolding situation, political and social; to express a constructive sympathy, which involves, not blindness to the excesses of the radicals, but a willingness to stand by the moderates till they recover power; to refrain from intolerance in attitude and expression, appreciating the magnitude of Young China's task, both in area and in size of population involved; and finally, to support every well-considered plan for action in favor of liberal China. The centre of such action will consist in a public declaration by our government that old agreements are outworn and that we are ready to meet China's representatives as soon as they have been chosen, in order to reconsider all our political relationships and to put them on a basis that shall be truly equitable and reciprocal. Such a demonstration of our sincerity would strengthen the hands of Young China as it proceeds on its enterprise of rebuilding a nation.

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FUTURE PHILIPPINE POLICY UNDER THE JONES ACT

By Henry L. Stimson

NEARLY a generation has now passed since the occupation of the Philippines by our army and navy first brought those Islands to the responsible attention of the people of the United States. Not only are trans-Pacific affairs now receiving greater attention in America than formerly but our own experiments in government in the Islands have continued long enough to enable us to get a better grasp and perspective of the controlling facts. With the aid of this information we should be able now to forecast more accurately than hitherto the line which our governmental policy in the Philippines should follow. This article is an attempt to briefly sketch such controlling facts and conditions and the outlines of the policy they would seem to dictate. Obviously within the limitations of space imposed by a magazine article they must be presented almost dogmatically and without argument or detail.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND RACIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The following conditions of geography, population and race fundamentally control the situation:

1. The Philippines are a group of very rich, tropical islands occupied by a relatively scanty population. Over eighty percent of their area is undeveloped public land. They are surrounded on three sides by countries containing the most dense population in the world and composed mainly of more warlike and industrially competent races than the Filipinos. Within a brief period prior to their occupation by Spain they were successively overrun by conquerors from Java, China and Japan. I believe it to be a fair statement that at present the Philippines are protected from foreign submersion either in the form of gradual penetration or military conquest solely by the exclusion laws and military power of the United States.

2. Under Spanish and subsequent American supervision the Malay tribes occupying the Philippines have made marked progress towards the development of a common Christian civilization and a common national consciousness. Yet while the original

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provinces or states, and finally in the insular government. While the American Commission exercised as it were "parental" supervision and control at the top, a well chosen force of American civil servants interspersed in key positions throughout the service performed what might be called the function of "big brothers" lower down. Admirable progress was made in sanitation. The tropical diseases which prior to our advent had scourged and kept down the population were one after another attacked and conquered by the efforts of the Medical Corps of our army and our Health Service. The economic development and welfare of the Islands was assured by the grant to them of free trade with this country in 1909. Somewhat prematurely, as appears now in the light of after events, an elective assembly was established in 1907. But although this fostered an agitation for independence among the professional politicians, it also accelerated political education among the larger masses. This agitation for independence produced repercussions in the United States and American leaders occasionally made statements to the effect that if after the development of the Filipinos in self-government was complete, they deliberately and maturely desired a severance of their ties with this country, such a desire could not be denied. Yet these utterances were usually coupled with the expectation and hope that when that time came the advantages of the connection would be so manifest that it would become permanent. So far as I know during that period none of the American administrators having knowledge of the Filipino situation expressed any other anticipation than that the process of development in self-government would require a very long, indeed an almost indefinitely long time.

Furthermore, although at the beginning of the Philippine experiment there had been a sharp division of party lines in America on the subject of "expansion" or "imperialism," the actual administration of the Islands was conducted on non-partisan lines. Of the five Governor Generals who held office during those fourteen years, two were Republicans, two were Democrats and one an independent, and each one when chosen for that position, excepting necessarily the first, Mr. Taft, had had preliminary administrative experience in the Islands.

In 1913 what may be termed the "Harrison interlude" began. Governor Harrison came to his post without any previous Philippine administrative experience. The same thing was true I believe of most if not all the associates sent with him. Nor had the

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American President who sent him any experience in Far Eastern matters. Under the theory that the Filipinos were almost ready for independence and should be granted it in the near future, and that the best method of preparing them for that eventuality was an increase of responsibility in government, a policy of rapid "Filipinization" was put into effect. The American Commission was transformed into one in which the majority of votes and balance of power were held by Filipinos. The American "big brothers" in the civil service were rapidly disposed of by dismissal and bonuses for retirement. The supervisory and veto powers of the Governor General were left unused. Filipino policy and Filipino administration were dominant throughout the insular government.

The Malay tendency to backslide promptly made itself felt with disastrous consequences. The sanitary service became disorganized with resulting epidemics of smallpox and cholera, which within a single period of two years carried off over sixty thousand people. The Philippine government was allowed to invest its funds in a national bank, a railroad, cement factory, sugar centrals and other business enterprises substantially all of which were failures. The bank nearly became insolvent, the insular currency dropped to fifteen percent below par and the insular government was wholly unable to live within its revenue.

Such was the condition in 1921 found by the investigation of the Wood-Forbes Commission and which Leonard Wood was then appointed Governor to rehabilitate. For nearly six years that work has been in process and is substantially accomplished. Inasmuch as the American personnel in the civil service had been dismissed and under existing law there was no way to restore it without the assent of the Philippine Senate which has not been given, the work has fallen upon the practically unaided shoulders of the Governor General. It has necessarily aroused temporary antagonism. Political supervision once abandoned is with difficulty restored over any people. But today the sanitation is again restored, the bank has been saved, the currency is at par and the government is living within its income. Taxes are low and collected without difficulty.

Under the present system of government the material condition of the individual Filipino is better than that of any other person in the Orient. He is protected by our army, navy and diplomatic service and yet he pays no American income tax or

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other taxation. He is protected by our Oriental Exclusion Laws and yet himself can migrate freely to the United States. He has autonomy in framing his own tariff against foreign countries while at the same time he has free access to the American market. His standard of life is more Occidental than any of his Asiatic neighbors. His daily wage, if he be a laborer, is higher. Due to the American market, the price which he secures for his products is far higher. If the connection with America were withdrawn he at once would be presented with the alternative of reducing his standard of life or complete bankruptcy.

III. THE PRESENT UNREST AND AGITATION

While the reality of this contrast in individual condition between the Filipino and his Asiatic neighbor was never more apparent to the visitor to the Orient than it is today, yet quite a contrary impression has been given to the people of America by a continuance of the agitation for independence. As to this the following observations I believe to be accurate and conservative.

The agitation takes its origin entirely among the comparatively small element of Mestizo politicians who dominate the central insular government. The Malay farmer who constitutes over ninety percent of the population is comparatively prosperous and entirely content. He takes no part in originating the movement. He will obediently follow his political leaders in any ordinary expression of opinion at the polls but would not either originate or understand the significance of such a movement.

For several years the movement was artificially stimulated by an annual "independence fund" of one million pesos appropriated by the legislature for that purpose, but which was declared illegal and stopped in 1924. The main center of the agitation in the Islands is confined to the neighborhood of Manila and perhaps two or three other cities where there have accumulated bodies of young Filipinos who have during recent years received a kind of education for which the development of the Islands does not yet afford a sufficient outlet in practical application. The system of education which we have introduced has in some respects been faulty and these faults have been accentuated by Filipino tastes. We have educated young men too freely for "white collar jobs" which do not exist among this purely agricultural people. For example the press reported that over eleven hundred young men endeavored to register as applicants for the annual bar examina-

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tion last summer — a number which would excite comment in New York, let alone Manila. As a result it is a quite prevalent idea among the young men that a diploma should entitle them to a place in the government or some other easy livelihood and that independence will create such jobs for them. A comparatively small and radical element of the population centered about Manila and recruited from this younger student class furnishes the main response to the agitation for immediate independence. On the other hand, men who have acquired substantial property or business express themselves emphatically against it. This is usually done in confidence for fear of political reprisal.

One of the reasons for the continuance of the agitation among the *politicos* is of course the friction growing out of the restoration of American supervision by Governor Wood, particularly in respect to the functions of the legislature where Wood has exercised freely the veto power which Harrison almost abandoned. Again, the effort of Wood to free the government from the unwise business ventures in which the preceding administration had embarked it has brought him into direct conflict with legislative leaders who, contrary to the law as now laid down in the opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States, were conducting that business. Such friction will normally cease with the elimination of the causes thereof, and personal observation on a visit to the Islands last summer led me to believe that with Wood's tact and patience it was already dying down. Similar observation on a fairly extended trip through the Islands produced the very strong impression that the supervision of the American Governor-General over the ordinary operations of local government throughout the Islands not only produced no friction but was attended with every evidence of good will and coöperation on the part of the Filipino local officials.

It must always be remembered that in the absence of other political issues independence is used as an easy slogan to catch unthinking votes for local purposes. When we remember how easy it is for American politicians to keep themselves in office by arousing agricultural animus against a distant money trust or Wall Street, we cannot be surprised or over-critical at these efforts to make political capital among a brown constituency against a distant white America. My real surprise on visiting the Islands was that, due to the general content and the amiable characteristics of the Malay farmer, the reaction to it was so slight.

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IV. FUTURE POLICY

Yet the final impression left upon the visitor is that much might be done by Americans to improve the present situation in the Islands and to pave the way towards a future constructive growth of the governmental system. The first and principal step would be the public avowal of a stable American policy towards the Islands, even of the most general character. This of course is not easy, because it depends finally upon the cultivation of an intelligent public opinion in America and cannot be accomplished by any single statutory enactment. The road to it would be by the abandonment of all planks for "prompt Philippine independence" in party platforms; by repeated manifestations of a consistent policy on the part of our executives and our Congresses of both parties backed up by similar consistent expressions of opinion by our press and other leaders of opinion. The reply of President Coolidge in 1923 to the demand of the Roxas Mission for the recall of Governor Wood is an instance of a clear and satisfactory expression of American policy and produced an excellent effect in the Islands.

If in that way it were made entirely clear that America had decided to carry out patiently to its distant conclusion the experiment undertaken in 1899 and that in the meanwhile it would not consider any abandonment thereof or experiment with any short cuts, the effect upon the ultimate solution of this problem would be great. The thoughtful Filipino politicians would then discuss in public what they now discuss in private with the visitor, namely the necessary steps to be taken along that path of self-government which our Senate mentioned in its resolution twenty-eight years ago.

When the subject is examined with even the most moderate care, the general course which we must follow, assuming that we intend to carry out our trust and not abandon it, seems plain. It lies between the extremes of annexation on the one side and immediate independence on the other, neither of which I believe would be supported after such study by any considerable body of American opinion. The course proposed by our Senate in 1899 of holding the Islands indefinitely and training them in the meanwhile in local self-government has been pronounced constitutional by our Supreme Court, which has thus ruled that there is nothing in our American constitution inconsistent with the purpose of

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developing self-governing possessions or colonies whose citizens did not participate in our citizenship and were not represented by votes in our Congress.

Along that general path the other great group of English speaking peoples known as the British Empire is already travelling. In the ideal of the "Association of Free Nations" it has found what satisfies the desire for independence among its members at the same time that it secures the strength of mutual association. While it has not yet realized in full measure that ideal in the case of any dependency composed entirely of a brown race, the course which it is following as to the others logically and ultimately commits it in respect to all. Under the terrible test which came at the outbreak of the late war the strength and loyalty of the bonds between the different elements of that empire were almost as marked among the brown peoples as among the white.

V. DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE JONES ACT

The present Organic Law of the Philippine Islands is the statute enacted by our Congress in 1916 commonly called the Jones Act. Except for its preamble, which in its statement of the historical policy of this country towards Philippine independence quite misrepresents the historic facts, the Act is in most respects a careful and well-considered piece of legislation. It contains a bill of rights substantially similar to that in our Federal constitution. It conveys general legislative power to a Philippine legislature consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives, the members of the former being elected for six and the latter for three years from senatorial and representative districts respectively. Beside these elective representatives the Governor-General has the right to appoint senators and representatives for certain districts containing the Moro and other non-Christian tribes. In a few respects the general powers of the Legislature are restricted. Acts relating to the disposition of the public land, foreign tariffs, immigration and the currency must receive the approval of the President of the United States before becoming a law, and the trade relations between the Islands and the United States are governed solely by the acts of the American Congress.

Executive power is vested in the Governor-General, appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate and holding his office at the pleasure of the President. He has a veto power over legislation similar to that of our

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State executives, except that if his veto is over-ridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Philippine Legislature the statute then goes to the President of the United States for approval or disapproval. The Governor-General appoints, subject to the consent of the Philippine Senate, all civil officers of the Insular Government, including the heads of the executive departments and the governors of certain provinces inhabited by non-Christian tribes. He also appoints the judges of the Courts of First Instance, the judges of the Supreme Court being appointed by the President of the United States. There is an express provision "that all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor General or within one of the Executive Departments under the supervision and control of the Governor General." Unlike most of our State Constitutions, there is no provision of law which prohibits a member of one of the houses of the Legislature from serving as the head of an Executive Department. In addition to these powers over the insular government the Governor General has been vested by Philippine statutes with power to investigate and remove delinquent local officials of the various provinces and municipalities similar to the statutes which exist in many of our States.

Thus it will be seen that we have sought to transfer to the Philippine Islands the general form of government with which we are familiar in this country, with two important changes material to our present discussion. The first is that the general power of executive appointment and executive supervision and control is vested in a governor not chosen by the local electorate but chosen by the American President and Senate. While by this provision we have tended to exaggerate the separation between the executive and legislative powers even beyond the separation which exists in our own governments, we have by a second change left open the door to a possible cure of the evils which would thus arise. By the omission of the customary bar which in this country prevents members of the Legislature from serving in executive positions, we have created an opportunity for the development of a responsible cabinet system. We have also given to the Governor-General in very explicit form the power of supervision and control over the workings of the insular government and this has been extended by other legislation to a supervision over the workings of local government.

I believe that, taking these points into consideration, we may

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find in the Jones Act ready to our hands an adequate instrument for the ultimate development of an autonomous government in the Philippines, while at the same time it provides for adequate training and supervision during the intervening period of political immaturity. We have created a Governor-General with the duty and power not only of performing the ordinary executive functions, as we understand them at home, but also of representing the American viewpoint in those far distant Islands and of exercising visitorial functions over government which the entire absence of critical public opinion now makes necessary. It would be a complete misapprehension of the Philippine situation to think that we can soon appoint or permit the Filipinos to elect a Filipino Governor-General. So long as a connection remains between us and them, the Governor-General's office should be the channel by which our views and our influence and help can be transmitted to our wards in that far-distant region.

Today it is the work of the office of the Governor-General which stands between the material welfare of the Islands and that racial tendency towards backsliding which produced disaster ten years ago. The present Governor, a man of indefatigable energy, by his veto checks the development of unwise general policies at Manila but by means of constant visits extends a fatherly guiding influence to the uttermost Islands of the Archipelago. Until the Filipinos have created a live and critical public opinion; until they become general readers of a public spirited press; until their men and women of leisure organize themselves into active charity associations, prison aid associations and school boards to watch and criticize the functions of government; in other words, until the Malay population of these Islands develop those basic foundations of self-government which we have developed during the past six or eight hundred years, either this visitorial American power must continue or progress in the Philippines cease.

This, however, does not mean that we must retain in our hands all executive power or keep the Filipinos from the exercise of the vital and educational function of administration. Even today the heads of the Executive Departments are all Filipinos, though appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Senate and removable by him. Today, in the absence of any system of responsible party government with clear cut party issues represented by distinct alignment in the Legislature, these department heads are the mere individual selections of the Governor-

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General and perform their work solely in responsibility to him. But with the development of responsible majority and opposition parties in the Legislature such department heads could be selected by the Governor from the dominant party as shown by the general election and could be held to party responsibility in their conduct of administration. In that way responsible cabinet government could be gradually evolved, including, in time, representation of the cabinet on the floor of the houses. When that is accomplished, the work of administration would be carried on by executive heads of Departments politically responsible to the dominant majority of the Legislature, but performing their work not only under the scrutiny of the opposition party but also under the constant inspection of an American Governor who possesses the ultimate power (not to be used, however, except in case of serious dereliction) of removal. Furthermore, the development of political responsibility would thus be subject to control; it need not be carried to the point of subjecting cabinet tenure to casual fluctuating majorities in the houses; nominations made in accordance with the result of one general election may normally carry over to the next election. Fickle tenure may thus be avoided, yet a hitherto unknown sense of party responsibility may be introduced.

I believe that in this way the Jones Act can be made a bridge by which we can pass gradually from a rigidly supervised system of government to one depending more and more upon responsibility to political parties and public opinion, and I believe further that the system thus developed under it would be safer and more efficient in execution than the suggested methods of an American "Resident Commissioner" or "Adviser," supposedly guiding a Filipino Governor. Also, there is the inestimable advantage that this system is founded on an already existing law, and one which in general structure is consistent with American tradition.

It is an interesting and hopeful sign that the minds of the Filipino political leaders themselves have already turned to such a development as the solution of their problem. It has long been urged by Sergio Osmeña, for many years the speaker of the House of Representatives and a thoughtful student of politics. Such a development was also apparently in the mind of Governor Harrison during his administration, though he made the grave mistake of attempting it prematurely and of failing at the same time to exercise the vital visitorial functions of the American Governor-

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General. For it is manifest that the very attempt to introduce party responsibility and thus to permit Filipino political control over administration will, particularly during the formative period, tend to result in a lowered efficiency in administration which must be guarded against by special vigilance on the part of the American Governor. For a long time the two functions must continue side by side; on the one hand, gradual transfer of administrative responsibility to Filipino representatives; on the other hand, special vigilance in watching, investigating and checking their work by the American representative. In order to prevent such a slump as took place under Mr. Harrison, the Governor must be provided with an adequate American force of inspectors responsible to him alone and comprising experts in the important lines of government, such as sanitation, agriculture (including mines, forests and fisheries) and law. Today he has no such force, and provision for it is a crying need even under present conditions.

To carry out such a development as I have outlined, no change in the present Organic Law is necessary — nothing but patience and steadfastness in adhering to a definite line of policy in spite of inevitable discouragements. That is the principal and most difficult requirement. Certain minor changes in that law might obviate dangers and make the task easier. For example, the condition of the Moro and other Pagan provinces presents a specific problem. The historic antipathy between the Moros and the Christian Filipinos renders satisfactory government of the Moros by Filipinos a difficult if not impossible task. For a long time impartial American governors of demonstrated character and efficiency will be required in the Moro provinces. Under the Jones Act the governors of those provinces are appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Filipino senate has refused to confirm any other than Filipino governors. That provision should be amended and to that extent the Moro provinces should be relieved from Filipino domination. Until the Filipinos have learned better to govern themselves, it is not safe to trust them to govern the Moros. Other minor changes may also be suggested.

But when all is said, such changes are of slight importance in the light of the workability of the statute as a whole. The primary thing is the creation of a stable and intelligent American opinion in regard to the Islands, and its application in a patient, consistent and steadfast colonial policy.

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GERMAN AND ITALIAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA

By Evans Lewin

THE entry of Germany into the League of Nations was preceded by a well organized propagandist movement for the return of some of her lost colonies and a demand that the price of her adhesion to the League should be the allotment to her of mandates in Africa. From one end of the Fatherland to the other the question was discussed in all its aspects and the movement was staged and managed with uncommon skill by the various colonial bodies, led by the "Korag," or Union of Colonial Societies, so named after the initial letters of its title, Koloniale Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft. This federation is stated to represent some thirty different societies, composed of over 400,000 members; the principal member organization, the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, acts under the presidency of Dr. Seitz, a former Governor of German South-West Africa, who is also president of the "Korag."

Although there is a tendency in some quarters to belittle the influence of these organizations and to consider the movement they represent as of small practical importance, it must be remembered that Germany's slow emergence as a colonial Power in the 'eighties and 'nineties of the last century was heralded and supported by exactly similar societies which by constant propaganda in the chief cities of the empire, and particularly in the old Hanseatic centers, at length compelled the government to enter upon the thorny path of colonial expansion.

A similar movement is in process to-day, and although conditions are different and the world-position has become far more difficult, there can be no doubt that the colonial ideal, rightly or wrongly, is now far more deeply engrained in the German people than it was previous to the war. The reason is simple and obvious. Nothing affected German national esteem so deeply or aroused so profound a resentment in the mass of the people as what has been wrongly called the rape of the colonies, the "Kolonialraub" of every German propagandist writer. Based as this loss was upon charges of brutality and maladministration on the part of those who were responsible for the welfare of the natives — charges which were mentioned in the Allied Note of

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June 16, 1919,[1] and formed the justification of the Allies for their action in seizing the German colonies — it struck directly at the *amour propre* of the German nation so that its repercussions are felt today in every part of the Fatherland.

It would be unwise, therefore, to regard as of little importance this ingrained German hostility to the post-war settlement in Africa or to look upon the revivified colonial movement as not representing a national question. It is true, as the London *Times* correspondent has stated, that it cannot be regarded as national in the political sense, but nevertheless the warning of *Germania*, the organ of the Center Party, that "this federation of colonial societies should not be looked upon as a new edition of the German Navy League, a State within a State and capable, owing to its powerful organization, of forcing its claims upon the government," is a warning of what may well become an accomplished fact in the not distant future. Although official Germany remains entirely correct in its attitude towards this deeply-rooted feeling, it may be obliged, sooner or later, to sanction an official demand for a place in the African sun.

The colonial movement in Germany cannot be regarded as merely the expression of a pious ideal. It is fathered, it is true, chiefly by those who were concerned with the building of the German empire overseas, ex-governors and ex-colonial ministers, officials who have served in the colonies, colonial traders and settlers, and all those who have interests in the supply of raw materials for the German economic machine, and supported by the mercantile and shipping communities of the great cities which were in the forefront of the old colonial movement. But it has received in addition the coöperation of Reichstag deputies who, under the presidency of Dr. Heinrich Schnee, a former governor of German East Africa, have formed a powerful colonial group within the portals of parliament itself. This group, the Interfraktionnelle Koloniale Vereiniging, includes two former colonial ministers, Doctors Bell and Dernburg, and numerous specialists in colonial subjects, and is always ready to bring pressure to bear upon the government on all questions relating to the furtherance of German colonial demands. Though there is no longer a Ministry of Colonies, such work as remains to be done in connection with them is still performed by a special colonial section of the

[1] This Note declared it to be impossible, in view of the past history of German colonial policy, to hand the colonies back to Germany or to entrust her with the responsibility for the welfare of the inhabitants.

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Foreign Office, which continues to publish the well known "Mitteilungen aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten," a review dealing with geographical, ethnographical, and other scientific questions in the former colonies. This publication is the only official colonial review rearing its head in the sea of non-official journals representing the propagandist side of the movement. The official element is not dead but sleepeth.

The beginnings of this movement are to be found as far back as 1920, when the press and colonial organizations commenced their energetic campaign against the stigma that had been cast on German colonial methods. The movement was based on the official protest of Dr. Bell, then Minister of the Colonies, who in the National Assembly on October 11, 1919, protested against the "hypocritical reproach of colonial incapacity by which the Allied Powers had attempted to justify this rape of the German colonies," and stated that he hoped that a friendly discussion would lead to a revision of the Treaty of Peace so that Germany might be permitted to take part in the "colonization work of civilized nations." During the following years the swelling tide of propaganda carried on its surface many curious examples of German propagandist methods. Pamphlet after pamphlet came from the press, meetings were arranged throughout the Republic, colonial weeks were organized in Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne and other cities, parades of ex-colonial soldiers were held, as, for example, at Potsdam on August 16, 1926, in the presence of Prince Eitel Friedrich and Prince Oscar, and the popular taste was appealed to by the provision of cardboard beer-mats at the restaurants, bearing more or less suitable inscriptions. The latter method may appear somewhat childish, but the constant presence of inscriptions such as — "The colonial dominions of England are one hundred times larger than the Mother Country. The population of the British colonies is nine times larger than that of England. And what of Germany?" — or, "Without colonies, no raw materials; without raw materials, no industry; without industry, no prosperity. Therefore, Germans, we must have colonies!" — is likely to produce in the long run the necessary "colonial feeling" even in the most unlikely quarters. Finally, the movement was summarized by Dr. Heinrich Schnee in a book purporting to be a vindication of German colonial policy and containing a bitter attack upon British methods.

As has already been stated, the German Government, realizing

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the extreme difficulty of obtaining any revision of the colonial settlement, has maintained a perfectly correct attitude. In the face of this attitude it may appear somewhat ungracious to labor the importance of the colonial movement, particularly as one of its main objects, the demand that Germany should make terms as to receiving mandates before entering the League, was not attained. Nevertheless there is reason to believe that this demand would have been made if it had not been quite evident that the request would have ruined the negotiations. There is now a considerable body of opinion in Germany which believes that the time has arrived for the formulation of such a demand and that Germany as a member of the League is entitled to insist upon its right to receive such mandates. There is, of course, no question whatever as to Germany's rights in this matter. They have been admitted both by the British Prime Minister and his Colonial Secretary, Mr. Amery, as well as by M. Briand on behalf of the French Government. The somewhat indiscreet remark of Dr. Stresemann at a local German club in Geneva that the charges against Germany for responsibility for the war had been quashed *ipso facto* by her admission into the League, and presumably also the charges of brutality in the colonies, does not represent the true state of affairs.

The admission of Germany is not a white-washing process but merely a recognition of her position as a great Power and this recognition involves the right to hold mandates. The German delegation at Locarno had already been informed that Germany was eligible as a candidate for colonial mandates (House of Commons, March 18, 1926) and on July 6, 1926, Mr. Baldwin implemented this statement. But no one, except Dr. Schnee and his associates, has indicated where and how such mandates are to be obtained. As a matter of fact, Mr. Amery, speaking on behalf of Great Britain, has stated categorically that he regards the mandate over the Tanganyika Territory, formerly German East Africa and the real bone of contention, as being permanent and only to be removed at the request of Great Britain or by a unanimous vote of the League of Nations.

It is not necessary, however, to wander along the mazy ways of colonial intrigue to be convinced that, so far as Africa is concerned, there is little likelihood of Germany being entrusted with a mandate without a radical disruption of the present colonial system. Turn where one may, the paths of diplomacy seem to be

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absolutely blocked by the vested interests of established colonial Powers. Moreover, as was proved by even so small a redistribution of territory as the cession of Jubaland to Italy, which took six years to accomplish, there are the treaty and other rights of the natives to be considered — difficulties that would doubtless be overcome if the spirit were willing. But the difficulties represented by economic interests and vested rights, however obtained, are apparently insuperable without a total overthrow of the African system; and nothing at present seems more unlikely. For the present, therefore, one can only state the facts without suggesting the remedy.

The demand of Germany for colonies is based upon three premises. She wants colonies: (a) in order to provide homes for her surplus population and openings for officials and traders; (b) to produce the raw materials and foodstuffs needed by her vast industrial population and incidentally, as pointed out by Dr. Schnee, to provide markets for her manufactured goods; and (c) so that as a self-respecting nation she can free herself from the stigma of incompetence, for "no great nation, if it is to be free and self-respecting, can be deprived permanently of colonial possessions." The first of these three reasons may be dismissed as non-proven, seeing that there are other nations, as will be shown, whose need is greater in this respect. The second is one capable of infinite adumbrations. The third strikes at the very heart-beats of the German people.

Mr. Amery, the British Colonial Secretary, has argued, and perhaps rightly, that colonies are not a necessity for any great nation and has pointed to the examples of pre-war Austria-Hungary which was a first-class and prosperous Power and yet possessed no colonies, and of present-day Portugal with its vast African possessions and national stagnation. Of course it is easy for a British minister to argue upon these lines. But it may be asked, If colonies are not necessary how is it that every great Power so ardently desires their possession and retains them when they have been acquired? There is material for a dozen theses in this one question alone. Dr. Schnee, on the other hand, while maintaining that Germany is morally entitled to wield a colonial mandate, states that it is a vital necessity from an economic point of view for her to regain some of her lost possessions owing to the fact that she can only produce two-thirds of what is needed to feed her population. This means, he states in the *Daily News*

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of March 3, 1926, that "Germany must import the food and raw materials necessary for the life of 20,000,000 of her population. It is obvious that such imports involve enormous expenses, whereby Germany's obligations, notably under the Dawes Pact, are gravely endangered."

The economic argument, so far as Germany is concerned, has been most concisely and ably put by Dr. Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank. Speaking at Berlin on March 25, 1926, he demonstrated the essential connection between the Dawes Plan and the possession of colonies. His arguments may be summarized as follows. Without colonies Germany can only fulfil her reparation obligations by two means, either by an excess of exports, which must consist largely of manufactured goods which would compete with the products of the creditor nations, or by the investment of foreign capital in German undertakings. There remains, therefore, only one other way, the introduction of German activity into the production of raw materials in countries under a German currency — in other words, in colonies of her own. Further, Dr. Schacht contended that Germany might very well be permitted to resume her colonial activities on the chartered company system, but, as an economist, he left severely alone the political aspect of providing suitable colonial areas. This opinion was implemented by Herr Külz, then Minister of the Interior, in an article in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of April 13, 1926, in which the minister discussed the question from the academic point of view of Germany's right and fitness to administer colonial territory but, nevertheless, supported the argument that the reparations problem cannot possibly be solved without damaging the creditor countries themselves unless Germany obtained full political control over colonial territories.

In considering these expressions of the German colonial movement one must notice that it received little attention in England (save in government circles) until the entry of Germany into the League was finally consummated. The contrary, however, is the case on the Continent. Both France and Italy have watched closely the continuous growth of the German colonial idea. Especially beyond the Alps the movement has been followed with a keen appreciation of what the reëntry of Germany into the colonial sphere would mean to a country like Italy, so poor in coal and iron and raw materials, and yet so burdened by a constantly increasing population for whom its own colonies offer little

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outlet. So far as Italian sentiment has been expressed on this subject, it may be summed up as Italy to be served first, Germany second. Francesco Coppola, an Italian delegate to the League of Nations, emphasized this opinion in the *Idea Nazionale* of November 17, 1925: "If Germany only envisages a relief from her indignity and only demands a platonic moral rehabilitation, we have no objections to offer. But if she desires the grant of any colonial mandate, then we say immediately and unmistakably, No, not before Italy has received the justice which was refused her at Versailles. Before the desire of Germany stands the right of Italy."

The position of Italy with regard to colonies may be compared with that of Germany. In all the great cities of the peninsula the colonial movement has assumed an importance that before long may become political as well as moral and economic. As in Germany, colonial weeks have been organized everywhere and the press has been plentifully supplied with articles on the need for expansion. Mussolini's recent journey to Tripoli, escorted by fifteen warships, was something more than the visit of the first minister of the crown to Italy's most important colony. It was designed to focus the attention of his countrymen and of all Europe upon the moral claim of Italy to overseas expansion, to demonstrate to the world the success of Italy as a colonizing nation, and to bring a message of hope to those Italian settlers who are rebuilding the old Roman empire on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. "I wish," said the Duce, "to make Italians wake up to the fact that they have possessions overseas. Comrades, let us turn our thoughts to that Italy of the past from which sprang the strong Italy which is ever spurred on towards the sure triumphs of the morrow." In a later speech the Italian national leader emphasized the fact that his visit was not to be regarded as an ordinary administrative act. "I intend it to be a demonstration of the might of the Italian nation, which derives its origin from Rome, and which has borne the triumphant and immortal Fasces of Rome to the shores of the African sea. It is destiny that has urged us to this country. Nobody can dam the stream of destiny, and above all nobody can break our inflexible will."

These flamboyant words are not to be regarded as the empty boast of a powerless visionary but rather as the carefully weighed statement of one who not only sees into the future but also is powerful to aid the arm of destiny. And Mussolini only

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voices what nearly all patriotic Italians feel. "We are Mediterraneans," he said when on the battleship *Cavour*, "and our destiny, without copying anyone, has been and always will be on the sea" — a statement reminding one irresistibly of a similar phrase uttered on another occasion when a young nation was getting into its first stride of manhood. There are many causes urging the Italian people towards overseas expansion. Although her colonies in Africa, consisting of Tripoli and Cyrenaica (forming the compact territory of Libya), Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Jubaland, cover an area of 850,000 square miles, they have only an Italian population of some 50,000, and are not likely to absorb any considerable proportion of the annual surplus of Italy's population. It is estimated that during the next ten years 100,000 settlers could go to Tripoli, and 160,000 to Cyrenaica; but it must be remembered that Italy's excess of births over deaths reaches an annual total of 461,000. It is evident, therefore, that her present colonies cannot assimilate this population.

The loss of hundreds of thousands of Italians by emigration to foreign countries presents a serious problem for Italian statesmanship. "I am not an enthusiastic partisan of emigration," said Mussolini in the Italian Senate on May 28, 1926. "It is a sad and sorrowful necessity which Italy can only accept." When Italians cluster together in communities, as they do in the south of France or in Tunisia, the problem becomes a difficult one for a foreign government and perhaps scarcely less so for their Mother Country, but when they leave for South America (only 3,845 can enter the United States in a year) Italian emigrants may almost be regarded as lost to their fatherland. Coupled with this increase of population and extensive loss by emigration is the notable lack of mineral products and raw materials that makes Italy, although essentially prosperous by reason of her highly organized agriculture and splendidly equipped manufacturies, one of the poorer nations of Europe. For these reasons it is evident that the colonial idea, once it has firmly seized the Italian imagination, will not be long in urging the leaders of the movement to action and calling them to formulate demands which the present government may be only too ready to support.

At present Italy has a distinct and easily understood grievance. Promised great things under the London Pact of October 16, 1915, whereby she was to have had the Turkish province of Adalia, and more under the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement of

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April, 1917, by which she was allotted Smyrna and its hinterland, she found herself balked of these spoils at the Peace Conference. Greece instead was installed in Asia Minor. Moreover, the London Pact stated that "in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain." It is not surprising, therefore, that Mussolini complained that "despite written pacts and solemn promises, we have had to fight, to discuss for months and even for years, in order to secure for Italy the modest colonial compensation of Jubaland, and the oasis of Jarabub, which we luckily occupied just in time," or that Italian writers are constantly suggesting compensations elsewhere. To the east they look across the Adriatic to Albania, and, further afield, across the stepping stones of the Dodecanese Islands, now under Italian occupation, to the fair but devastated regions around Smyrna. To the south they look beyond their colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland to the highlands of Kenya, over which it has sometimes been suggested that there should be an Italian mandate; or to the French protectorate of Tunisia where so many thousands of Italians are settled.

While there seems little probability of any rearrangement of African territory in the near future, there is one region where Italy is claiming, and legitimately, a considerable extension of her economic sphere of influence. This is the western area of Abyssinia where there are ample opportunities for commercial and industrial activity. It cannot be said that Italian policy, so far as regards Abyssinia, has been particularly fortunate. She entered upon her career of expansion in north-eastern Africa with a disaster which put a stop to further efforts to obtain political control of the rich and entirely unexploited country of Abyssinia. The memorable battle at Adowa, where on March 1, 1896, the Emperor Menelik decisively defeated an Italian army of 17,000 men, forced Rome to acknowledge Abyssinian independence. Since that time Italy has pursued a policy of encirclement from the east, pushing her interest in the Abyssinian littoral, and establishing firmly her colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. Here, with the exception of the small French territory around the port

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of Jibuti, the terminus of the French railway into Abyssinia, and the enclave of British Somaliland, she has a free hand to pursue a policy of peaceful economic penetration.

The favored position of Italy in north-eastern Africa has been recognized by Great Britain both in the Agreement of December 13, 1906, and the recent Accord of December, 1925. The latter agreement resulted in a protest by Abyssinia to the League of Nations which, however, was withdrawn when it was stated that the Italo-British agreement was merely a statement of policy and infringed in no way upon the sovereign integrity of the country. Under this agreement, subject to the consent of Abyssinia, Italy will be able to join together by a railway her possessions in this part of Africa, while Great Britain will be able to erect the barrage at Lake Tsana which is so vitally necessary to the prosperity of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It is improbable that France will raise any objection to this arrangement which, undoubtedly, will be of great benefit to Italian enterprise in this part of Africa. Without considering as worthy of attention the fantastic suggestion of an Italian protectorate over Egypt adumbrated by the Rt. Hon. Josiah Wedgwood in the *Observer* on January 23, 1927, it may be decided that Italy is not likely to advance further in these regions.

In whatever direction Italians may look for territorial expansion beyond the enlarged boundaries of the present kingdom, it is apparent that the position of Italy with regard to Africa itself is worth careful consideration. In view of the parallel movement in Germany, there can be little doubt that the clash of European interests in Africa will assume before the end of the next decade a more ugly appearance than it has at present. Under the guidance of Mussolini, Italy has learnt to regard the opposite shores of the Mediterranean as her peculiar sphere, and as the heir of imperial Rome she seeks to revive her ancient glories and to recreate in northern Africa the granary of the empire. That either Italy or Germany will remain content with the present position is doubtful. But that under the European system as imposed by the Treaty of Versailles they can receive compensation in Africa, either in the form of mandates or redistribution of territory, is even more doubtful; for not until a real and compelling clash of interests occurs does there seem the least likelihood of any one of the present colonial powers releasing its hold upon any part of the territory it occupies.

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TIN: AN INTERNATIONAL METAL

By H. T. Warshow

TIN is in the singular position of having its deposits located in the non-industrial countries of the world, such as Malaya, Bolivia, Dutch East Indies, China, Siam and Nigeria, while it is consumed almost entirely by the great manufacturing centers of the United States and Europe. By force of these geographical circumstances tin falls into that group of commodities which must be considered from an international point of view. The general problem is further complicated by the fact that some authorities predict the exhaustion of the world's tin supplies within the next decade. Such a possibility naturally tends to aggravate the more immediate problem regarding the political control of present resources. The purpose of the writer is to give a brief analysis of world production, consumption, ore depletion, smelting capacity, tariffs, and price fluctuations, and so prepare the ground for a better understanding of a problem in which most modern nations have a direct interest.

I. PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

In the year 1925 the tin production of the world reached a new high point, and though production in 1926 fell somewhat short of what it had been in 1925 it nevertheless exceeded that of any other previous year.

Graph I on the following page indicates that the production of the British Empire for the year 1925 amounted to 42.64 percent of the world's total. (The average British production for the five years 1920–1924 had been 41.19 percent.) Bolivia and the Dutch East Indies come next with a production of approximately 22 percent each. The remainder is scattered among four or five other non-industrial countries. It is interesting to note that of the total production more than two-thirds comes from alluvial deposits; the chief exception is the Bolivian production. It is the opinion of some experts that lode mines go deeper into the ground and carry larger reserves, so that while alluvial mines are expected to diminish in production, the lode mines are expected to show an increase. In the last few years the Bolivian tin production has been increasing and R. L. Hallett has predicted that "with the decrease in the production from the

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Straits Settlements, the indications are that before very long the Bolivian tin deposits will be the most important in the world, and Bolivia will probably be the leading producer."

The second graph shows the consumption of tin, by countries, for the year 1925. It will be seen that the metal is consumed almost entirely in the industrial countries of the world, with the

I. TIN PRODUCTION, 1925

Percentages, by countries



In Long Tons

British Empire	62,154
Bolivia	32,980
Dutch East Indies	32,704
China	8,880
Siam	6,802
Miscellaneous	2,250
Total	145,770

II. TIN CONSUMPTION, 1925

Percentages, by countries



In Long Tons

United States	75,714
Great Britain	21,217
France	11,076
Germany	10,175
Italy	4,311
Canada	2,000
Belgium	1,749
Czechoslovakia	1,516
Holland	1,174
Miscellaneous	16,838
Total	145,770

United States leading, England second, then Germany and France fairly close together, and Italy, Canada, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Holland following.

The two graphs together illustrate the interesting fact that although the United States is the largest consumer of tin in the world, using more than all the other countries put together, it produces practically no tin whatever within its own territory. The commercial control of tin ore deposits by American citizens

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or American corporations has, however, been increasing in the last few years. The Guggenheim Brothers have been developing the Caracoles mines in Bolivia, and in July, 1924, the Patino Mines and Enterprises, Inc., Consolidated, which owns extensive mines throughout Bolivia, became an American corporation. But the prospect of the United States ever controlling a sufficient supply of tin to satisfy its full needs is beyond the hopes of even the most optimistic.

Great Britain is second to the United States in the consumption of tin, having consumed approximately 14.6 percent of the world's production in the year 1925. The amount of tin produced in the British Empire during the same year was 42.64 percent of the world's total, so that the British controlled about 28 percent more of the world's total production than they themselves required. Such industrial countries of the European continent as France, Germany, and Italy, which are considerable consumers of tin, are in a position somewhat similar to that of the United States. Although large consumers of this commodity, they have practically no production within their own political territory and no commercial control of any tin ore deposits outside of their territory. Belgium has a small tin production in the Katanga mines in the Belgian Congo; and in 1923 a smelter was opened near Antwerp by the Societé Générale Metallurgique.

II. SMELTING CAPACITY

So far our discussion has pertained entirely to the metal content of tin ore production. The ore is of course not a finished product, since it must be smelted and refined before it can be used in industry. The location of the smelting industry is quite as important in the consideration of the general problem as the location of the ore supplies, although it is obvious that the location of the mines cannot be changed, whereas the smelting industry may be transferred if conditions are favorable. The tin smelting capacity of the world is estimated at approximately 145,000 long tons at the present time, distributed as follows:

British Empire: United Kingdom	40,000	
Straits Settlements	71,000	111,000
Dutch East Indies		16,500
Germany		6,000
Miscellaneous		11,500
Total		145,000

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Before the war Germany had developed a considerable tin smelting industry, the supply of ore coming from Bolivia. During the war the plants had to be shut because of lack of ore. However, during the year 1926 a new tin smelting plant was erected in Germany and is already operating successfully. The German people have for many centuries been expert in the smelting of ores of all kinds, so that it seems likely that the tin smelting industry may regain its pre-war position in that country. However, due to restrictions in the export of the ore from the British dominions (which as we have seen produce approximately 43 percent of the world's total), and the fact that the ore from the Dutch East Indies is either smelted in its own territory or in the Straits Settlements, Bolivia is the only remaining source of ore supply for smelters not under British control.

Tin smelters twice made serious attempts to set up an industry in the United States. The first was in 1903. The boats of the Standard Oil Company, which was then engaged in exporting oil to the Orient, were habitually compelled to return empty due to the lack of available cargo destined for the United States. It was planned to use these returning ships for the transportation of tin concentrates purchased in the Straits Settlements. The Governor of the Straits Settlements, however, became aware of the activities of this new American organization, and was fearful of its competition with the smelting operations of the Straits Trading Company. Largely on his advice, a law was passed prohibiting the export of tin concentrates from any of the colonies of the United Kingdom, except under a heavy export duty which was designedly prohibitive. This was a blow that the American enterprise could not survive.

The outbreak of the Great War offered the United States a second opportunity to enter the tin smelting industry. The Bolivian tin concentrates which before the war had been smelted in Germany had to find a new outlet. Furthermore, the flow of tin from the Straits Settlements was endangered, while the additional use of tin for war purposes increased the demand. The result was a continued rise in price, with a high point of $1.10 per pound in the year 1918. This conjuncture of favorable circumstances stimulated an American desire to venture again into the tin smelting business. In 1916 the American Smelting and Refining Company began building a tin smelting plant at Perth Amboy, N. J. and in 1917 the Williams Harvey Corporation

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built a plant in Brooklyn, N. Y. In 1919 two or three other plants attempted tin smelting on a commercial scale, but they did not succeed and went out of business shortly. The general depression of 1921 found tin in a very vulnerable position and the price fell precipitously from a high point of about $1.10 to a low of about 27c per pound. This condition of general business depression, along with continually decreasing returning charges (allowances for the smelting of tin ore), made tin smelting unprofitable. Attempts were made to lower costs both in this country and in England, but economic conditions in England were such that the smelters in the United States could not, without a tariff on tin as an artificial aid, sustain the test of competition. The result was that the American Smelting and Refining Company closed its plant early in 1923. Shortly thereafter the Williams Harvey Corporation also shut down its plant and arranged for the transfer of its tonnage to the Williams Harvey Co., Ltd., Liverpool. At present no tin smelting is being done in the United States.

Efforts have been made from time to time to encourage the discovery of tin mines in the United States. In the latest tariff act, that of 1922, tin ore appears on the free list, with the provision, however, that a tariff of 4c per pound shall be imposed as soon as mines in the United States are producing 1,500 tons of tin per year. This provision was also contained in the tariff acts of 1909 and 1913. Its purpose was to stimulate domestic production of tin ore. But such efforts have thus far had no effect whatever. A duty of 2c per pound on imported metallic tin was proposed in the first draft of the Fordney Tariff Bill, 1921, whereas tin concentrates were to be exempt from duty. The obvious object was to accomplish the transfer of the smelting industry, at least for Bolivian ore, to the United States. However, this section was eliminated in the final bill as it went through the Senate. Even if there were a duty on tin metal, and the concentrates were smelted in this country, we would still be dependent upon the Straits Settlements for approximately 25,000 tons required by our tin plate industry, no other grade of tin having as yet fulfilled the exacting requirements of this industry.

III. PRICE FLUCTUATIONS

Tin has always had the reputation of being a highly speculative metal. The most important single factor in the price fluctuation is the extent of the so-called "visible supply," which is taken to

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mean tin actually in sight, either afloat or in warehouses. Ordinarily, when the supply is low the price is high, and vice versa. However, the peculiar characteristic of the tin market is that the visible supply fluctuates between a low of about ten thousand and a high of only about twenty thousand tons, so that an increase of a few thousand tons in the visible supply is likely to affect the price of the metal considerably. This is the reason that tin is so speculative and attracts a host of traders. The total quantity of tin represented by sales transactions has been calculated to be ten times as large as the amount actually consumed.

Although the United States consumes over half the tin produced each year, London is nevertheless the trading center of the world and the London Metal Exchange sets the daily price for standard tin, with differentials for other grades. The New York Metal Exchange is an exchange in name only, its transactions being practically negligible.

The immediate cause of the recent active discussion of prices among the tin dealers and the irritation on the part of the tin consumers[1] is found in the fact that the metal has been rising in price for nearly a year and has now reached the highest point since the war and post-war inflation periods of 1918 and 1919. Straits tin for immediate delivery reached 64½c in 1925, and sold as high as 72½c per pound during November, 1926, compared with a high of about 39c per pound in 1922. Furthermore, during most of 1925 and practically all of 1926 spot tin (tin for immediate delivery) has been selling at a higher price than three months tin. The "backwardation" (the term used when spot tin sells higher than tin for future delivery) in the past year has ranged from 3c to 4c per pound, which is unusually high. It seems that as the price of tin kept advancing, speculators, expecting the market price to decline, sold three months tin short; but at the expiration of three months had to make delivery, and were therefore compelled to buy spot and take their losses on the difference. Another factor to be mentioned is the recent tendency of "hand-to-mouth" buying on the part of consumers, which has increased the demand for spot tin for immediate use.

[1] In the *New York Evening Post* on Oct. 4, 1926, an article by one of that paper's foreign correspondents bore the headline: "Britain Is Victor in Tin Price Wars With U. S. Buyers." The article began as follows: "The next annuity on the British war debt to America, or at least a substantial part of it, will be paid by American buyers of tin, as the previous one was paid by the American buyers of rubber."

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IV. FUTURE SUPPLIES

It is perhaps natural for consumers of tin to see in the rising market the manipulations of some combination rather than to realize that the higher prices are merely a result of the normal operation of the law of supply and demand. It is a fact that the production of tin has been rising in the last few years and that the year 1925 witnessed the largest production that the world has seen. But the number of independent companies and individuals mining tin is so great that a combination or any sort of understanding to limit production would be rather difficult to achieve. While it is true that the smelting of Straits tin is entirely in the hands of two large companies, the Eastern Smelting Company and the Straits Trading Company, their stated policy is not to hold any tin for their own account but to sell it all immediately for smelting, thus protecting themselves against the vicissitudes of the market. The fact is that although the tin supply has been increasing, it has nevertheless failed to keep up with the rising demand, especially in the United States.

The general situation is a difficult one and many qualified experts have asserted that any future decrease in price must come about through a decrease in consumption rather than through an increase in production. The more pessimistic believe that the sources for further supplies are limited and that the present rate of consumption is rapidly bringing about the exhaustion of the world's tin resources. For example, G. Temple Bridgman, mining engineer for Guggenheim Brothers, foresees a production of tin at about the present rate for the next ten years, with acute price fluctuations synchronizing with general prosperity; and "a constant, fairly rapid, and virtually complete approach to exhaustion" of the world's tin resources thereafter, with no limit to the levels to which prices may rise.[2]

These predictions, however, even if acceptable on all other grounds, are of course based upon present knowledge of the technique of mining and smelting. There are millions of tons of low grade tin ore in South America and in other countries of the world which thus far have had no commercial value, due to the lack of sufficient technical knowledge to make their treatment commercially profitable. Just as the changes in the copper mining industry made it possible and profitable to mine very

[2] *Engineering and Mining Journal*, Oct. 23, 1926, p. 674

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low grade copper ores, so improvements in the tin mining and smelting industry may make it profitable to mine and smelt the vast deposits of low grade tin ore which have heretofore been neglected. It is to the scientific advances yet to be made in the technique of mining and smelting that we must look for aid, so that more of this important metal may become available for commercial purposes. The problem is not simple; but the solution, at least for the large consuming countries such as the United States, lies not in reducing the consumption of tin but rather in improving methods, so that what are now considered poor deposits may be made productive and profitable.

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THREE AMERICAN COMMANDERS IN FRANCE

By M.

COMMANDING AN AMERICAN ARMY. By Major General Hunter Liggett. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925.
PERSONALITIES AND REMINISCENCES OF THE WAR. By Major General Robert Lee Bullard. Garden City: Doubleday, Page, 1925.
LEAVES FROM A WAR DIARY. By Major General James G. Harbord, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1925.

THE Civil War was fought to the somber strains of "John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave" and "In the prison cell I sit." The men who were with Grant, Sherman and Sheridan later read the memoirs of their chiefs and found their own great achievements recorded, in tune with their times, in those excellent volumes. On such and such a date was the battle fought, by such and such units. Success and failure were plotted on the map, and special commendation was awarded where due. The stress and strain of it all was stated as simple fact, largely without the aid of personal sidelight; the highest authorities had spoken and might forever be quoted: clearly these were books to be passed down to one's sons and grandsons. But those same sons and grandsons engaged in a still greater war—and sang of "Fritzy Boy" and "Madelon." Perhaps in more mature middle age they may be accorded solid pabulum of history as authenticated by their chiefs. In the meantime they must content themselves with the memoirs of Liggett, Bullard and Harbord, generals who make little attempt to rescue Clio from her maze of facts or to instruct future generations.

And well may they be content with those memoirs if they value the personalities of their chiefs and the spirit of the war. There are few better pen pictures of men than Bullard's little etchings of Liggett, Summerall, Harbord, Lassiter, Pétain, Mangin and Degoutte, or than Harbord's more detailed portraiture of Pershing, Dawes and Joffre, and his cynical sketch of House.

Harbord brings into the drama of war an occasional episode of pure comedy. General Pershing, on the point of leaving Paris with his staff, suddenly finds himself minus hat and Sam Brown belt, lent for a day to a portrait painter and not returned. The plot of a

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French farce could not have woven together, out of so simple an incident, more scatterings and scurryings to and fro or more amusing characters than Harbord's bewildered chauffeur who stalls his engine, "the Count, in much agitation, very much *excité*," or the faithful aide who stands by his chief through it all and finally lends him hat and belt.

By way of contrast Harbord draws a pathetic picture of the visit of Joffre to American Headquarters. The great French soldier, shelved by his government and deprived of all save the semblance of power, was back for a moment in the limelight on a formal visit to Chaumont. In the French Military Mission there he "acted as though he thought he was still helping the machinery move. He drifted over to the principal desk in the office, settled down over a chair, and asked if there were any papers. There were none to be acted upon by him." Shortly after dinner one of Pershing's aides "was told to tell the old Marshal that he was no doubt fatigued and wished to retire. And he was and he did."

Then there was the flat-footed Marine who waited on General Harbord's table and who, in the thick of the Château Thierry fighting, asked for an afternoon off to go up to the front line and kill a Boche. But major generals, it appears, cannot themselves indulge in even minor forms of risk without being reproved for recklessness. Back in the S. O. S., months after he had passed through his battles, Harbord decided to take a trip by airplane. On starting for the airdome he said to an aide: "Well, Williams, don't you want to go along and see us off?" The aide drew himself up very formally and replied: "Sir, I do not approve of this trip at all, and prefer to have nothing to do with it."

General Bullard likewise finds a bit of humor here and there, even where he himself is concerned: "A passing enemy plane dropped the biggest and loudest bomb that I have ever heard explode. It fell . . . a few rods from where I was. I almost said to myself, like other cowards that I have known, that I was the only one of the whole headquarters that was not killed. . . . And not a soul had been hurt." But, much more than its humor, Bullard's book is notable for its frank honesty. He sets down what he thought at the time, regardless of the light thrown by subsequent events. Through his dark pessimism, in the fall and winter of 1917, one may see those days in their true perspective. In October '17 his diary notes "a conviction that I have long felt, to-wit, that we, the United States, came into the war too late. We

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may perhaps save France from a shameful peace, but we cannot beat Germany. . . . So far as we are concerned, the war is practically lost; and we will get nothing out of it, not even barren victory." In November he writes: "They are consulting together, the three governments [France, England and Italy]. Of course, they cannot decide to end the war, but this German victory [Caporetto] will nevertheless bring the end." And in January of '18 he is much of the same opinion: "Our Allies will have to reduce their terms very greatly before any peace will come. The Americans talk awfully big but do very little."

Bullard has no patience with that form of American optimism which foresees great accomplishments in the future from small performances in the present. Even as late as October of '18 he complains of "too much talk, a great deal of expectation and too little realization. This has been the great American failing in the war. We have talked at long range. . . . It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that we made good only on the men: the gas came too late, and the airplanes and many other things did not come at all." Not pleasant reading, this; but it rings more true than General Liggett's soothing statement, in commenting on the "whole-hearted" manner in which we entered the war, that "there has been no other instance where all the military, naval and civilian resources of a country were so promptly and completely mobilized and thrown into a conflict."

Bullard's admiration for the American soldier is unquestioned: almost so much a matter of course as to be left unspoken. He indulges in no glowing encomiums. But now and then his uncompromising frankness strikes out at certain shortcomings. The Negro troops he puts down as being "hopelessly inferior," and gives his reasons for thinking so. Nor did he always find the rest of the army perfect, for he writes: "We are now going to transmit to our children the same exaggeration of uniform American duty, bravery and prowess as fill the popular histories of our Revolution. . . . The hardest work that I did or saw done in France was the holding of men to duty in service and battle." Four years later Marshal Foch, visiting America, asked a representative group of his former companions in arms what had been the greatest difficulty they had encountered in the war. One of them gave him, without knowing it, something like Bullard's answer: "Getting orders obeyed." And the Marshal agreed.

Bullard's pessimism spared not himself: "I do not believe I

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have the ability to make good," is a diary note. And to a certain degree it extended to his chief. "General Pershing is not a fighter," he wrote in December of '17. Yet with all his misgivings and in spite of the terrible handicap (during the summer and fall of '18) of severe and constant attacks of neuritis, he drove on through his work, sparing neither his subordinates nor himself.

Perhaps he had absorbed a little of the French spirit which he so well understood. "Miles and miles of them passed in column," he writes of their troops in the spring of '18, "steadily marching towards battle, deliberate, self-possessed, quietly smoking, silently gazing at me and other passers. No excitement, no worry or despair on those faces, only calm, a look not of determination but of resignation to go on and face whatever lay before them. I cannot think that they believed that they could stem the awful tide of German victory; they seemed only to feel that they could face it. . . . Death, annihilation, to fall and pass as they had seen many others fall and pass forever from their world. I wondered if these men were thinking of these things. Doubtless; but they moved on, looking calmly at one as they passed. Surely, where the war takes a good man, it makes and puts two in his place. Men may be lost, but manhood is never diminished by war."

It is these true pictures of war-time France, without any subsequent retouching, that give value and flavor to the memoirs of Bullard and Harbord. General Liggett is unfortunately prone, at times, to fix a battle line or chronicle in due order the achievements of his divisions and corps. But this occasional reversion to Civil War type only emphasizes the more that outstanding quality of Harbord's and Bullard's books, the personal reaction of these men to the appalling situations with which they coped. Their books are clear-cut silhouettes of their times and trials, poignant human contacts with the reality of war.

Liggett was a major general when we declared war and, after commanding the largest single army the United States has ever put into the field, was retired by a not over-grateful government with his pre-war rank. He was the only successful army commander of all the many nations who was retired after the war with the same grade he held when hostilities began. It is much to the credit of such a man, whose pen is by no means lacking in facility, that he should have written so dispassionately and so impersonally. But through this restraint his book suffers.

Once only does he give us a glimpse of the inner meaning of

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things. It is the 25th of October, before the last drive in the Argonne, and he is commanding the First American Army. General Gouraud commands the neighboring French army. Naturally both wish to attack at the same time, for mutual support. Liggett visits Gouraud, taking the occasion to return a call of the previous month — and to line up the French in the attack, if he can. "When will you be able to attack?" Liggett asks. "When will you?" rejoins Gouraud, preferring to make the last bid. "We are directed to attack October 28th," Liggett replies — he had, as a matter of fact, received formal orders to that effect four days before. Gouraud will not hear of so early a date, cannot possibly make it, and proposes the 2d of November. This really pleases Liggett, who thinks his own date too early. Finally a satisfactory bargain is struck between them for November 1st — later approved by Pershing and Foch. And so the little scene closes, with its hint as to the real workings of the much heralded unity of command.

It is curious that not one of the three American generals (except Liggett, in a short paragraph) mentions this burning question of unity of command, supposed to have been the *sine qua non* of victory. General Bliss, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for December, 1922, has described the "Evolution of the Unified Command" from the view point of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. But for the Chaumont side of that story, and its effect on American command in France, we will probably have to wait for General Pershing's long expected book. Harbord knew most about it, next to Pershing; but his book consists of his journal-letters to his wife, intimate and sometimes rather too personal. Perhaps in their *ménage* unity of command was a question of purely academic interest.

Harbord, steeped in French history and sensitive to all the beauty of France, occasionally gets a moment's respite from his great responsibilities by describing to his wife cathedrals and châteaux. Of Chenonceaux he finds time to write, at the height of the war: "One of the most beautiful dwellings ever fashioned by the art of man, in a most exquisite setting of vinelands sloping to the river's edge, — a site too lovely to be long left without an occupant, — the best of the *plus excellents bâtiments de France*, with its towers, turrets and gables, caught the eye while Tours was still just behind us. It has no stain of murder on its walls, almost the only great château of France of which that can

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be said, but stands as it has stood for centuries, a memory of the love and luxury of women." The man who could write that at such a time and place can be forgiven many omissions concerning unity of command.

But more to the point in a war diary are his descriptions of the fighting at Château Thierry and Soissons. The French were not at their best at those critical moments, and General Harbord, sympathetic always towards their difficulties and failings, is very sparing of criticism. Nevertheless the picture he draws of the almost indescribable confusion behind the lines and of changes of orders at the last moment puts the French command and staff in a far from favorable light.

Running through the three American memoirs from the time of Pershing's landing to the battle of Château Thierry, are constant echoes of the long and bitter struggle to form an American army. The French and British knew full well that our pre-war army had consisted of small isolated units, and that it contained no officers of proven capacity in the handling of even a division under war conditions. They therefore contended that we could not learn command and staff work — the handling and supply of large forces in war — in time to be of use, and hence that our troops should be given to them in small units. The logic of their contention seemed almost perfect at that time, and they backed it up with powerful pressure on the authorities in Washington. Against them stood only a rather inarticulate national pride, and the stubborn conviction of the professional American soldiers that they could meet the issue.

The scales seemed heavily weighted against an American army. The British threw in against it the promise of more shipping if our troops came over in separate battalions consigned to them. (And, according to Harbord, Pershing had determined to send our troops to the British rather than to the French if they were not to serve under their own flag.) Furthermore, in contending against the formation of a separate American army, the tried soldiers of England and France were presumably thinking only of the best means of winning the war, while the American generals were advocating a policy which would also lead to their own advancement and renown. To that extent their contention had to be discounted. Doubtless it was; yet withal, so honest, so firm (and perhaps also so innately American) was their faith in their own and their countrymen's ability to meet a gigantic trial of

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brain and stamina, that they finally carried the day. The American armies were formed.

That, in the end, we fought as a full-fledged ally and equal, and did not merely furnish small units of cannon-fodder to foreign armies, we owe largely to the old Regulars, especially to Pershing, Harbord, Liggett and Bullard. Harbord's vivid account of the confusion incident to the operation of American troops under French command at Château Thierry and Soissons, and Bullard's equally unpromising experience with French orders at Montdidier and Fismette, go far to prove how right and necessary was the formation of the American armies.

On one other vital point the three American memoirs throw a light. It was another conflict with our Allies — a conflict intricately involved in the question of the formation of the American armies. General Pershing and his subordinates stood out for open warfare, aggressive action unhampered and unsheltered by elaborate systems of entrenchments. Only by breaking the German lines and pushing through into the open in vigorous offensive, they held, could the war be won. The French (and, to a certain extent, the British), with the bitter experience of three years of war behind them, could see little hope in anything but position warfare. The trench, to them, was the basis of everything.

In all those long months of organization and training which preceded our attack at Cantigny, well over a year after we declared war, this conflict continued, all the way down from Pershing's headquarters to the smallest training center. French officers were on the staffs of our schools and camps, and our divisions had to have their first try-outs in their trenches. At every point of contact the question of open vs. trench warfare was paramount in all matters of training and in much that concerned organization. Success in open warfare is largely dependent on accurate rifle and machine-gun fire at longer ranges, flexible infantry formations and artillery methods, and a command and staff which can function without the voluminous and meticulous orders of 1917. We prided ourselves on rifle fire: the French thought little of it. We were lost in the mazes of their trenches and the still more confusing labyrinth of the detailed orders and rigid methods produced by their stabilized warfare: they were habituated to it all as to a necessity of life. Pétain wrote, in an official memorandum on instruction dated as late as May 1, 1918; "Americans dream of

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operating in open country, after having broken through the front. This results in too much attention being devoted to that form of warfare." "So, too," writes Harbord, "with the staff organization; they sent us instruction as to how to organize our staff, ignoring our former organization, our history, our peculiarities, our laws; and are a bit sad that in training and organization we have insisted on remaining American."

After all, what presumption it was for us, who had not fought a great war in half a century, to go to France in 1917 and preach the offensive! And to the French, of all people, — the French, who had begun the war with an army so thoroughly indoctrinated with the aggressive spirit. During that awful August of 1914 I happened to be thrown in close contact with an officer of the French General Staff. The agony of spirit of that man before the battle of the Marne cried aloud that intense French faith in the offensive, only the offensive, nothing but the offensive. The miracle of the Marne clearly lay not so much in the *élan* of that great counter-blow as in the retention of any cohesion in their high-strung and aggressive armies throughout the long retreat which preceded the battle.

An army which had had so gallant a spirit crushed out of it by the unanswerable logic of war, which had been forced to learn at Verdun the slogan of "Ils ne passeront pas" and to forget Danton's "De l'audace, encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace," was now, if you please, to have the offensive doctrine of open warfare preached to it by newly arrived soldiers whom one might so easily mistake for amateurs! It is not surprising that there was trouble, and plenty of it. One wonders what would have happened had not the Germans, breaking through the great lines of Allied entrenchments, forced the fighting under conditions of relatively open warfare, and so brought into strong relief the native fighting ability of the fresh and determined American riflemen and gunners. For, as it happened, we won our spurs and vindicated the faith of our chiefs in open warfare, not by driving Germans to it, but by meeting them after they had driven through the Allied trench systems. And the irony of it all lay in the fact that the Germans broke through the Allied lines by methods of open, rather than position warfare, — by strategical and tactical surprise, by flexible infantry formations, by accompanying artillery, by unlimited objectives and by immediate and vigorous exploitation of success.

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We were right in our contention for open warfare, as the Germans helped us to prove. But the interesting point is that we were right at that particular time. Had we come into the war immediately after the sinking of the Lusitania and advocated open warfare in September of '15, we would have found our Allies in complete accord with us. The great attempts to break through at Champagne-Artois, Verdun, the Somme and the Aisne-Arras had not then failed. Little practical evidence then existed to show that the deep systems of entrenchments were impenetrable. But by the fall of '17 the evidence against the probability of a break-through into open warfare must have seemed almost overwhelming. It had been tried so many times by the Allies and the Germans without success. Some of the best military minds in the world, with three years' practical experience behind them, had been thrown back onto the expedient of the limited objective attack. This meant attrition by relatively small bites into the deep zone of hostile fortifications. It was the best that position warfare could offer; but essentially it was a form of attack exacting most rigid methods and intricate preparations, enormous expenditure of munitions and great loss of time. Withal, it offered very small returns. It could not be decisive, save through the slow process of attrition. Messines and Malmaison were the classic examples.

That our people should not have embraced this form of warfare with any enthusiasm was to have been expected. No one liked it. But that they should have rejected it in the face of so much evidence against its alternative (which Harbord's and Bullard's books clearly show they did) is very remarkable. Did they know that the Germans were training their troops for open warfare? They probably did: but through British and French sources. Did they perceive that time was working for the German submarines and against the slow methods of position warfare? Why, then, was not this also apparent to the British and French? Did they foresee that air-force, tanks and gas would soon give the offensive sufficient superiority over the defensive to enable the war to be wrenched out of the trenches? If they did, their calculations were wrong, for this factor alone does not account for what actually happened in 1918. Or did they sense the fact that the American troops, with all their lack of training and experience in war, had nevertheless a marked superiority over the Germans in the open, in that they were fresh and of prime vigor while the

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corresponding German manhood had been killed off in the preceding years?

To train our troops for the offensive in the open was one of the crucial decisions of the war. It is rather a pity that the memoirs of the three generals throw so little light on the reasons which led to it. They were not doctrinaires, those men, but hard-headed Americans facing a practical problem; yet in their books they say only that the offensive had always been the American doctrine, and that by it alone are wars won. This, of course, begs the question, since the offensive is everyone's doctrine in war (when it can be used), and everyone knows that it alone brings decisive victory. What one would really like to know is whether our generals were right in 1917 simply because capable on-lookers sometimes see more clearly into the true essentials of a problem than those who are deeply involved in it, or because the American military mind was, at that period at least, decidedly superior to the British and French.

But these three books do clearly show, if such showing be necessary, that war is not an enterprise which lends itself to international management. It is too intense, too wearing on the nerves. We fought on French soil, in close contact with French troops, and our lines of supply ran from one end to the other of their country. At a thousand points two high-strung races, differing even more in a temperament than in language, impinged on each other. Under those trying conditions it was fortunate that we had in high command in France men whose sympathetic eyes looked deeply into the French character. Beneath all irritating superficialities they saw underlying virtues, and on those they patiently built a *modus vivendi* — while at the same time they "insisted on remaining American."

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ITALIAN RULE IN GERMAN SOUTH-TYROL

By Josef L. Kunz

THE German South-Tyrol and its people are purely German. Never in history has the Brenner been the frontier of Italy. It can be proved that the following statement made by Mussolini in February, 1926, is not correct: "We shall Italianize this territory, because it is Italian, geographically and historically. The frontier of the Brenner has been traced out by Our Lord. The Germans in the Alto-Adige are not a national minority, but an ethnographical relic." The contrary is true. For fourteen centuries, as at the present day, the frontier between the German-speaking and Italian-speaking populations has been the Gorge of Salurn. It was in the 12th and 13th centuries that German South-Tyrol became a political unit with North-Tyrol, first under the Counts of Tyrol (their castle still exists today, near Meran, now in Italy), and after 1363 under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs. The history of this country was always German, and German was its population, its language, its law, its culture and its art. Andreas Hofer, born in the Passeier valley (now in Italy) was a German hero.[1]

This German country's tragedy in consequence of the Treaty of St. Germain is twofold: first, its annexation by the Kingdom of Italy; second, its present situation within the Kingdom of Italy.

The peace treaties and other treaties concluded in 1919 and 1920 created a system for the international protection of national, linguistic and religious minorities under the guarantee of the League of Nations. But the Great Powers, including Germany and Italy, were not bound by these international obligations, so that the Germans of German South-Tyrol are not to be reckoned among the national minorities in whose favor special conventions exist. In consequence, the normal procedure in dealing with minorities questions (that is, action on the initiative of a member of the Council of the League, or as a result of petitions) cannot be followed.

Italy nevertheless has an international obligation with regard to the rights of the German population of South-Tyrol. When the Austrian Peace Delegation protested against the attribution of this area to Italy, it received the following reply through the Peace Conference: "According to the very definite declarations made by the Italian Prime Minister in the Parliament at Rome, the Government intends to carry out a wide and liberal policy towards its new German subjects, in respect of language, culture and economic interests." And the Austrian National Council replied on September 6, *expressis verbis:* "The Austrian National Council expects that the promises given in the reply shall be fulfilled by the Powers in question."[2] This note was accepted by the Allied and

[1] For details of the history of South-Tyrol see the excellent study by Prof. Voltelini. Statistical information is given in the study of Prof. Winkler, "Deutschsüdtirol im Lichte der Statistik;" also in "The Case of German South-Tyrol Against Italy," London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.

[2] "Bericht über die Tätigkert der deutsch—österr. Friedensdelegation in St. Germain," 2 vols., Vienna, Government Printing Office, 1919. Vol. II, p. 323, and p. 360.

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Associated Powers, including Italy, without any contradiction. As the promise in question was given not only by Italy, but by all the Entente Powers, the juridical situation of the inhabitants of German South-Tyrol within the Kingdom of Italy (despite the fact that Italy is not bound by the obligations of a minorities treaty) is no longer a "domestic affair" in the sense of article 15, paragraph 8 of the League Covenant, but has come within the realm of international law.

At the time of its annexation South-Tyrol enjoyed a very large degree of self-government, for the old Austrian Empire, though not a federal state, had a system of decentralization. South-Tyrol had a special Diet, with not only administrative but also legislative competence. After the annexation the Germans of South-Tyrol asked for autonomy in accord with the words of Signor Luzzati, *rapporteur* in the Italian Parliament.[3] Opposite action was taken. By the Royal Decree of January 21, 1923,[4] German South-Tyrol was united with Italian South-Tyrol into one administrative unit, thereby losing its separate legal *locus standi* and the possibility of national self-determination.

The same thing happened with the self-government of the parishes. The Royal Decree of April 16, 1925, made the secretaries of the parishes officials of the government, nominated by the prefect and removable by him. Germans can be nominated secretaries of parishes only if they fulfill (apart from the other conditions required) the condition of having studied at an Italian college or having satisfactorily served in a public office, with Italian as the official language, for at least three years. The same decree gives the prefect the right to unite different parishes, whether they wish it or not. Another Royal Decree orders that official burgomasters shall be nominated for all parishes. Before, the burgomasters were freely elected by the citizens.

The Decree of the Prefect of Trento, No. 1796, of October 28, 1923, fixed Italian as the official language of all public services, including organizations for the promotion of foreign trade, savings banks, chambers of commerce, sick funds, etc., as well as of all works under the control of the State or the province or the parishes, such as tramways, waterworks, gas and electric works, etc. Laws and decrees are published exclusively in Italian, though there are hundreds of parishes where no one knows Italian. The former officials, most of whom knew both German and Italian, were nearly all dismissed and replaced by officials from the South of Italy who do not know a word of German. Another step towards the denationalization of the country was taken in the Royal Decree of October 15, 1925, which stipulates that Italian is to be the only language used in pleading before the courts of law. The counsel of the defendant is forbidden to address questions in German to his client, even when he is unacquainted with the Italian tongue. Only citizens who know Italian can be jurymen.

The Decree of the Prefect of Trento of October 28, 1923, No. 14718, orders that in the province of Trento[5] inscriptions, signs, placards, titles, catalogues,

[3] "It must be an honorable duty for the Government and Parliament to grant autonomy to those Germans, who were annexed only owing to the absolute necessity for defending our frontiers. . . . They must feel themselves completely free and unmolested in the observance of their cultural and religious needs in administrative and economic life. . . . "

[4] See "*Gazetta Ufficiale*," for text of Royal Decrees cited in this article.

[5] Not in the old Kingdom of Italy; this is therefore an exceptional law for the annexed province only.

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time-tables and all inscriptions and descriptions in general addressed to or destined for the public, or accessible to the public, even if referring to private matters, must be drawn up solely in the official tongue of the State. This applies even to picture postcards, which, like maps, guide-books, time-tables and names of all places in general, must bear exclusively the official Italian designation. By the Decree of the Prefect of Trento of August 9, 1923, No. 12637, only the official title "Alto-Adige" ("Oberetsch" in the German translation) is



allowed and the people who have been Tyrolese for more than one thousand years are forced, under penal sanctions, to call themselves henceforth "Atesino," "Etschlander."

A special commission was created in Rome by Royal Decree, March 28, 1923, with the duty of translating the old names of towns and villages in German South-Tyrol into Italian. This Commission freely invented Italian names for places, the German names of which have existed for centuries. No one under-

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stands these new names, — neither the native population of the country nor foreign tourists, especially as even to use the old German names in parenthesis is prohibited.

A campaign of decrees, administrative acts, censorship and acts of violence (such as the destruction of printing-presses) was directed against the German press in German South-Tyrol. In 1925 all four German provincial newspapers of German South-Tyrol were forced to close down, so that today no native German newspaper is edited there. Instead of them the Government has founded at Meran a Fascist newspaper, written in the German language, the editor of which is the former chief of the press department at the Foreign Office at Rome.

The proclamation issued to the population of German South-Tyrol by the first Italian Military Governor, on November 18, 1918, promised: "The idea of the suppression of other races or tongues is far from Italy. . . . The German-speaking parishes will be allowed German elementary schools, and all private and confessional schools already in being will be allowed freedom to retain the German language as the language of instruction."

Italy partially kept these promises in the first years after the annexation. The first school law, the "Lex Corbino,"[6] provided for German schools, with instruction in German, for the children of families of German origin, and schools with instruction in Italian for the children of families of Italian origin. Nevertheless this law meant a loss for the German schools, for the Italian authorities themselves decided whether a family was originally German or Italian.

But with the inauguration of the Fascist Government the systematic Italianization of the German schools began. Article 31 of the Royal Decree of October 1, 1923, reads as follows: "Beginning with the scholastic year 1923–24, all instruction in the first classes even of the non-Italian schools will be carried on in the Italian language only. In the scholastic year 1924–25, also, the second classes will be taught in Italian only. In the same way the successive classes 3, 4 and 5 will be taught entirely in the Italian tongue, so that within five years the language of instruction throughout the elementary schools will be Italian." In this way more than 500 classes of German elementary schools (that is to say, nearly all of them) were closed by the end of 1925.

German could thenceforward be taught only in supplementary lessons. Moreover, this teaching was impeded in many ways, especially by the Decree of the Education Board of Trento, May, 1924, which prohibited German spelling-books and the use of Gothic letters. Then, by the Decree of the Education Board of Trento of January 18, 1926, No. 626 a/3, these supplementary lessons of German were entirely abolished, so that it is no longer allowed to speak a single word of German in the schools.

This situation is still more aggravated by the prohibition even of private instruction in German. In spite of the fact that there are no laws in Italy restricting private instruction, the Prefect of Trento, in an urgent and secret decree of November 27, 1925, gives the Under-Prefects of German South-Tyrol the following orders in this connection: "It is absolutely necessary to crush with the utmost determination all efforts of this kind . . . . I request you therefore to employ every possible means for detecting the instigators and

[6] Royal Decree of Aug. 28, 1921, No. 1627.

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helpers of this organization . . . . Should you succeed in detecting any such private schools, close them down immediately; all their means of instruction are to be confiscated and the responsible persons are to be denounced to the tribunals. With regard to the persons acting as teachers in such private schools, they are, when foreigners, to be expelled from the Kingdom. When Italian subjects, they are to be forcibly removed to their native parishes. The trespassers, moreover, are to be officially reprimanded and kept under police supervision. For this purpose you will secure also the assistance of the Volunteer Militia which, on request, will be put at your disposal."

Is it not more than paradoxical that in German South-Tyrol instruction in French, English and any other language is allowed, even to German children, that the teaching of German is allowed to Italian children, but that the teaching of German to German children constitutes a crime?

The liberal legislation of the old Kingdom of Italy concerning the rights of free association and the holding of public meetings is not extended to German South-Tyrol. Discussions on German poetry and philosophy are proscribed. Catholic juvenile organizations and clubs for the culture of the German language are forbidden. The Decree of the Prefect of Trento of September 3, 1923, orders the dissolution of all Alpine tourist clubs, unions or sections, in so far as they are not sections of the Club Alpino Italiano. At the same time the property, both personal and real, used by or in possession of the above-named organizations, was transferred to the Club Alpino Italiano.

The Decree of May, 1924, No. 1122, involves extraordinary restrictions on landed property in the German and Slav frontier districts (but not in the French and Swiss frontier districts). The real object, of course, is not so much military defense as the control of sales of land in these territories. Article 1 prohibits building operations of whatever description, without the previous consent of the military authorities. Article 7 orders that every full or partial sale of real property, as also the transfer of rights of usufruct, residence or hereditary tenure, and in general all transactions involving a change of proprietorship or leasehold or tenancy of real property, are to be submitted to the approval of the prefect.

In many minor ways the Fascist Government seeks to destroy the ancient traditions of the South-Tyrolese people. The school books have been "cleansed" of everything reminding one of German customs, traditions and history. The singing of German "Lieder" is considered dangerous to the Kingdom of Italy. The Decree of the Prefect of Trento of December 26, 1922, No. 24515, requests the directors of all schools to remove all pictures of local heroes such as Andreas Hofer, Haspinger and Speckbacher from the premises.

As is well known, Italian laws have been created for the purpose of silencing the anti-Fascist Italian opposition in domestic politics. As applied to German South-Tyrol, these laws constitute another means for outlawing the Germans there. Take for example the Royal Decree of January 31, 1926, No. 168, which orders the cancellation of the Italian citizenship of persons who take any action abroad calculated to endanger public order in the Kingdom, prejudice Italian interests, or diminish in any way the good name and prestige of Italy, even though such action does not involve a crime. In graver cases private properties can be confiscated in addition to the cancellation of citizenship.

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The application of this law to the Germans of South-Tyrol makes it nearly impossible for them to inform public opinion abroad of their real situation, as they risk losing their citizenship and property.

A second decree is aimed directly at the Germans of German South-Tyrol. It is the Royal Decree of January 10, 1926, No. 16, dealing with the cancellation of rights granted to foreigners who opted for citizenship. This Decree states briefly that "the citizenship acquired by option on the basis of the stipulation of the Peace Treaties can at any time be repealed when the person concerned proves by his political attitude that he is unworthy of Italian citizenship." This constitutes a violation of the Peace Treaties, and renders the persons in question "heimatlos" (stateless).

With these acts the denationalization of the German people of German South-Tyrol might have been considered complete. But a new climax has been reached by the promulgation of the Royal Decree of January 10, 1926, No. 17, concerning the "repristination" of the Italian form of family names in the province of Trento. Family names "derived from the Italian or Latin and translated into other languages or altered by suffixes or foreign spelling," and "all titles of nobility translated or transformed" must be restored to the Italian form. This process will be carried out arbitrarily through the Prefect by means of a decree published in the *Gazetta Ufficiale*, and whoever thereafter adheres to the old form of his family name or title of nobility will be liable to a fine of from 300 to 5,000 lire. This so-called "repristination" of the family names is determined by the Prefect of Trento. Families which have for centuries borne honored German names will learn by reading a decree in the *Gazetta Ufficiale* what their names are to be in future.

After having lost their provincial and parish autonomy and the use of their language in all public services, after the barring of German teaching either in schools or in private lessons, after the prohibition of the use of the words "Tyrol" and "South-Tyrol," after the Italianization of all geographical names, the Germans of German South-Tyrol are now deprived of their last German heirloom, their family names.

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RUSSIAN MANGANESE CONCESSIONS

By Josiah Edward Spurr

TAKING the world as a whole, there appears to be enough manganese to supply all users in all countries for an indefinite period. International struggles to secure certain sources of supply are therefore apt to be short-lived, and are not likely to result in the permanent tenseness which often arises in the competition for possession of more highly localized and exhaustible mineral supplies. It is true that the United States is definitely deficient in manganese, which, as explained in a previous article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS,[1] is essential to the production of steel; yet so are the other great steel-producing countries, like Germany, France and England. Nature has placed the greatest supplies of manganese in Southern Russia, Brazil, India and the Gold Coast of Africa (the newest large producer), all of them remote from great steel industries. With open sea-lanes, there is sure to be keen selling competition among the different producing regions.

In 1925 the principal concession to mine manganese in the Caucasus region, east of the Black Sea, was granted by the Soviets to a syndicate dominated by American capital — the so-called Harriman syndicate. This concession centers about the Georgian town of Chiaturi, which is connected by rail (part narrow gauge, part broad) with Poti, a port on the Black Sea about a hundred miles distant. The Harriman concession for working a large part of this area seemed to have considerable international significance, and much discussion ensued. Before the war the field in question had been dominated by the German Krupp interests; and German diplomacy was exerted to the full to prevent the concession passing to the American group. Likewise opposed were the other European steel-making countries, including France and Italy. Italy was particularly stirred, because her plans for industrial expansion, conceived before the Mussolini régime and maintained during it, involve steel plants to use the abundant hydro-electric power which her mountain streams are to provide.



It does not appear that American steel interests took any widespread or concerted part in developing the plans which led up to the Harriman concessions. Indeed, the greatest factor in steel production in America — the United

[1] "Steel-Making Minerals," by J. E. Spurr, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1926. In the present article, the author has had the advantage of the advice and collaboration of J. W. Furness, of the Bureau of Mines, Department of Commerce, Washington.

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States Steel Corporation — abstained from the enterprise, inasmuch as its position is adequately assured by the control of Brazilian and Indian deposits. The principal American participants were the Bethlehem Steel Co. and the banking house of W. A. Harriman and Co. The results of the endeavors put forward by various continental interests was seen in the final allotment of interest in the corporation, named the Georgian Manganese Co. Ltd. The American interests held only 51 percent of the stock, German interests 25 percent and British interests 15 percent, the rest being variously allocated.

In granting the concession to this organization, the Soviet Government exacted terms highly favorable to itself, including a flat rate of $4 per ton on mined ore, and a very high minimum tonnage requirement. The richest part of the deposit — Perevissi Hill — was excluded from the contract, it apparently being reserved for the future use of Soviet Russia. This, incidentally, is an interesting example of active mineral conservation, a subject much discussed in other countries. It is likely that the terms agreed to by the concessionaires were too high, given the keen competition from other great manganese producing centers. Indeed, the Georgian Manganese Company has barely succeeded in reaching the minimum production and thus holding the concession. It is now asking the Supreme Concession Committee of the Soviets for a modification of some of the stipulations of the contract.

There are rumors today that the United States Steel Corporation, which has been drawing its manganese supplies largely from Brazil, has arranged to get its 1927 supply from the Caucasus, but this move is probably simply part of a natural policy of buying at the cheapest rates in the open market. Brazil, whence the Steel Corporation has been drawing largely, in recent years has raised its export duty on manganese, following the time-honored principle of testing to see how much the traffic will bear. It would appear that the traffic will not bear the last raise, in view of the plentitude of manganese in the world. Other countries which impose heavy export taxes on their natural production may take the lesson to heart; the commercial world is nowadays very keen in discovering competitive sources of supply.

The German desire for a German-controlled supply, balked as far as concerns the Caucasus, has been met by another Soviet concession, granted at Nikopol, in Southern Ukraine, to the Southern Mining Trust, composed of the Rawack & Grunfeld Group. Transportation from Nikopol to Germany must be by rail — the sole instance of large-scale importation of manganese into a great steel-producing country except by sea. Germany has also during the past year purchased part of the Harriman output. Should the Harriman concession be forfeited, European capital would doubtless be glad to get it, but they would probably demand more favorable terms.

On the Russian side, the Soviets may have hoped that the concession would help pave the way toward the desired recognition by the United States. It has not had this effect. But, since foreign capital must come, they doubtless are glad to have American participation on another score, namely in order to have as much diversification as possible; they may then play one interest and one nation against the other, in the time-honored fashion for countries similarly situated.

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NATIONAL RIGHTS IN THE ANTARCTIC

By David Hunter Miller

THE recent Imperial Conference gave some consideration — at the instance primarily of Australia — to the question of British policy in the Antarctic. Political rights in the Antarctic are much less complicated and much less important than those involved in the Arctic, with which the writer dealt in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for October, 1925. At London vast areas were mentioned "to which a British title already exists by virtue of discovery," namely: the outlying part of Coats Land (viz., the portion not comprised within the Falkland Islands Dependencies), Enderby Land, Kemp Land, Queen Mary Land, Wilkes Land, King George V Land, and Oates Land. These are in addition to earlier British claims to the Falkland Islands Dependency (20° West to 80° West. Letters Patent of July 21, 1908, and March 28, 1917), and to the Ross Dependency of New Zealand (160° East to 150° West. Order in Council of July 30, 1923).

It may be assumed that each "Land," while not capable of precise delimitation and perhaps referring primarily to the coast, is intended to include the segment to the south as far as the Pole, the hinterland or "hinter-ice," so to speak. Taken all together, with the Ross Dependency and the Falkland Islands Dependency, they would include nearly all of the Antarctic Continent.

The seeming exception is the region known as Adélie Land in the neighborhood of 140° East, 66° South, which the French claim by reason of the discoveries of D'Urville in 1840. No precise statement of the limits of this region has been made. Publication of the claim was made in the *Journal Officiel* of March 29, 1924; but it seems to have been notified to the British and perhaps to other Governments as early as 1912, when the region was spoken of as "that portion of Wilkes Land known as Adélie Land." Terminology here may cause some confusion; in the report of the United States Geographic Board, Wilkes Land is described as the region between 155° East and 96° East; the British list above speaks of Wilkes Land as the area *west* of Adélie Land; while the French decree of 1924 says "Adélie or Wilkes Land."

Later French decrees (November 21 and December 30, 1924) indicate increasing interest of the French Government in the whale and other fisheries. Kerguelen Land or Desolation Island and the Crozet Archipelago, as well as Saint Paul and Amsterdam Islands, lonely and remote points in that vast stretch of ocean between South Africa and Australia, are placed under the Fisheries Regulations with special provisions made for conservation of animal life; and all of them, with Adélie Land, are attached to the Government of Madagascar. The phraseology of the British White Paper indicates that the French claim to Adélie Land is not contested by London, although it seems that Australian sentiment would be quite reluctant to admit it. However, as yet there has been no express international recognition of the French and British claims.

No other claim to sovereignty in the Antarctic has been made public, though there are various other countries that might conceivably rest on the exploration

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of their nationals. However, any German rights were renounced in the general language of Article 118 of the Treaty of Versailles; and there are similar clauses in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary.

Our Department of State has never acquiesced in various suggestions made that this country should claim sovereignty over Wilkes Land because of the



discoveries of the Wilkes Expedition (1840), which was official in the strict sense, having been authorized by Act of Congress of May 18, 1836. As recently as 1924 Secretary of State Hughes wrote to an inquiring citizen as follows: "It is the opinion of the Department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization even when coupled with a formal taking of possession, does not

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support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country. In the absence of an act of Congress assertative in a domestic sense of dominion over Wilkes Land this Department would be reluctant to declare that the United States possessed a right of sovereignty over that territory."

Knowledge of this Polar Continent and its surroundings is as yet very incomplete. Commander Byrd has expressed the opinion that exploration by the air, while difficult, would not be impossible; but such voyages as those of the "Discovery," which sailed in September, 1925, on a three years' expedition under the auspices of the Government of the Falkland Islands, are more likely to be of scientific value.

The Antarctic region is of present importance only in connection with sea life; there is no question of future air transit, as in the Arctic; any form of mineral wealth is no more than a remote possibility of the unknown; nor can we today visualize any settlement or occupation, in the ordinary sense, of any part of the Antarctic Continent. National territorial jurisdiction, if exercised, could seemingly touch only those visitors engaged in whaling or sealing or in exploration.

Such diplomatic discussion of the Antarctic as may have taken place is unpublished and doubtless not important; perhaps because of the fact that there has been no attempt at a rigid administration of any system of control of the fisheries. However, if certain marine species are not to become extinct, international discussion and agreement, which will include the Antarctic region generally, are a necessity. Various valuable forms of sea life are in question; but in particular, because of whaling in the Southern waters, a highly profitable and very active industry, the whale seems destined to extinction within a brief period. The very learned and interesting report made to the League of Nations Committee of Experts by M. Suarez in December, 1925, on exploitation of the products of the sea, tentatively estimates the remaining number of whales at not over 12,000, with at least 1,500 killed in Antarctic area every year.

In no part of the globe are claims to sovereignty over land areas of as little apparent consequence as in the Antarctic; but the waters of the Antarctic, which seem to be a natural refuge for the whale and other habitants of the sea, are now the scene of a ruthless and reckless slaughter of those creatures of the deep whose protection from extermination is a matter of interest to mankind generally. From this point of view alone the Antarctic is a part of the problem of international coöperation.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

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A usable but rather conventional handbook.

CONSULAR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. By Irwin Stewart. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926, 216 pp. $4.00.
A thoroughly scholarly treatment of an important subject.

L'EXTRATERRITORIALITÉ. By Baron Alphonse de Heyking. Paris: Rousseau, 1926, 220 pp. Fr. 25.
A careful monograph by the former Russian Consul-General in London.

FREIE STRÖME. By Richard Hennig. Leipzig: Gloeckner, 1926, 104 pp. M. 5.
A splendid and much-needed study of the history and present law of international rivers.

LA GUERRE ET LA PATRIE. By Armand Charpentier. Paris: Delpeuch, 1926, 340 pp. Fr. 20.
A serious and well-documented examination of the theories and practice of war and of the nature of patriotism.

CAUSES OF WAR AND THE NEW REVOLUTION. By Tell A. Turner. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1927, 228 pp. $2.00.
A rather naïve and not very reliable account of the origins of past wars.

THE CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE. By G. T. Wrench. London: Heinemann, 1926, 478 pp. 21/.
A theoretical approach, stressing the importance of the "racial impulse."

DER IMPERIALISMUS. By Fritz Sternberg. Berlin: Malik, 1926, 614 pp. M. 13.
Useful for reference.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AT THE BAR AND THE FEDERATION OF MAN. By H. J. Paintin. Blockley: Paintin and Simpson, 1926, 340 pp. 2/6.
A violent indictment of the League, with proposals for a new type of organization.

THE WORLD COURT MYTH. By James V. Giblin and Arthur L. Brown. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1926, 457 pp. $3.00.
An examination of some of the problems connected with the Court.

HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. By George N. Barnes. London: Williams and Norgate, 1926, 106 pp. 3/6.
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FÜNF JAHRE INTERNATIONALE ARBEITERHILFE. By Willi Münzenberg. Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1926, 184 pp. M. 3.50.
An introductory review of the work of the International Labor Office.

WORLD WAR DEBT SETTLEMENTS. By Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky. New York: Macmillan, 1926, 460 pp. $2.00.
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FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES. By James Q. Dealey. Boston: Ginn, 1926, 402 pp. $2.80.
The author stresses the fundamental and broader aspects.

OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT. By Felix Morley. Garden City: Doubleday Page, 1926, 199 pp. $2.00.
An open-minded and instructive survey of the situation in the Philippines, China and Japan.

A HISTORY OF HAWAII. By Ralph S. Kuykendall. New York: Macmillan, 1926, 385 pp. $2.00.
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A POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF EUROPE: PARLIAMENTS, PARTIES AND PRESS. Edited by Malcolm W. Davis. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1927, 103 pp. $1.00.
The first convenient brief reference book on the political organization of the European states today.

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POLITIQUE ET FONCTIONNEMENT DES TRANSPORTS PAR CHEMINS DE FER PENDANT LA GUERRE. By Marcel Peschaud. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926, 290 pp.
An exhaustive history of the French railways, in the Carnegie series.

CE QU'IL FAUT CONNAÎTRES DES CRISES FINANCIÈRES DE NOTRE HISTOIRE. By Marcel Marion. Paris: Boivin, 1926, 160 pp. Fr. 7.
One of the best brief popular accounts of French financial history, by a French professor.

LE FRANC FRANÇAIS DEPUIS 1914. By Gregoire Feldmann. Paris: Figuière, 1926, 160 pp. Fr. 25.
A thorough study fully equipped with tables and charts.

LÉOPOLD II. By Comte Louis de Lichtervelde. Paris: Plon, 1927, 430 pp. Fr. 20.
The best biography of the Belgian king, based in part on unpublished material.

LA BELGIQUE RESTAURÉE. Edited by Ernest Mahaim. Brussels: Lamertin, 1926, 687 pp.
A stupendous sociological study reviewing the present state of Belgium.

ESPAÑA EN LA POLITICA INTERNACIONAL. By Un Español Neutral. Madrid: Talleres, 1926, 248 pp. Pes. 5.
The best general review of the international position of Spain, with an introduction by Don Gabriel Maura.

LOS SEMBRADORES DEL BIEN: ESPAÑA CON EL DIRECTORIO. By Luis de Biskaya. Madrid: Marzo, 1926, 203 pp. Pes. 4.
A defense of the Directory, with a survey of the legislative work of the new régime.

LA QUIEBRA DE NUESTRO SISTEMA POLÍTICO Y LA GESTACIÓN DE UN RÉGIMEN NUEVO. By Jerónimo García Gallego. Madrid: Talleres, 1926, 415 pp. Pes. 7.
Volume one of a pretentious review of Spanish affairs in the recent period.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE DAY AND SOME ASPECTS OF FASCISM. By Tommaso Tittoni. London: Simpkin, 1926, 302 pp. 10/6.
A collection of the essays and addresses of the well-known Italian statesman.

FASCISM. By Giuseppe Prezzolini. London: Methuen, 1926, 217 pp. 7/6.
One of the clearest and most moderate statements of the problems of Italian politics.

HISTOIRE DE MUSSOLINI. By Louis Roya. Paris: Kra, 1926, 210 pp. Fr. 13.50
Chiefly sensational revelations.

BENITO MUSSOLINI. By Giorgio Pini. Bologna: Cappelli, 1926, 124 pp. L. 5.
A popular glorification of no great value.

OMBRE E LUCI DI DUE CONTINENTI: DUE ANNI DI POLITICA COLONIALE E MEDITERRANEA. By Massuero F. Nobili. Milan: Alpes, 1926, 514 pp. L. 22.
A detailed study of colonial enterprise during the years 1923 and 1924.

ITALY'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION. By Constantine E. McGuire. New York: Macmillan, 1926, 606 pp. $3.00.
A first-rate study published by the Institute of Economics.

THE PAPACY AND THE KINGDOM OF ITALY. By Humphrey Johnson. London: Sheed and Ward, 1926, 124 pp. 3/6.
A lucid and moderate examination of possible solutions, written by a Catholic.

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THE CASE OF GERMAN SOUTH TYROL AGAINST ITALY. By C. H. Herford. London: Allen and Unwin, 1927, 96 pp. 3/6.

A collection of material aiming to set forth the evils of the Italian administration.

DIE SÜTIROLER FRAGE. By Paul Herre. Munich: Beck, 1927, 430 pp. M. 12.

A well-known German historian examines the history and development of the problem.

HISTOIRE DE LA SUISSE. By William Martin. Paris: Payot, 1926, 320 pp. Fr. 20.

A much-needed brief history of Switzerland.

DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA, 1890–1914. By Friedrich Stieve. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1926, 247 pp. M. 4.

A good brief account of German policy, based largely on the documents published by the German Government.

GRUNDZÜGE DER AUSSENPOLITIK SEIT 1871. By Wolfgang Windelband. Berlin: Zentralverlag, 1926, 104 pp. M. 2.50.

A series of lectures giving a broad outline of international relations during the period.

MY EARLY LIFE. By William II. Volume I. London: Methuen, 1926, 362 pp. 30/.

The first part of the former Emperor's reminiscenses, covering the period to his accession to the throne.

POLITISCHE DOKUMENTE II. By Alfred von Tirpitz. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1926, 676 pp. M. 14.

A very important collection of documents throwing much light on the war.

DENKWÜRDIGKEITEN AUS MEINEM LEBEN. By Friedrich von Bernhardi. Berlin: Mittler, 1927, 541 pp. M. 15.

The notorious German general gives a valuable picture of the old army and the old system.

VORKRIEGS UND KRIEGSSÜNDEN. By Gerhard Gieren. Leipzig: Thalacker and Schwarz, 1926, 310 pp. M. 7.50.

A popular but suggestive account of the old military system, the politico-military conflicts and the chief operations of the war.

STAAT, RECHT, UND FREIHEIT. By Hugo Preuss. Tübingen: Mohr, 1926, 588 pp. M. 21.50.

A reprint of some of the more important articles on politics and constitutional law by one of the chief authors of the Weimar constitution.

SCHRIFTEN, AUFZEICHNUNGEN, REDEN. By Friedrich Ebert. Dresden: Reissner, 1926, 384, 357 pp. M. 11.

An excellent edition of the speeches and writings of the late president, with some interesting recollections.

REDEN UND SCHRIFTEN. By Gustav Stresemann. Dresden: Reissner, 1926, 388, 413 pp. M. 13.

The addresses and writings of the German foreign minister covering 1897 to 1926.

DER POLITISCHE NIEDERGANG DEUTSCHLANDS IN SEINEN TIEFEREN URSACHEN. By Georg Steinhausen. Osterwieck: Zickfeldt, 1927, 206 pp. M. 6.

A detached examination of the fundamental structure of the old régime.

DIE GROSSEN BEWEGUNGEN DES NEUEN DEUTSCHLAND. Würzen: Unikum, 1926, 64 pp. M. 4.80.

The programs of the leading parties by the party leaders.

DAS GRENZ UND AUSLANDDEUTSCHTUM. By Otto Boelitz. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1926, 196 pp. M. 6.

A useful history and descriptive account of the Germans outside the Reich.

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HISTOIRE DE L'EUROPE CENTRALE. By J. Aulneau. Paris: Payot, 1926, 656 pp. Fr. 45.

An attempt to present the history of central Europe as a whole. A useful textbook.

DAS OESTERREICHISCHE STAATS UND REICHSPROBLEM. By Josef Redlich. Volume II. Leipzig: Neu Geist, 1926, 846 pp. M. 38.

The second volume of the great and authoritative work on the constitutional history of the Dual Monarchy.

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN AUSTRIA. By C. A. Macartney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926, 298 pp. 8/6.

A pioneer attempt to set forth some of the far-reaching non-political changes of the past decade.

EFFETS DE LA DISSOLUTION DE L'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE SUR LA NATIONALITÉ DE SES RESSORTISSANTS. By Ivan V. Soubbotitch. Paris: Bloch, 1926, 316 pp. Fr. 50.

An important technical study by one of the staff of the Jugoslav foreign office.

LA RESTAURATION MONÉTAIRE ET FINANCIÈRE DE L'AUTRICHE. By G. H. Bousquet. Paris: Rivière, 1926, 158 pp. Fr. 8.

A substantial and reliable account by the former secretary of control.

HUNGARY NEW AND OLD. By Countess Elisabeth Czekonács. Budapest: Csáthy, 1926, 194 pp. M. 5.

A general descriptive work.

LA HONGRIE: OLIGARCHIE, NATION, PEUPLE. By J. Diner-Denès. Paris: Rivière, 1926, 178 pp. Fr. 9.

An interesting exposition of present conditions, by a former secretary of state.

FÜR UND WIDER DIE DONAUFÖDERATION. By Johannes C. Barolin. and Kurt Schechner. Vienna: Braumüller, 1926, 150 pp. M. 3.60.

Two very suggestive essays, especially the second which urges German divergence from the Rhine to the East.

DER DEUTSCH-OESTERREICHISCHE MENSCH UND DER ANSCHLUSS. By Friedrich F. G. Kleinwächter. Vienna: Eckart Verlag, 1926, 240 pp. M. 9.

Setting forth the cultural, economic and political advantages of the *Anschluss*.

AMERICA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE. By Charles Pergler. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1926, 113 pp. $1.75.

A summary of American policy toward the Czech question during the war.

DER NEUE OSTEN. By Elias Hurwicz. Berlin: Mittler, 1927, 201 pp. M. 6.

An examination of the origins of the new states of eastern Europe along broad lines.

DIE POLNISCHE FRAGE ALS PROBLEM DER EUROPÄISCHEN POLITIK. By Walther Recke. Berlin: Stilke, 1927, 399 pp. M. 10.

One of the best surveys of the Polish question in its larger European setting.

POLAND'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Francis Bujak. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926, 67 pp. 3/.

A reliable sketch of Polish economic history by a Polish professor.

SOUS LE CIEL PÂLE DE LITHUANIE. By Jean Mauclère. Paris: Plon, 1926, 212 pp.

An interesting travel book.

DER DRANG NACH OSTEN. By Lieutenant-Colonel Du Parquet. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1926, 346 pp. Fr. 18.

A useful history of German policy in Latvia.

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The first scientific treatment of Estonia from the physical, ethnical and economic standpoints.

MARX, LENIN AND THE SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION. By Max Eastman. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926, 263 pp. 7/6.
A suggestive criticism of Marxian teaching and Lenin's tactics.

GESCHICHTE DER RUSSISCHEN SOZIALDEMOKRATIE. By Julius Martov. Berlin: Dietz, 1926, 340 pp. M. 8.50.
The German translation of the standard Russian work on the subject.

LA GEOGRAFIA POLITICA DELLA RUSSIA SOVIETISTA. By Aurelio Palmieri. Rome: Garroni, 1926, 163 pp. L. 10.
A good handbook, by an outstanding Italian authority.

UTOPIA IN CHAINS. By Morris Gordin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927, 287 pp. $2.50.
The Russian experiences of another disillusioned Communist.

LE ROYAUME SERBE-CROATE-SLOVÈNE. By Albert Mousset. Paris: Bossard, 1926, 270 pp. Fr. 24.
The first volume of a good general work on the new Jugoslav state.

AUS DER WELT SÜDSLAWEN. By Hermann Wendel. Berlin: Dietz, 1926, 282 pp. M. 8.
Political, historical and sociological studies, by a careful and fair German authority.

SOUTHERN ALBANIA IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, 1912–1923. By Edith P. Stickney. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1926, 195 pp. $2.50.
A painstaking scholarly treatment.

MY FIFTY YEARS. By Prince Nicholas of Greece. London: Hutchinson, 1926, 328 pp. 21/.
A moderate book, and a useful antidote to Venezelism.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, 1898–1914. Volume XI. The Outbreak of the War. Edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. London: H. M. S. O., 1926, 389 pp. 10/6.
The definitive British publication, indispensable for the study of war origins.

LE RETOUR À L'ÉTALON-OR. By Georges Lacout. Paris: Payot, 1926, 256 pp. Fr. 20.
An excellent account of English monetary history from 1914 to 1926, by a member of the economic staff of the Bank of France.

THE THIRD BRITISH EMPIRE. By Alfred Zimmern. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926, 148 pp. $2.00.
Three lectures by a well-known English writer, who examines the bases of the Empire and looks at the future optimistically.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EMPIRE. By L. Haden Guest. London: Labour Publishing Company, 1926, 95 pp. 2/6.
A leading Laborite discusses various imperial problems and defends his party's attitude towards them.

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RICHARD COBDEN AND FOREIGN POLICY. By William H. Dawson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926, 349 pp. 12/6.
An outstanding book.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE. By Stephen King-Hall. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926, 204 pp. 9/.
A knotty problem attacked from the standpoint of the taxpayer.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE 1588–1914. By Colonel J. F. C. Fuller. London: Sifton Praed, 1926, 110 pp. 3/6.
A useful brief survey of the facts, presented by an advocate of the balance of power.

MICHAEL COLLINS AND THE MAKING OF NEW IRELAND. By Piares Béaslaí. London: Harrap, 1926, 458, 484 pp. 42/.
The first serious study of the life of the Irish leader.

THE NEW CANADA. By Joseph E. Rey. London: Hutchinson, 1926, 156 pp. 4/6.
A competent, short and closely packed descriptive account.

AUSTRALIA WHITE OR YELLOW? By Fleetwood Chidell. London: Heinemann, 1926, 255 pp. 8/6.
A detailed investigation of the arguments for and against exclusion.

INDIA BOND OR FREE? By Annie Besant. New York: Putnam's, 1926, 216 pp. 7/6.
A mystical approach to a world problem.

INDIA AND THE EARTHLY PARADISE. By E. Sylvia Pankhurst. Bombay: Sunshine Publishing Company, 1926, 638 pp. Rs. 6. 8.
A wild communistic attack upon the existing régime.

THE SOUTH AFRICANS. By Sarah G. Millin. London: Constable, 1926, 280 pp. 7/6.
A vivid, keen and sympathetic treatment, by a South African.

SOUTH AFRICA FROM WITHIN. By Manfred Nathan. London: Murray, 1926, 324 pp. 12/.
The situation seen from an outspokenly anti-English viewpoint.

The Near East

THE CHANGING EAST. By J. A. Spender. London: Cassell, 1926, 256 pp. 10/6.
A well-balanced and competent survey dealing chiefly with India and Egypt.

THE MIDDLE EAST. By Major E. W. Polson Newman. London: Bles, 1926, 316 pp. 25/.
A dispassionate record of observations, especially in Palestine and Syria.

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA. By Major R. Evans. London: Sifton Praed, 1926, 143 pp. 7/6.
A very readable account by one of the participants.

LE CALIFAT. By A. Sanhoury. Paris: Geuthner, 1926, 627 pp. Fr. 75.
One of the best books on the Califate, dealing with its doctrine and history and attempting a forecast of the future.

PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDANIA. By Ludwig Preiss and Paul Rohrbach. London: Sheldon Press, 1926, 30/.
One of the most substantial and competent books on the subject.

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IN UNKNOWN ARABIA. By R. E. Cheesman. New York: Macmillan, 1926, 467 pp. $10.00.
One of the great books of travel in Arabia.

THE PEOPLE OF ARARAT. By Joseph Burtt. London: Hogarth, 1926, 184 pp. 3/6.
A brief and very sympathetic account of the vicissitudes of the Armenians.

Africa

LA PAIX FRANÇAISE EN AFRIQUE DU NORD. By T. Steeg. Paris: Alcan, 1926, 288 pp. Fr. 25.
An important contribution to the history of French policy in Algeria and Morocco, by the Resident-General in Morocco.

IN BARBARY. By E. Alexander Powell. New York: Century, 1926, 505 pp. $4.00.
An admirer's story of the French achievement in North Africa.

LA ACTUACIÔN DE ESPAÑA EN MARRUECOS. By Juan de España. Madrid: Ramona Velasco, 1926, 369 pp. Pes. 8.
One of the few extended accounts of the present situation as it affects Spain.

LE PROBLÈME DE TANGER. By Raphael Durand. Paris: Sirey, 1926, 132 pp. Fr. 20.
A timely sketch.

AN AFRICAN ELDORADO. By T. Alexander Barns. London: Methuen, 1926, 245 pp. 15/.
A substantial work on the Belgian Congo, written by an enthusiast.

The Far East

THE VANISHED EMPIRE. By B. L. Putnam Weale. New York: Macmillan, 1926, 388 pp. $5.00.
A well-known writer on the Far East reviews recent events and suggests possible future developments.

PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA. By Harold M. Vinacke. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926, 214 pp. $2.00.
A scholarly study intended as a preliminary to a more detailed treatment.

DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE IN CHINA. By Kinn Wei Shaw. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926, 215 pp. $3.50.
A former professor at Hangchow shows the reaction of fiscal ideas upon the political evolution of the country.

RUSSEN UND CHINESEN IN OSTSIBERIEN. By Wladimir Arsenjew. Berlin: Scherl, 1926, 229 pp. M. 9.50.
Mainly a sociological study of native conditions.

CHINESE CENTRAL ASIA. By C. P. Skrine. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926, 322 pp. $7.50.
An excellent descriptive work on Chinese Turkestan, by the former British Consul-General in Kashgar.

THE NEW KOREA. By Alleyne Ireland. New York: Dutton, 1926, 366 pp. $5.00.
A good review of the work of the Japanese.

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Latin America

NORTEAMERICANIZACIÔN DE CENTRO AMÉRICA. By Vicente Sáenz. San José de Costa Rica: Opinián, 1926, 312 pp.
A protest against peaceful penetration.

EL PROBLEMA IBERO-AMERICANO. By Colonel Garcia Caminero. Cadiz: Renacimento, 1926, 216 pp. Pes. 4.50.
Another plea for the strengthening of the ties between Spain and Latin America.

ALIANZA HISPANO-AMERICANA. By Emilio Zurano Muñoz. Madrid: Pueyo, 1926, 320 pp. Pes. 6.
The author sees the hope of the future in the closest possible connection.

ASPECTS OF MEXICAN CIVILIZATION. By José Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1926, 202 pp. $2.00.
Stimulating and suggestive lectures delivered at the Norman Waitt Harris Institute.

SOME MEXICAN PROBLEMS. By Moises Saenz and Herbert Priestley. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1926, 183 pp. $2.00.
An authoritative discussion of some of the great questions of the present.

BRASILIEN IM 20-TEN JAHRHUNDERT. By Alfred Funke. Berlin: Hobbing, 1926, 435 pp. M. 13.
An excellent work, especially valuable for the account of German colonization.

L'ÉTAT DE SAÔ PAULO ET LE RENOUVELLEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'EUROPE. By A. D'Atri. Paris: Chiron, 1926, 360 pp. Fr. 20.
Really a full account of the economic, political and social situation in Brazil.

Miscellaneous

THE RACIAL BASIS OF CIVILIZATION. By Frank H. Hankins. New York: Knopf, 1926, 394 pp. $3.25.
The Nordic doctrine subjected to critical and scholarly examination.

DER WEG DURCH DAS WIRRSAL. By Eugen Diesel. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1926, 285 pp.
One of the most profound and penetrating studies of our civilization.

PAPST UND CURIE IN IHRER POLITIK NACH DEM WELTKRIEGE. By Friedrich Ritter von Lama. Illertissen: Martinus, 1926.
An extensive and pretentious examination of the position of the Papacy since the war.

THE OIL WAR. By Anton Mohr. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1926, 244 pp. $2.50.
A short history of the oil industry since its beginnings.

DIE WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Sartorius von Waltershausen. Leipzig: Gloeckner, 1926, 416 pp. M. 22.
A thoroughly reliable handbook of world trade, by one of the foremost German authorities.

GESCHICHTE DES WELTHANDELS IN DER NEUZEIT. By Wilhelm Langenbeck. Leipzig: Weber, 1926, 215 pp. M. 5.
A brief text, considering foreign trade not by countries, but as a whole.

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AGRICULTURE

COLLECTION of World Agricultural Legislation (for the year 1925). International Institute of Agriculture. Rome, 1926. 1104 p. 25 cm.

INTERNATIONAL Agricultural Statistics (up to 30th June, 1926). Rome, 1926. 558 p. 25 cm.

MICHELIS, G. de. L'Institut international d'agriculture, son programme et son activité. Rome, Imprimerie de l'Institut international d'agriculture, 1926. 143 p.

LES QUESTIONS agricoles au point de vue international. Matériaux concernant l'agriculture pour servir aux travaux du comité préparatoire de la conférence économique internationale. Rome, Imprimerie de l'Institut international d'agriculture, 1926. 391 p. 31½ cm.

AIR NAVIGATION

INTERNATIONAL Commission for Air Navigation. Official Bulletin No. 10. June, 1926. Official Acts relating to the Air Convention of the 13th October, 1919; Documents relating to the Commission; Review of the tenth session of the International Commission for Air Navigation held at the Japanese Embassy in Paris from the 11th to the 15th May, 1926. Paris, 1926. 97 p. 31½ cm. 25 fr.

ARMAMENT

PREPARATORY Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Report of Sub-Commission A (Military, Naval and Air). 176 p. 33½ cm. (League of Nations. C. 739. M. 278. 1926. IX. 16.)

————. Sub-Commission B. Report No. 1 [Report of the Joint Commission]. 35 p. 33½ cm. (League of Nations. C. 738. M. 277. 1926. IX. 15.) 30 cents.

BRITISH IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1926. Summary of Proceedings. London, 1926. 61 p. 24½ cm. (Brit. Parl. Paps., Cmd. 2768.) 1s.

————. Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings. London, 1927. 446 p. 24½ cm. (Brit. Parl. Paps., Cmd. 2769.) 4s.

CHINA

REPORT of the Advisory Committee together with other Documents respecting the China Indemnity. London, 1926. 197 p. 24½ cm. (China No. 2 (1926). Cmd. 2766.) 3s. 6d.

REPORT of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China. Peking, September 16, 1926. Being the Report to the Governments of the Commission appointed in pursuance to Resolution V of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, together with a brief summary thereof. Washington, 1926. 156 p. 23½ cm. (At head of title: Department of State, Washington.) 20 cents.

REPORT of the Commission on Extra-territoriality in China. London, 1926. 130 p. 24½ cm. (China No. 3 (1926). Cmd. 2774.) 2s. 6d.

Separate documents of the commission:

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————. Draft Chinese civil code. February, 1926. 56 p.

————. General and particular tables showing . . . judicial expenditures, etc. 1925. 31 p.

————. General statement of the present conditions of the Chinese judiciary. 1925. 31 p.

————. Judicial statistics of . . . China. 1925. 2 v.

————. Recueil des sommaires de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême de la République de Chine, en matière civile et commerciale (1912–18). Fas. 2. Chang-Hai, 1925.

————. Regulations . . . relating to cases involving subjects of non-extraterritorial powers. 1925. 64, 25 p.

CLAIMS

SIXTH Annual Report of the Controller of the Clearing Office, the Administrator of German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Property and the Director of the Russian Claims Department. London, 1926. 65 p. 24½ cm. 2s.

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CLAIMS (ALIEN PROPERTY)

AN ACT to provide for the Settlement of certain Claims of American Nationals against Germany and of German Nationals against the United States, for the ultimate Return of all Property of German Nationals held by the Alien Property Custodian, and for the equitable Apportionment among all Claimants of certain available Funds. H. R. 15009, 69th Cong., 2nd sess. 38 p. 28 cm.

AMERICAN POLICY relative to Alien Enemy Property by Warren F. Martin and J. Reuben Clark, Jr., Presented by Mr. Reed of Pennsylvania, December 22, 1926. Washington, 1926. 35 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Doc. No. 181, 69th Cong., 2nd sess.)

AMERICAN WAR Claims against Germany. Message from the President of the United States transmitting in response to Senate Resolution No. 198 of April 5 . . . , 1926, a report by the Secretary of State submitting copies of correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Government of Germany respecting American War Claims against Germany. Washington, 1926. 90 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Doc. No. 173, 69th Cong., 2nd sess.)

RETURN of Alien Property. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means sitting in Conjunction with a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 69th Cong., 1st sess., on H. R. 10820, a bill to provide for the payment of the awards of the Mixed Claims Commission, the Payment of certain Claims of German Nationals against the United States, and the Return to German Nationals of property held by the Alien Property Custodian. April 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 14, 1926 (and including data received up to April 22, 1926.) Indexed. Washington, 1926. 561 p. 23½ cm.

————. Supplement to Hearings . . . Washington, 1926. 53 p. 23½ cm. (Return of Alien Property, No. 2.)

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GERMANY. Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Statistisches Reichsamt. Statisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1926. Berlin, 1926. (Various paging.) Charts.

NOTES exchanged between the United Kingdom and Spain respecting the duration of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Spain of October 31, 1922. Madrid, October 22, 1926. London, 1926. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 27 (1926). Cmd. 2753.) 1d.

TREATY of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Greece and accompanying Declaration. Signed at London, July 16, 1926. London, 1927. 44 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 2 (1927). Cmd. 2790.) 9d.

TREATY between the United States and Hungary. Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights. Signed at Washington, June 24, 1925. Washington, 1926. 27 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 748.)

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

EIGHTH (Ordinary) Session (June–August, 1925). Documents relating to Judgment No. 6 (August 25, 1925). Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia. 368 double pages. 25 cm. (Series C, No. 9, I.) $3.60.

EIGHTH (Ordinary) Session (June–August, 1925). Expulsion of the Oecumenical Patriarch (Request eventually withdrawn). 118 double pages. 25 cm. (Series C, No. 9, II.) $1.80.

GERMAN Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits), May 25, 1926. 97 double pages. 24 cm. (Series A, No. 7.) $1.50.

TENTH (Extraordinary) Session (February–May, 1926). Documents relating to Judgment No. 7 (May 25, 1926). Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits). 3 vols., 1324 double pages. (Series C, No. 11, I–III.) $12.60. I, Minutes, speeches, German memo-

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rial; II, Polish counter-case, German reply, Polish rejoinder; III, Other documents, correspondence.

THE PERMANENT Court of International Justice. Question of Accession of the United States of America to the Protocol of December 16, 1920. London, 1926. 27 p. 24½ cm. (Misc. No.11 (1926). Cmd. 2776.) 6d.

ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

INTERNATIONAL Economic Conference, Geneva, May, 1927. Documentation. Natural Movement of Populations during the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century. Geneva, 1926. 7 p. charts. (League of Nations, 1926. II. 61.)

MEMORANDUM on Dumping, by Jacob Viner, Professor of Political Economy at Chicago University. Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the International Economic Conference. Geneva, 1926. 19 p. (League of Nations, 1926. II. 63.)

MEMORANDUM on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1911–1925. Vol. I, Balance of Payments and Review of World Trade. Geneva, 1926. 239 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1926. II. 51.) $1.25.

INTERALLIED DEBTS

RUMANIA. The Report of the Minister of Finance to the Council of Ministers on the Situation of Rumania created by the Reparation and Interallied Debts Policy, September 24, 1925. Bucharest, Minister of Finance, 1925.

HUNGARY

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